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Abstract 
The Dynamics ofRestructuring and Relocation: 
The Case ofHong Kong's garment industry 
The study examines the restructuring strategy of local garment manufacturers in 
Hong Kong and the consequent changes in work organization during the late 1970's to 
1990's. Garment industry has been playing a significant part in the industrialization of 
Hong Kong. Its growth has been undermined by the increasing competitiveness from other 
low-wages newly developed countries in Asia. Meanwhile, the world economy is 
undergoing a process of global restructuring that redefines the capital-labour relationships, 
the role ofstate and furthering the interdependency of economic functions across national 
boundaries. The study aims to investigate how local manufacturers manage to survive in 
the current era. Why is industrial relocation perceived as the "only-option" as their major 
restructuring strategy? By drawing out the diversity oflocaI garment firms，experiences in 
the restructuring process, it is hoped that that we can shed Ught on the features of the 
"Hong Kong way，’ of industrial restructuring. 
This study engages a theoretical dialogue with the Global Commodity Chain 
perspective from Gary Gereffi. The focus is on the discussing the critical role ofoverseas 
buyers in shaping production networks in the buyer-driven commodity chain. When local 
manufacturers are incorporated in the world economy through the OEM or OBM, there 
emerges diverse patterns ofinterfirm linkages between buyers and local manufacturers in 
the commodity chain: close-tie and loose-tie. The former is characterized by its 
"cooperative" nature while the latter is more "instrumental". These two types ofties have 
implications for the restructuring strategy oflocal garment manufacturers. 
i 
The unravelling of these two types of interfirm Unkages helps to fill the gap about 
the content ofthe buyer-driven governance structure which Gereffi neglects in the buyer-
driven GCCs literature. Using the resource dependency perspective, this study shows that 
local manufacturers look for autonomy to avoid control from the buyers. This study shows 
when local manufacturers make the relocation decision, the buyer is not necessarily the 
coercive factor to push the relocation. There emerges different types ofresponses from 
buyers upon the relocation decision. Both contested and disinterested responses are found 
in the relocation process. The buyer-driven thesis holds only when the manufacturers are 
dependent on the buyers or when the buyer becomes a manufacturer as well. Listead, the 
emergence of "mimetic isomorphism" is very dominant among the local manufacturers, 
whether they are in a close-tie or a loose-tie pattem. The sense ofuncertainty becomes a 
powerful force for manufacturers to model their actions after other firms in relocation 
decision. 
� . 
This study also finds that the presence of the institutional arrangement Hke the 
quota system is also conducive to the industrial relocation. Labour-intensive production 
processes have been shifted to the Mainland. Some garment firms however retain the 
production base in the territory and still manage to survive by utilizing the production 
network in the Mainland. 
Meanwhile, it also leads to the re-organization ofwork in Hong Kong's production 
base. Most ofthe labour-intensive process are shifted to China. Hong Kong remains as a 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This study is concerned with the restructuring experiences of garment 
manufacturers in the Hong Kong's garment industry and interfirm linkages between 
domestic manufacturers and overseas buyers in the global commodity chains. I would 
like to take the restructuring experience oflocal garment manufacturers in Hong Kong as 
a case to shed light on the "Hong Kong's way ofindustrial restructuring", and to engage in 
a theoretical dialogue with Gary Gereffi on his theory of global commodity chains 
(GCCs). 
The garment industry plays a significant role in Hong Kong's post-war 
industrialization. It is the largest manufacturing industry in Hong Kong in terms of gross 
output, employment and export.(Hong Kong Industry Department:1996) Hong Kong is 
also one of the world leading apparel sourcing center. However, the industry's growth 
has been undermined by the intense competition from the East Asian NICs and other 
developing countries and increasing protectionism from the core countries in the past 
decades. Meanwhile, the world economy has been undergoing a global restructuring 
process that redefines capital-labor relations, mobility of capital, and the organization of 
production and trading activities, resulting from the industrialization of peripheral and 
semi-peripheral economies in the post-war decades. ^Ienderson:1989, Frobel 1981， 
Dicken:1992, Gereffi:1994) The changing global economy provides opportunities and 
imposes constraints on the development of the Hong Kong's garment industry. And at 
the home front, local garment manufacturers also encounter the problems of rising 
production cost and changes in the labor market. Hong Kong economy is undergoing a 
restructuring process. The tertiary sector graduaUy replaced the manufacturing sector as 
the major economic sector in 1987 and subsequently the share ofgross domestic product 
ofmanufacturing activity fell to less than ten percent ofthe total GDP in 1994. How do 
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local garment manufacturers manage to survive in such a business environment? What 
are their restructuring strategies for maintaining their competitive edge? What are the 
social outcomes of the re-organization of production network and changes in the work 
organization brought about by the restructuring process? These are the questions that I 
would like to examine in this study. 
Let me further explain why I am interested in the above questions. First, until 
recently, the issues of the industrial restructuring in Hong has not attracted much 
academic attention. Recently however, Chiu, Ho, and Lui (1997) have examined the 
industrial restructuring patterns and outcomes in Hong Kong's industries from a 
historical-institutional perspective. One of their major concerns is to examine the 
institutional configuration of the manufacturing sector in several aspects Hke the state-
capitaI relationship, capital-labor relations, and the banking sector, and how these 
institutional factors shape the industrial restructuring patterns and outcomes of local 
manufacturing industries. Without going further into their studies here，(I will address 
these issues in the next chapter), suffice it to say that they remind us that all economic 
actions are historically instituted (also see Polanyi, 1957). The restructuring experience 
ofthe manufacturers cannot be fully explained in terms of technical efficiency or economic 
optimization. In reality, their restructuring strategies illustrate a sociological dimension 
that cannot be abstracted from the institutional setting and the embeddedness ofeconomic 
action. How can we unearth the sociological dimensions of their restructuring strategy? 
Li what ways are their actions structured by the institutional arrangements? In my 
view it is also important to show the active role played by the manufacturers in shaping 
the business environment. 
Second, industrial relocation is the major restructuring strategy of local garment 
manufacturers. Various studies show that many local manufacturers have moved their 
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production to South China OHong Kong Industry Department and KSA Reports, 
various years). It seems that garment manufacturers have chosen relocation as their major 
coping strategy. I am interested in knowing why industrial relocation is oftenperceived 
hy local manufacturers as the "only^ption" to deal with industrial restructuring. How 
do they arrive at such a decision? On the other hand, it is also very interesting to note 
that while many garment firms decide to relocate production to South China, some 
garment firms manage to retain their production bases in the territory. I do not intend to 
treat them as "exceptional". How can we explain their restructuring strategy in the 
context of massive relocation? What are the social outcomes of changes in the 
production network and work organization in Hong Kong's manufacturing in the 
restructuring process? These are the questions that this study tries to answer. 
Our study of industrial restructuring will throw light on the literature of 
development theories. The recent work on the global commodity chains (GCCs) 
by Gary Gereffi (1992, 1994) is found relevant to my research on industrial restructuring 
in Hong Kong. 
It is my contention that there is tension between macro political economy analysis 
and the micro level analysis of economic action. A close scrutiny of the social process 
shaping industrial restructuring strategy is needed in order to strengthen the political 
economy analysis of the GCCs. I suggest therefore that a study ofindustrial restructuring 
at the firm level is important. 
The central questions of this study are: what is the restructuring strategy ofHong 
Kong's garment manufacturers? Why is relocation perceived by local manufacturers as 
their major coping strategy? How do they interact with overseas buyers? What are the 
social outcomes of industrial relocation? By exploring the above questions, I hope this 
study can throw light on the "Hong Kong's way industrial restructuring “ as well as 
3 
entering into a dialogue with the GCCs literature. 
Data and Methodology 
In-depth interviews and visits to the garment factories are employed for data 
collection in this study. Thirteen garment factories have been interviewed by means of 
an open-ended questionnaire in May 1996 - February 1997. The selection of these 
thirteen cases is mainly based on the method of snowball sampling . At the beginning of 
the study, I asked my friends to introduce me to management of garment firms. Two 
garment firms were interviewed in May - August 1996 as a pilot study. After the 
interviews, I asked the managers to introduce me to other garment factories. Apart from 
this, letters were sent to fifty local garment factories by random sampling method. The 
sampling frame is adopted from the Trade Development Council,s garment 
manufacturers' directory. However, the response was poor, only four companies 
responded and granted me an interview. The interviewees were either the owner, the 
managing director or manager of the garment firms. (See the appendix) The interviews 
lasted for about one and a half-hour each time. A second round interview was conducted 
in December 1996 - February 1997, asking follow-up questions relating to interfirm 
linkages. All the interviews were cassette-recorded and then transcribed for analysis 
(except case M). The interviews covered the following areas: 1. Organizational profile 2. 
The perception of difficulties on the industry 3. Connections with buyers 4. product 
markets 5. the process of relocation 6. changes in production network and work 
organization. Where appropriate, I have also carried out documentary research (e.g. 
reviewing annual reports or company profiles about the interviewed garment factories ) on 
the garment-making industry. 
I also visited the shopfloor of selected factories. Most of my respondents 
accompanied me to visit their production lines in Hong Kong (except case C because of 
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time constraints). If possible, I also talked to some workers in their factories. 
The third source of data in this study is the records of interview on garment 
factories published in Textiles and Clothing, a Bi-monthly trade joumal published by the 
Trade Development Council in 1989. 
Besides, the general manager ofthe Quick Response Centre, Mr Lee Kwok Keung 
and the chairman of the Exporters' Association, Mr. WiUy S M Lam, had been interviewed 
and asked their opinion on the government's role and outlook for the garment industry. 
Given the non-random nature of these cases, these intensive interviews concerning 
the restructuring strategies is not intended to give a representative picture (in the 
statistical sense) of the restructuring patterns ofHong Kong. These cases are essentially 
heuristic. I hope that the interviews with garment manufacturers can advance our 
understanding of the social process and dynamics of industrial restructuring in Hong 
Kong. 
Organization of chapters 
The following chapter reviews the development literature. A critical evaluation 
on the existing major theoretical perspectives is carried out to assess their strengths and 
weaknesses. My review covers the statist, free-market, world-economy and historical-
institutional perspectives. Then, I tum to the global commodity chain perspective. 
My review suggests that we need to bring back the role of local manufacturers at an 
organizational level of analysis in the product world and to unravel the diversity of inter-
firm linkages in the buyer-driven commodity chain. Chapter Three gives a brief 
description of the background of the historical development of garment industry after the 
post-war period in Hong Kong and the difficulties the industry encountered during the 
eighties and the nineties. 
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Then, in Chapter Four, we look at how garment manufacturers manage to capture 
the market niche in the world economy through original equipment manufacturing(OEM) 
or original brand manufacturing (OBM). Different types of product strategy as well as 
the notion of "industrial fIexibUity" being utilized by the manufacturers will be examined. 
Li Chapter Five, I shaU examine the relationship between the buyers and the 
manufacturers in the commodity chains. There are two different types of ties in the 
relationship with the buyers. I examine the nature of these ties and their characteristics 
in order to analyze the governance structure of the global commodity chains. 
In Chapter Six and Seven, I shall deal with the restructuring experiences ofthe 
garment firms during the eighties and the nineties and the subsequent changes in the 
production network and work organization in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter Two： 
Literature Review on industrialization and 
Global Commodity Chains perspective 
Jn this chapter I would first review the major studies of industrial development 
in Hong Kong. Then I introduce the Global Commodity Chain approach. My 
contention is that the existing literature cannot provide an adequate framework for 
us to comprehend the form and the process of industrial restructuring in Hong 
Kong. The GCCs approach provides a good starting point for us to connect 
economic actors' actions to the macro processes in the world economy. This can 
be an entry point for us to analyze the process of industrial restructuring. The 
second section is a review of the GCC approach and the relevant studies. The 
GCC approach addresses questions raised by Marxist theories of development. 
This perspective attempts to go beyond a production-based analysis of economic 
organization and explains how economic actors' actions are connected to the 
commodity chains. It draws our attention to the need to bring the firm back into 
our analysis ofdevelopment. It is my intention to enter into a dialogue with 
the GCCs Uterature by unraveUing the nature of the governance structure of the 
buyer-driven commodity chain. 
2.1 Existing theoretical perspective on industrialization and their limitations 
The phenomenal economic development in East Asia has attracted enormous 
academic interest from different perspectives in recent decades. The East Asian 
NICs have experienced favourable economic growth by export-led 
industriaHzation during the sixties when there was an expansion of the world 
market and an inflow foreign capital to the region. The increase in production cost 
in the developed countries in the 1970's pushed the capitalists in those countries to 
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shift their production to the East Asian NICs or to find overseas suppliers for the 
core market. This helped to foster the development of the light industries in the 
NICs. 
In the following, I would examine some of the major perspectives in the study 
ofeconomic development in the NICs. 
The Free-market perspective: The neo-classical economists emphasize the 
advantages of a free market economy. Their main argument is that economic 
Uberalism is the main driving force for economic growth. The favourable economic 
growth of Hong Kong is due to the operation of a free-market mechanism and 
efficient allocation of resources. By free-market, they mean that there is no control 
of the inflow and outflow of capital, provision of free port, and the practice offree 
trade. Besides, the government creates a regulatory framework and a modem 
infrastructure for free market operation, ^*riedmann:1980, Lethbridge:1980, 
Haddon-Cave: 1980). The argument that a "free market" works in Hong Kong has 
been seriously challenged. OHenderson:1990, Chiu:1993, Chen:1980, Lui and 
Chiu:1994) In the study of the politics of the laissez-faire policy of the colonial 
government, Chiu (1993) argues that through selective intervention, the colonial 
state has provided an institutional basis for industrial development in the post-war 
decades. The institutional bases like the rule oflaw, the provision of social services 
and public housing, and the land development policy have laid the foundation for 
the industrial take-off during the fifties and sixties. In other words, economic 
growth ofHong Kong cannot be understood as an outcome of a "free market”. 
The World-system perspective: This perspective takes the entire capitalist 
world system as an unit of analysis in the industrialization of developing countries. 
(So:1986:244) The world system thesis tries to dispute the free market and 
8 
culturalist explanations of the development of the NICs. It is argued that the 
changing nature of the entire capitalist world system has shaped the development 
pattem of Hong Kong's industry. For instance, the interaction between the world 
capitalist system and sociaHst China after the WW H shaped the development path 
of the Hong Kong economy. The Korean War in the early fifties forced Hong 
Kong to abandon its entrepot trade and to develop its own industries. The path of 
industrialization is conditioned and constrained by the opportunities and 
constraints imposed by the world capitalist system (So:1984). The strength ofthis 
perspective is that it highlights how the interactions between the global forces and 
domestic institutional factors shape the processes of industrialization and industrial 
restructuring in Hong Kong, ^.ui and Chiu:1997:9) However, the world-system 
perspective is criticised for its core-determinism (Gilpin 1987). It directs us away 
from understanding the internal dynamics of the domestic economies and how 
local manufacturers are able to capitalize on the opportunities for their 
development. 
The statist perspective: This takes the role of the state as the key to 
understanding economic development. Recently, there has been a surge of 
academic interest in analysing how the state facilitates capital accumulation and 
economic development (Castells:1983, 1987，Skopol:1985). It is argued that the 
"economic miracle" of the NICs is not due to the "invisible hand" as claimed by 
neo-classical economists, but rather driven by the developmental state. The central 
proposition of this perspective is that the process of transformation of industrial 
and economic structure is greatly determined by the state's policy. In the 
development experiences of the East Asian NICs, the states play a very significant 
role in shaping socio-economic development (Clark 1994, Deyo 1987). 
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There are several weaknesses in the statist approach. First, it underlines the role 
of the state in socio-economic transformation and focuses on the state capacity in 
shaping the development. But state capacity varies in different stages of 
development. Chiu and Levin (1993:7) argue that one of the shortcomings ofthe 
statist approach is that the state's capability to influence business decisions 
regarding restructuring is more Ukely to become Umited as industrial capital 
becomes more mature and autonomous in the later stage of development. 
Second, it is rather difficult to apply this perspective to the situation ofHong 
Kong. Hong Kong is not really a case of a pure "free market". But neither is it a 
case of a developmental state. 
The Institutional-historical perspective: Chiu and Lui (1995) propose an 
institutional historical perspective to comprehend and explain the processes of 
industrialization and industrial restructuring in Hong Kong. Three sets of 
institutional variables are examined, namely the role of the colonial state in the 
industrialization process, the financial system, and capital-labour relation. Each 
phase of industrial development comes to constitute both the enabling and 
constraining structures for the development of manufacturing industries in the 
subsequent phase. 
This perspective examines the strategy of local manufacturers in the 
restructuring process to which the political economy and world-system 
perspective fail to address. Their study on the electronics and garment industries 
in the early nineties demonstrates how these two industries are locked into 
labour-intensive production which is shaped and constrained by the existing 
institutional framework ^Lui & Chiu, 1993, 1994 and 1997). 
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The strength of this approach is that it highlights the importance ofinstitutional 
factors in shaping corporate responses to restructuring. However, I would suggest 
that their analysis stops at the institutional level and fails to examine the active role 
played by economic actors (that is，firms) in constituting the path of industrial 
restructuring. There are stiU some questions at the organizational level that are left 
unanswered. For instance, how do local manufacturers react to changes in the 
business environment? What is the mechanism that shapes the restructuring 
strategy of local manufacturers? I underline the need to go back to the 
organisational level of analysis in order to address the above questions. 
To sum up, we can briefly conclude that the world system thesis underplays the 
importance of internal dynamics of the domestic economy and the statist 
perspective ignores the autonomy of local capital in shaping the process of 
industrial restructuring. Both fail to provide a satisfactory and adequate theoretical 
framework for us to understand the process and form ofindustrial restructuring in 
Hong Kong. The strength of the historical-institutional perspective lies in its 
emphasis on the historical constitution of economic development. However, I 
would like to supplement their analysis by bringing back the organizational level 
analysis into our discussion. As mentioned above, to unravel the social process of 
restructuring, I examine the interplay between the active agents and the 
institutional factors and also the interplay among different agents (economic 
organizations within the economy) in shaping the industrial restructuring process. 
2.2. The Global Commodity Chain perspective 
The Global Commodity Chain perspective addresses issues raised by Marxist 
development theories. Marxist development theories focus on historical-structural 
analysis of the international political economy. Under the new international 
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division of labour, large multinational corporations in the core countries exploit 
labour in developing countries and create a spatial segregation of production 
processes in the world economy ^Fobel et aI 1981). The semi-periphery region is 
defined as an intermediate stratum between core and peripheral nations that 
promotes the stability and legitimacy of the three-tiered global economy. The East 
Asian NICs, as part of the semi-periphery region, have the capacity to resist 
peripheralization but not the ability to move to the core. (Wallerstein: 1974) 
Without probing into details about the Marxist tradition in the development 
Uterature, one of the major criticisms is that it fails to explain the development 
trajectories of the NICs like the East Asian Four Dragons. (Gereffi: 1991) The East 
Asian MCs have the capacity to manage and negotiate dependency to upgrade 
their economic activities. Gereffi suggests that when the NICs play the role of 
component supplier and are connected to the world economy through commercial 
subcontracting, local manufacturing industries can enjoy more autonomy in their 
development. 
Gereffi puts forward his idea of the Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) to 
address the issue of economic development trajectory of the nations. Global 
commodity chain has been defined as, 
“A network oflabor and production process whose end result is a finished commodity." 
^Iopkins and Wallerstein:1985:159) All firms or otherunits ofproduction receive inputs 
and outputs. Their transformation of input that results in outputs locates them within a 
commodity chain, (or quite often within multiple commodity chains."OHopkins & 
WaUerstein:1994:17) 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz elaborate that, 
“GCC consists of“nodes”，or operations that comprise pivotal points in the production 
process: supply of raw materials, production, export and marketing. Each node is itsetfa 
network, connected to different nodes concerned with related activities. Such export 
networks are increasingly important in the contemporary global manufacturing system, 
resulting in a new logic of transnational integration based on geographical specialization 
and tightly linked international sourcing." (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz:1990) 
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Gereffi tries to analyse the coordination of industrial capital and commercial 
capital in the organization of economic activity in the GCCs. The commodity chain 
links up the economic activities of firms to technological and organisational 
networks that permit firms to develop different commodities. Gereffi and Hamilton 
recently apply the concept of"product world" to conceptualise complexities of the 
commodity chain - the sequencing and co-ordination of steps of production, the 
levels and types of technology used in each step, the types of economic actors 
performing the steps, and the "conventions" that allow for co-operative efforts 
among diverse sets of actors in production. (Gereffi and Hamilton:1996) In this 
process, the commodity chain consists of actual networks of firms that create 
different types of product worlds. Put it in a simple way, it draws attention to how 
raw materials can be transformed into final commodity in the entire commodity 
chain through the cooperation and interaction of the economic actors in every step 
of production. 
There are four dimensions in the GCCs. First, an input-output structure in 
which there is a set of products, services, and resources that are linked together in 
a sequence of value-added activities across a range of relevant industries. Second, 
there is a territoriality dimension in which spatial dispersion or concentration of 
production and marketing are carried out in the semi-periphery zones, core 
countries and periphery countries. Third, there is a governance structure of 
authority and power relationship between firms that determines how financial, 
material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain. (Storper & 
Harrison 1991，Gereffi:1994, 1995) Fourth, there is an institutional framework 
that identifies how local, national, and international conditions and policies shape 
the globalization process at each stage in the chain. The governance structure is 
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significant to the coordination of transnational production systems. In 
describing the patterns of the coordination of globalized economic activities, 
Gereffi has identified two types of commodity chains. They are the producer-
driven chain and the buyer-driven commodity chain. 
Producer-driven commodity chain 
Producer-driven commodity chain are usuaUy found in those industries in which 
large-scale multinational groups or enterprises play a central and significant role in 
coordinating the production activities, through both backward and forward 
linkage in the global commodity chain. The technology-oriented and capital-
intensive industries like computer, automobiles, electronics industry are usually 
classified under this category. The transnational corporation carries out the 
research and design processes for product innovation in the headquarters of the 
core countries and then shifts the labor-intensive processes to developing countries 
(Gereffi & Hamilton:1996, Henderson:1989). The overseas subcontractors 
become the component suppliers by doing original equipment manufacturing 
(OEM) for the producer. The control of the technological, production and 
distribution activities are totally in hands of the multinational groups in the core 
countries. In this light, industrial capital becomes the driver of the GCCs and the 
multinational corporations from the core countries have the central control of 
production activities. 
Buyer-driven commodity chain 
Another governance structure is the buyer-driven commodity chain. It is the 
buyers or the business-led buyers who coordinate the production and trading 
activities through an international subcontracting network in the buyer-driven 
global commodity chain. This is found in industries where in large retailers, 
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brand-name merchandisers, and trading companies play an active role in setting up 
decentralized production networks in different export countries. It is very 
commonly found in most labour-intensive industries producing consumer or non-
durable goods like footwear and apparel. (Gereffi:1994). The retailers and 
brand-name merchandisers do not own any manufacturing facilitates themselves; 
rather they depend on international subcontracting. The overseas buying offices, 
agents or the trading houses serve as a mediator for the buyers to manage 
production. 
To briefly sum up the key elements of producer-driven and buyer-driven 
commodity chains, the governance structure of the two GCCs can be described as 
followings: 
1. ProducerKiriven commodity chains (industries like automobiles, computers, electrical 
machinery) 
Manufacturers ^ Traders ^ Retailers and dealers 
丄 \ \ 
a • c z D 
Domestic and foreign subsidiaries 
and subcontractors 
2. Buyer^iriven commodity chains (light industries like garments, footwear, toys) 
^ ^ ^ Overseas traders ^ US Market 
Factories 4r^"^^ 个 ^ Brand-name companies 
f \ z 
\ 丨 〉 < 1 
Overseas Buyers Retailers 
Diagram 2.1. The organisation of producerKiriven and buyer-driven global commodity 
chains. Solid arrows indicate the primary relationships; dashed arrows show secondary 
relationships. Source: Gereffi, 1994:98 
The main distinction between the buyer and the producer-driven commodity 
chain is the difference in capital logic in organising the global production and 
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trading network and how profit is accrued in the commodity chain. The former 
emphasises the trade-led industrialization path while the latter on the producer's 
side. Under the governance structure of the buyer-driven GCCs, thebuyer plays a 
critical role in shaping the production network. 
2.2.2.Studies on the buyer-driven GCCs 
In this section, I would review the GCCs perspective (particularly that ofthe 
buyer-driven GCC) and its relevance to development theories. I concentrate on 
the review of the buyer-driven GCCs because it is more relevant to my analysis of 
the garment industry, a labour-intensive industry having the key characteristics of 
the buyer-driven GCCs. There are several themes in the GCCs studies including 
the examination of the buyers' role in shaping the production network and the 
organisation of production network within a domestic node in the commodity 
chain. I will review its main arguments and try to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the GCCs framework. Then, I outline how my study would 
contribute to the theoretical construction of the GCCs framework. 
To demonstrate how big buyers in the core countries have a dominating and 
crucial role in shaping the global production network, Gereffi and his colleagues 
examine the role of buyers and their function in the commodity chain. 
Korzeniewicz studies the development of the Nike corporation and how changes 
in marketing and consumption pattems in the core countries help to shape 
production pattems in the periphery and semiperiphery countries. 
(Korzeniewicz: 1994:) Starting from a social organisational perspective, 
Korzeniewicz emphasises the organisational development of the Nike Corporation 
and its tie with the Japanese producers during the early sixties. Then the Nike 
Corporation shifted their production to South Korea and Taiwan and built up close 
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relationships with the manufacturers in these countries during the mid seventies. 
As a big buyer in the althetic shoe industry, the Nike Corporation has a spatial 
division oflabour in producing different types of shoes with different price ranges. 
They are the developed partners, volume producers and developing sources, 
located either in the developed, semi-peripheral or peripheral countries. Different 
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types of overseas suppUers are classified on the basis of sophistication of the 
products as well as the price ranges. The developed partners are responsible for 
making innovative and upper-tier products. The volume producers are those 
manufacturers doing a specific type of product in large quantities and typically less 
flexible than developed partners in their organization of production. Finally, 
developing sources are the new manufacturers that attract Nike Corporation 
because of their low labour cost. Then, the social organisation of production 
network in the dependent economy is initiated by the Nike Corporation. In this 
process, the Nike Corporation (buyer) can maintain its competitive edge by 
strengthening its distribution network through the strategic alliance with the 
retailers while maintaining control over the overseas subcontractors in a stratified 
production system. (Korzenewicz:1994:225) 
The study demonstrates how market segmentation affects the social 
organisation of production. Although the study does not place much emphasis on 
the inter-firm linkages between Nike Corporation and its overseas suppliers, it 
leads us to look at the ties between the buyers and suppliers. Li this case, the Nike 
Corporation maintains quite a close control of the production network in the 
commodity chain, i.e. a close-tie relationship with the overseas suppUers. In this 
manner, the buyer (the Nike Corporation) plays a crucial and dominating role in 
shaping the production network for the footwear industry. Besides, the 
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knowledge transfer of product innovation (the upper-end suppliers) and the 
volume producers (South Korea and Taiwan) enable first-tier producers in the 
semiperipheral to be responsive to the global economy. In some cases, the buyer 
even assists the first-tier producers to set up factories in a dependent economy like 
China. 
<i 
Other studies using the GCCs perspective also focus on how big buyers shape 
the global production network. Gereffi (1994) studies how big retailers in the 
apparel industry in the United States shape the global production network at 
different stages of production. There are different market niches for apparel 
production and the producers serving different niches, different retailing and global 
sourcing strategy. Big buyers Hke the brand-named companies or mass 
merchandisers find their overseas suppliers through a dense production network, 
according to the cost advantages and quality requirement, Appelbaum and Smith 
(1996) further elaborate on the argument of the GCCs thesis and study how global 
restructuring shapes the industrial location of the garment industries in Hong Kong 
and South Korea. They suggested that under the keen competition among the 
NICs, local producers rely on flexibility in mediating the nodes in the commodity 
chain. Besides, they argue that the actions and decisions of the key actors are 
embedded in transnational and personal social networks in the NICs. 
The second major theme of the GCCs studies is about how different types of 
interfirm Unkages among different economic actors within the commodity chain 
shape the global production network. Donaghu and Barfif (1990) study the 
international subcontracting network in athletic footwear production and use their 
findings to throw lights on the new international division of labour thesis and 
address the issues brought into the debate about the post-Fordist form ofglobal 
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production. Although they do not apply the GCCs perspective in their study of 
athletic footwear production, their analysis, focusing on international 
subcontracting, can be easily appropriated and interpreted in the light of the GCCs 
approach. Like Korzenewicz's study, they analyse the historical development of 
Nike Corporation and how it maintains close ties with a core group of affiliated 
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factories in Taiwan and South Korea. Nike has different levels of ties with its 
subcontractors. It assists the first-tier producers in South Korea and Taiwan in the 
factory set-up, training, production methods, joint product development activities. 
Jn this manner, they maintain a very close tie with each other.^)onaghu and 
Baraff:1990:541) Its ties with the volume producers are different. The volume 
producers do not supply high-end products and they also supply footwear for other 
branded footwear companies. The relationship between Nike and the volume 
producers is relatively loose when compared with the first-tier producers. 
The second-tier producers form a network of material and components 
suppliers to support the first-tier production. There exists a complementary 
subcontracting relationship between the first-tier and second-tier producers in the 
production network. 
To sum up, the study illustrates that there exists different types of ties between 
buyers and their suppUers in the global production network of the athletic footwear 
industry. A closer scrutiny of the linkages between the buyer psfDCE) and the 
first-tier producers and those between first-tier producers and second-tier 
producers directs us to understand how different economic actors are connected in 
the global commodity chain. 
The third major theme of the GCCs studies is about the interplay of global and 
local factors in the operation of the commodity chains. ^Corzeniewicze: 1992, 
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Pan:1996) For instance, Korzeniewicze examines why the Brazilian leather 
footwear industry can be successful in the retail market of the United States 
(1992:313-27). It is found that the industry has the support of good quality leather 
from Argentina and it has high a flexible production network in Brazil. Most of the 
shoe manufacturers in Brazil are concentrated in an industrial district and their 
common ethnic background is German. He describes that this common 
background enables the producers and suppUers to have "competitive 
collectivism" which enhances their competitive edge through the sharing of 
information and technology in the dense social networks. They also enjoy a close 
and symbiotic relationship with the traders in the industry. 
(Korzeniewicz:1990:320) To sum up, it emphasizes the need to bring domestic 
political economy context as well as other social factors (like ethnic background, 
culture) back into the analysis of the shaping of the production network and how 
the domestic economy is inserted into the world system. 
Other studies focus on the social organisation of production network within a 
domestic node in the commodity chain. Pan (1996) compares the sectoral 
difference of the governance structure between apparel and computer industry in 
Taiwan. Using the GCCs perspective, she tries to explain how technology and 
social institution afFect the organisation of production network in these two 
industries. She identifies two forms of division oflabour in production, namely the 
"horizontal" and "vertical" division oflabour. Horizontal network means that the 
apparel producers depend on capacity subcontracting, which is anchored in the 
estabUshed social ties. The vertical network in the computer industry is based on 
specialized subcontracting. Such distinction helps us to understand the 
organisation of production network in a domestic node under the buyer-driven and 
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producer-driven network. However, it has little to say about the nature of the 
network. Gereffi argues that there is authority and power relationship in the 
governance structure that affects the allocation of human, material and financial 
resources in the GCCs. This impUes that buyers in the core countries are critical in 
shaping the global production network. When Pan describes the characteristics of 
"horizontal" network between the first-tier producers and subcontractors in the 
GCCs, it is valid to characterize it as "horizontal" from the viewpoint ofdivision of 
labour. However, such characterization tells us little about the power relationship 
among the buyer, the first-tier producers and the subcontractors in the GCCs. In 
other words, the relationship between different economic actors in the GCCs has 
to be examined in order to have a clearer picture on the nature of the network and 
its implications to the structuring of the GCCs. 
The above studies highlight several aspects of the GCCs perspective. Briefly, 
they demonstrate the effects of commercial and industrial capitals in shaping the 
social organisation of production network and how different forms of interfirm 
linkage between buyers and first-tier producers can enhance the competitiveness of 
domestic producers. Also, it brings the local political economy and institutional 
factors back into our discussion of why a nation can occupy a specific position in 
the world economy. In the following section, I examine the strengths and 
limitations of the GCCs approach. 
2.2.3. Strength and limitations of the GCCs approach 
The Global Commodity Chain approach exphasizes the need to look at the 
social organisational dimension of economic activity at different levels (i.e. 
world-economy, policies and institutions at the national level and the social bases 
of competitiveness at the local level). It tries to engage in a dialogue with the 
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Marxist tradition of studying the developmental trajectories of the peripheral and 
semiperipheral countries and to highlight the central role of industrial capital and 
commercial capitals in the global economy. 
"Specific processes or segments within a commodity chain can be represented as boxes or 
nodes, linked together in networks. Each successive node within a commodity chain 
involves the acquisition and/or organization of inputs (e.g. raw materials or semifinished 
products), labor power (and its provisioning), transportation, distribution (via markets or 
- transfer), and consumption^ The analysis of commodity chain shows how production, 
distribution, and consumption are shaped by the social relations (including organization) that 
characterize the sequential stages of input acquisition, manufacturing, distribution, marketing 
and consumption." (Gereffi，Korzeniewiez and Korzeniewiez: 1994:2) 
This perspective underlines the social configuration of economic action. The 
accrual of surplus in the commodity chain does not lie solely in the production-
based activities. This is why the GCCs approach also tries to address value-added 
activities and flow of capital in the process of marketing, distribution and retailing 
for commodity production and circulation. This is different from the Marxist 
tradition which is essentially production-based. As Lui and Chiu (1997) put it, 
"The analytical framework of GCCs perspective has gone beyond a production-
centered analysis and broadens our theoretical orientation in analysing the 
organisation of economic activities." 
Second, the GCCs perspective can be bridged to network analysis and makes 
use of the latter to comprehend the constitution of economic activity embedded in 
network or "nodes" within the GCCs. This provides us with a starting point to 
examine how different economic actors are connected and act collectively in the 
commodity chain. 
The commodity chain perspective alerts us to the need of examining the nature 
of inter-firm linkage in the networks of the GCCs. As suggested by Gereffi and 
Hamilton, 
22 
"the ties linking actors each other that have a repetitive character... then we need to define 
networks among economic actors in substantive terms.... It is not merely the fact of a 
connection, but more particularly the nature of the substantive ties that renders 
economic activity of network more or less predictable from the viewpoint of participants." 
(Pamilton and Gereffi:1996:8) 
To sum up, I would suggest that the GCCs perspective can depart from the 
Marxist political economy analysis and serves as an analytical tool to comprehend 
the developmental trajectories and the possibiUty ofmobility of semiperipheral and 
peripheral countries. By highHghting the importance ofindustrial and commercial 
capitals in the GCCs, it further helps us to go beyond a production-centered 
analysis and move on to understand the connection of the economic organisations 
and actors as different segments or networks in the commodity chain. 
However, there are several limitations in this approach. First, Gereffi maintains 
that the buyers are a driving force in shaping of the global production network 
under the buyer-driven GCCs. I would rather suggest that there is a need to 
examine the role of domestic manufacturers and their interaction with buyers in 
our analysis of the forces that influence and shape the organisation of production 
network. One of the limitations of the buyer-driven GCCs perspective is that 
Gereffi places too much emphasis on the buyers' side (commercial capital) and 
leaves out other important economic actors in the analysis of the GCCs. For 
instance, as mentioned above, the study of buyer-driven commodity chain 
concentrates on the buyer-side and their role in distribution, marketing and 
production. Domestic manufacturers' role in the semi-peripheral countries is left 
unexamined. Gereffi suggests that manufacturers (suppliers) have different 
modes ofincorporation in the commodity chain in which there is a possibility for 
them to move up the GCCs. But then he does not clearly explain how the 
interaction between the manufacturers and buyers would shape the social 
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organisation of production in the commodity chain. Here I argue that it is 
important for us to examine the active role played by economic agents and to what 
extent and under what conditions buyers shape the social organisation of 
production in the semiperiphery zones. When they organise the production 
network in a domestic node, are the domestic producers' action and decision 
structured and conditioned by the buyers' side? Put it in a simple way, from a 
viewpoint of domestic manufacturers in the commodity chain, how are the first-tier 
producers collectively connected with the overseas buyers in the commodity 
chain? How do these ties afFect the organisation of production in a domestic 
node? These questions have been left unexamined in Gereffi，s framework. 
I would like to argue that it is important for us to examine the active role played 
by local manufacturers in the context ofindustrial restructuring ofHong Kong. It 
is the local manufacturers (as the first-tier producer in the commodity chain) who 
face the challenges from the surging pressures both from the protectionism and 
keen competition from other low-cost countries. In an examination of how the 
economic organisation responds to and changes in the global economy, the 
GCCs perspective is only relevant to a macro level analysis. The GCCs approach 
is inadequate to provide a middle-range theoretical framework for us to explain 
the actual experience of restructuring in Hong Kong. ^Lui and Chiu:1997) 
Bringing back organisation to our analysis 
As stated above, the Global Commodity Chain approach cannot give us a 
satisfactory framework to explain the experience of industrial restructuring in 
Hong Kong. However, it serves to remind us of the significance of the social 
processes ofthe organization of economic activity at the global level. Following 
this hint, I would suggest that bringing back the organisational level of analysis is 
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important for us to understand Hong Kong's industrial restructuring process. 
Among various perspectives in organization studies, two perspectives are found 
particularly relevant. I shaU discuss the resource dependency perspective and the 
neo-institutionalist perspective in organisation theory. 
The resource dependency perspective OPfeffer and Salancik:1978) concerns at 
how an organization maintains its survival in an environment through interacting 
with other social actors (or other organizations). This perspective assumes that an 
organization is not self-directed and independent of the extemal environments. In 
this process, they need to depend on other organizations for resources. It also 
interacts with other organizations in order to accomplish the goals. ^Pfeffer and 
Salancik:1978:2-19) 
Once they require resources from other organizations, this implies the 
organization who possess resources can exert control and power over the focal 
organization. This is because resources possessed by the influencer are critical to 
the organization. This creates a dependent relationship between the organizations. 
However, on the other hand, the organization will try to avoid dependency by 
seeking various ways to cope with the control and to enhance its autonomy, 
(pfeffer and Salancik:1978:257). PfefFer and Salancik introduced the concept of 
"extemal control of organization" to describe the dependent and power 
relationship between the organizations. 
The concept of"extemal control ofthe organization" is defined as "the ability 
to initiate activity at one's discretion."(Pfeffer and Salancik:1978:259) 
Organizations generally wiU tend to be influenced by those who control the 
resources they require. 
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Peffer and SaIancik suggest that "Social control involves a process in which 
both the influencer and the focal organization act to affect the conditions 
governing the influencing process."(1978:45) They propose that constraints on 
organizational behaviour result from situations of asymmetric interdependence, 
when there exists the discretion to control resources and enforce demands and 
when the focal organization's behaviour is not ab*eady constrained. 
Following this hint, it is noted that social control between organizations is not a 
static process. Instead, the organizations attempt to alter the conditions ofbeing 
controlled and seek look for more autonomy in the environments. The 
management of the organizations are aware of the need to develop strategies to 
acquire the resources and to loosen the dependency upon other social actors. The 
interaction with other social actors, therefore, involves a dynamic sequence of 
actions and reactions leading to variations in control and discretion. (PfefFer and 
Salancik:1978) 
Without probing further into the resource dependency theory, this perspective 
provides us with insights to examine the relationship between domestic 
manufacturers and overseas buyers in the commodity chains. As suggested by 
Gereffi, there is a power and authority relationship inside the buyer-driven 
governance structure. However, he has not clearly spelled out the social process 
of the interorganizational influences between domestic manufacturers and buyers. 
The conditions of power and control over the manufacturers by overseas buyers 
need to be examined. Besides, as suggested by resource dependency theory, the 




While the resource dependency perspective deals with the interorganizational 
influences to uncover the dynamics of the power and dependence relationship 
among organizations, there are some cases in which the social actors of the 
organizations try to leam from other organizations when coping with external 
demands. The neo-institutionaUst perspective is relevant to tackle this 
phenomena. 
One of the major concems ofthe neo-institutionalist approach in organisation 
theory is to look at the relationship between symbol and practice of organization. 
(1991) Jn this light, neo-institutionalist organisational theory is relevant to our 
discussion here. 
One of the major concems of neo-institutionalist theorists is why 
organisations in modem society become homogenized instead ofbecoming diverse 
during the course of development. They contend that efficiency arguments cannot 
fully explain the homogenization of the organisation; instead, there are other 
sources (like rituals and symbols) of organisational change. The concept that 
captures the process of homogenisation is called "isomorphism", a continuing 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the 
same set of environment conditions. (Powell and DiMaggio: 1994:66) Powell and 
DiMaggio have identified two types ofisomorphism in modem organization. One 
is the competitive isomorphism which represents organisational changes coming 
from system rationality that emphasises market competition, niche change, and 
fitness. The second type of isomorphism is institutional isomorphism. Here, 
organisation does not only compete for resources and customers, but also political 
power and institutional legitimacy. Neo- institutionalist theorists place emphasis 
on "institutional isomorphism" in order to explain how organisations resemble 
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each other. (Powell and DiMaggio:1991) 
Three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism have been identified. First, 
coercive isomorphism. The source of organizational homogenization is derived 
from formal or informal pressure exerted on organisation. For example, superior 
organisation can exert pressure or authority to coerce the dependent organisation 
to follow its action. 
The second mechanism is "mimetic isomorphism". Uncertainty is a powerful 
force in driving organisation to model other organisations' practice when they 
perceive the modelled organisation as successful, Powell and DiMaggio explain 
that usually when the organisation technologies are poorly understood, goals are 
unambiguous or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, then it is 
more likely for organisations to converge. (Powell and DiMaggio:1991:69-70) 
The last mechanism is "normative isomorphism", which stems primarily from 
professionalization. PoweU suggests that professionalization process itself is a 
way for the profession to establish a cognitive base and legitimatization for their 
occupational autonomy. 
Without probing further into neo-institutionalist theory, here it is suffice to say 
that the concept of isomorphism suggested by Powell and DiMaggio provides 
some insights for us to comprehend the pattem ofindustrial restructuring in Hong 
Kong. Why is "industrial relocation" often perceived as a "taken-for-granted" 
restructuring strategy among garment manufacturers? It is observed that there is a 
homogenisation process in industrial restructuring. It is worthwhile to examine 
what are the sources of organisational homogeneity in relocation. Besides, the 
concept of"coercive isomorphism" has implied a dependence relationship between 
the economic actors. Pertinent to our discussion of global commodity chains, it is 
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important to note the power and dependence relationship between buyers and 
domestic manufacturers in the domestic node in the buyer-driven governance 
structure. In our discussion ofa homogenisation of restructuring strategy among 
local manufacturers, it is interesting to ask: do foreign buyers become “coercive，， 
by persuading local manufacturers to relocate? Under what kind of condition wiU 
such "coercive isomorphism" occur? If it is not the buyer who persuades local 
manufacturers to relocate, then is it "mimetic isomorphism" that drives 
manufacturers toward the same response to uncertainty? 
This leads to my second point about the weakness of the GCCs perspective. My 
point is that Gereffi fails to give a substantive account of the content and nature of 
networks among the economic actors in the buyer-driven governance structure. 
He argues that there is authority and power relationship inside the governance 
structure. However, Gereffi has not clearly spelled out the substance of the 
governance structure and its characteristics. As he put it, 
"Network is a set of units (or nodes) of some kind and the relations of specific types that occur 
among them. The form ofnetwork refers to the overall configurations of relations in the networks 
or parts... These properties, applied to the analysis of the GCCs, include the length of a chain, the 
density of interaction in a particular segment, and the depth or number of levels that occur at 
different stages ofa GCC. (Gereffi, M. Korzeniewicz and R.P.Korzeniewicz: 1996:7) 
I would like to suggest that this network, constituted by the buyers and the 
first-tier producers, is important for our understanding of the critical role played 
by the buyer in shaping the global production network under the GCCs. Interfirm 
Hnkage within each "node" in the buyer-driven GCC represents how different types 
of economic actors are socially connected and how power relationship and 
authority emerge in the node. Gereffi maintains that globalization actually 
reinforces the localization processes in the world economy and places great 
emphasis on the authority and power relationship inside the governance structure 
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in the GCCs. This in tum affects the allocation ofhuman, material, and financial 
resources in the GCCs. However, how is this kind of relationship shown in the 
governance structure? What is the nature of interactions among different 
economic actors in the commodity chain? How would this kind of connection 
afFect the organisation of production in the GCCs? 
This leads to my analysis of bringing the domestic context back to our 
discussion ofthe buyer-driven commodity chain. I argue that there is still a gap in 
Gereffi's analysis of the nature of interfirm linkages. It is necessary for us to 
uncover the nature and diversity ofinterfirm linkages in each of the nodes within a 
domestic node in the global commodity chain. The diversity ofinterfirm linkages is 
rooted in structures ofsocial relations in the domestic context. 
My study addresses issues raised by the GCCs perspective. Through an 
examination ofthe nature ofinterfirm linkage among domestic manufacturers and 
overseas buyers, I probe how such ties afFect the organisation of production 
network in the course ofindustrial restructuring in Hong Kong. I also discuss the 
forms of organizational "isomorphism" emerged in the restructuring process. 
This leads to my third point: how is the domestic node connected into the 
world economy in the buyer-driven GCCs? How can we explain why a nation 
manages to occupy a specific position in the global economy? Gereffi suggests 
that first-tier producers can enhance their competitive edge through the learning 
experience derived from OEM and it is possible for local manufacturers to move 
from OEM to the ODM(original design manufacturing) or OBM (original brand 
manufacturing). This upgrading gives rise to the possibility of upward mobility of 
semi-peripheral economies to the core in the commodity chain. Besides, some 
first-tier producers manage to change their role into middleman for buyers and 
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producers in the dependent economy through "triangular manufacturing". Also, I 
would like to examine how different types of ties with buyers shape the social 
outcomes ofindustrial restructuring in Hong Kong. 
Concluding Remarks  
To sum up, the GCCs perspective provides some insights for our analysis of 
industrial restructuring of Hong Kong. First, it departs from orthodox Marxist 
analysis and goes beyond a production-based framework. Second, it highlights the 
importance of commercial and industrial capital in shaping the global production 
network. Third, he tries to explain the possibility of upward mobility of the 
semi-periphery economies. However, that said, I would suggest that my study can 
contribute to a refinement of the GCCs approach by departing from the core-
centre views and bringing back the role oflocal manufacturers to our discussion of 
the GCCs. By uncovering the nature ofinterfirm linkage between buyers and local 
manufacturers within a domestic node, my study sheds lights on the substance of 
the governance structure of the buyer-driven GCCs by using the resource 
dependency perspective. It looks at the questions of to what extent and under 
what conditions are buyers influential in shaping the production network. Besides, 
I would suggest that by unravelling the diversity ofinterfirm linkages, it helps us to 
shed Hghts on how different patterns of ties with buyers affect the restructuring 
strategy of local manufacturers and the social organization of production in the 
commodity chain and what kind of social outcomes that it will bring about. I will 




The historical development of the Hong Kong's garment industry 
after the post-war period 
In this chapter, I would like to outline the development of garment making in 
Hong Kong in the post-war decades. The garment industry reached its peak in the 
mid-1970's in terms of its gross output, number of establishments and the number of 
persons engaged in the industry. It was not until 1988 when the industry began to shrink 
and reached a state of decline. While some firms succeed to move up the ladder ofglobaI 
commodity chains by doing the OBM, many strive hard to survive. In the following 
section, I would like to describe the characteristics of the industry from a historical-
institutional perspective. It is intended as a background for subsequent discussion on 
industrial restructuring in the next chapter. 
3.1. The industrial take-off after the post-war era 
Jn the manufacturing sector, the garment industry has been the largest industry in 
Hong Kong in terms of gross output, employment, and domestic exports since the early 
1960's. In 1995, there were 4,926 establishments that accounted for 15.8 per cent of the 
total manufacturing establishments, employing 111,917 workers (29 per cent of the total 
manufacturing employment) (See Table 3.1) 
As an open and dependent economy. Hong Kong is subject to changes in the 
global economy. Jn the pre-war period, the garment industry only served local 
consumption and its products were simple-designed and low-end. Qiong Kong Fashion 
History). Before the outbreak ofthe Korean War in 1951, Hong Kong was an entrepot 
for China.i Then, the embargo on China seriously disrupted the entrepot trade of the 
territory. In the meantime, rapid expansion in the world market opened opportunity for 
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industrialization through the export-led strategy. The manufacturing sector experienced a 
rapid growth in the post-war decades in terms of gross domestic product and 
employment. (Table 3.2 & 3.3) It was the largest single contributor to the Hong Kong's 
GDP until 1987 when the service sector (wholesales, retail, Import/Export trades, 
restaurants and hotels) overtook manufacturing. In 1994，the manufacturing sector was 
the fifth rank and accounted for only 9.2 per cent of the GDP. (Table 3.3) 
In 1950, the garment industry consisted of only 41 establishments (2.8 per cent of 
the total manufacturing establishments) and employed 1944 workers. (2.4 per cent of the 
total manufacturing employment). (Table 3.1) Generally speaking, the industry was 
divided into two segments: cut-and-sewn and the piece-knitted garments. Local 
manufacturers had to depend on local trading houses and Indian firms to obtain orders 
from overseas buyers. Most of the local manufacturers did not know English and did 
not have any direct connections with overseas buyers. (HK Fashion History:1992:109) 
They were incorporated in the world economy through the international subcontracting 
network. Local trading firms or buying offices acted as middlemen and related 
orders to local manufacturers. (Chu:1988, Yau: 1995) The orders were low-end, simple-
style like plain shirts and jeans, and mass volume products for South East Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa and United Kingdom markets. During the early 1950's, British 
firms benefited from the British Commonwealth Preferential Tariff Many British 
companies would like to source garments from Hong Kong at that time. Jn the mid 
1950's, local manufacturers and trading houses began to explore the market in the 
United States. British firms became less significant when the US became the major 
export market for local manufacturers. (Industry Department: 1996:61) By the 1970's 
1 The major income source in Hong Kong was entrepot trade and reexports. In 1950，it was 
estimated that reexports accounted for 89 per cent ofthe total exports. (Chen:1982) 
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Hong Kong was an important source of manufacturing products for the US markets 
(Bonacich & Waller:1994:5) 
Rising protectionism from developed countries during sixties to seventies 
Beginning from the early 1960's, the United Kingdom and other European 
$ 
countries imposed export quotas on Hong Kong's garment products. Then the United 
States followed accordingly. Jn 1962, the United States made use of the clauses in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Hong Kong was compelled to sign 
an agreement to restrict the garment exports from Hong Kong to the US. ^Iong Kong 
Fashion History:1992:lll) After signing the agreement, it was decided that quotas were 
to be equally distributed between local garment manufacturers and trading firms. 
Quotas were allocated according to past export performance, which was calculated 
twenty months backward from January 1964. This method is still in use today. Hong 
Kong's garment industry was constrained by the multi-fabric arrangement ^MFA) in 
1974. This placed Hong Kong under a monitoring system from the United States and 
other European countries. ^Lau & Chan:1994:117) The quota system and multi-lateral 
agreements with other developed countries, to a certain extent, are both constraints and 
protection for local manufacturers. It is because the industry faced ceiling 
restrictions from the major markets that might hinder the scope for expansion of the 
industry. (Industry Department:1995) But at the same time quota allocation gives a 
quantity assurance of the export volume and serves as a protection from other low-cost 
developing countries. 
3.2. Dominance of local capital and small-scale establishments in the industry 
The garment industry is characterized by the predominance of local small-sized 
establishments. In the 1990's the average number of persons per garment making 
establishments is 23 persons while for the manufacturing sector it is 12 persons. 
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Garment-making is the largest employer among the manufacturing industries in the past 
twenty years. The industry reached the peak in mid-1970's as the number of garment 
establishments started to rise to a peak of 10,565 in 1987 ( 25.9 per cent of aU 
manufacturing establishments), employing 298,377 workers (represented 37.9 per cent 
of the manufacturing workforce ). (Table 3.1) 
Foreign capital plays an insignificant in the garment industry. In 1995, only 9.3 
per cent of garment making estabUshments were owned by foreign capital. 
Although Hong Kong's garment industry enjoyed rapid growth in the past decades, 
it suffers from the erosion of its previous advantages such as low production cost, and 
increasing wave of protectionism of other developed countries. In the mid 1970's, 
garment manufacturers complained about labor shortage and called for government action 
for provision of training. In 1975 the Clothing Industry Training Authority was 
estabHshed in order to tackle the manpower problem. Li 1977，the government appointed 
an advisory committee to examine the possibility ofindustrial diversification and upgrading 
for manufacturing. In the report, the government recognized that increasing trade 
restrictions imposed on textiles and clothing industries "add new urgency to the long-
term desirability of broadening our industrial base." (TACD, 1979:6) It reviewed the 
government's role in land policy, finance, education and training. It also called for a 
governmental action to increase land supply for industrial development. However, this 
report was outdated when China launched its open policy in 1978. This led to the 
revival of entrepot trade. The report was criticized on the ground that no concrete plans 
were designed to achieve the proposed reforms. (Chen & Li: 1988:137) Due to the 
changing economic climate, the call for industrial diversification gradually faded out in 
public debate. 
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3.3. The continuation oflow-wage manufacturing in the eighties 
Hong Kong's economy experienced a restructuring process in the 1980's. The 
tertiary sector assumed a leading role in the economy and there is significant decline in 
the manufacturing sector. The share of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
manufacturing sector fell to only 9.2 per cent of the total GDP in 1994. The same pattem 
is found in the garment industry. Although Hong Kong is the world's third largest 
clothing exporter, the garment industry lost its relative importance in terms of the value 
added in the past decades, (its share decreased from 25 per cent of the total for the 
manufacturing sector in 1981 to 20 per cent in 1991)? (CSD:1993:114) During the past 
ten years, productivity of the industty, measured in terms of value added per person 
engaged, was below the average of all manufacturing industries. Its productivity increased 
at an average rate of 11 per cent, which was still far behind the figures of other 
manufacturing industries in 1994. (See table 3.4) 
The industry suffers from escalating production costs. It is increasingly difficult 
to compete with other newly developed countries. Overseas buyers no longer find Hong 
Kong's garment industry competitive. Compared with other Asian NICs and Latin America, 
in terms of production cost per standard hour, other countries have more favourable 
cost structures. Hong Kong was ranked second in the ladder of high production costs 
Asian countries, just below Taiwan. CKSA:1996:27-33, Table 3.5) 
Despite of the difficulties faced by the industry, the government is slow to 
respond the changes and is reluctant to assist the industry. In response to the tight labour 
supply and rising production cost, the Trade Department introduced the outward 
2 Value added is obtained by deducting intermediaty inputs (like cost ofbrought-in raw materials and 
components, payments for industrial services and other operating expenses) from gross output. It 
thus measures the value which manufacturing establishments have "added" to these bought-in 
materials and components. Conceptually, it covers the values of input of labor and input of capital 
and entrepreneur. (CSD:1993:114) 
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processing arrangement (OPA) under the rule of origins during the mid eighties which 
allows part ofthe garment products to be processed in China. Official statistics show that 
outward processing in China is becoming very important. In 1989, the re-exports to 
China for outward processing was HK$17,868 miUions and in 1994 HK$46,447 millions, 
representing an increase of 159 per cent of the outward processing activities for the 
industry. (Table 3.6.1 and 3.6.2) The massive relocation and the outward processing 
activities in South China by local manufacturers show that the industry capitalizes on the 
supply of cheap labour in South China. In a recent consultant report produced by a group 
of the MIT experts, one of the problems of the garment industry is its reliance on low-
wage manufacturing by utilizing cheap labour in South China. But it is difficult for Hong 
Kong's garment manufacturers to rely on such strategy for competing with other NICs. 
3.4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter gives a brief account of the historical development of the garment 
industry in Hong Kong. It is also my contention that the industry remains labour-
intensive and increasingly tums to relocation to cope with the problem of rising production 
costs. 
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Year No. of Persons engaged Average no. of persons Average no. of 
establishment Li the industry engaged per persons 
estabUshment in all engaged in 
manufacturing garment 
industries industry  
1950~"~4l I944 55 47 
1955 99 4261 45 43 
1960 970 51918 41 54 
1965 1514 87454 39 58 
1970 3491 158025 33 45 
1975 8047 257595 22 32 
1980 9499 275818 20 29 
1985 10307 292789 18 28 
1986 10392 299932 18 29 
1987 10565 298377 17 28 
1988 10412 286659 17 28 
1989 9672 274732 16 28 
1990 9746 251746 15 26 
1991 8837 224925 14 25 
1992 6980 167607 14 27 
1993 6943 167273 13 24 
1994 5628 137287 13 24 
1995 4928 111917 12 23 
1996 4016 89,112 n.a. |_n^  
Table 3.1.: No. of establishments, persons average in the industry, average number of persons engaged 
per establishment of the garment industry and average number of persons in all manufacturing 
industries from 1950 to 1996. selected vears 
source: Hong Kong Industiy Department, Hong Kong's Manufacturing Mustty, various years 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council 1997，Profiles of Hong Kong's Major 
Manufacturing Industries (1997:12) 
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Year Manufacturing Wholesale, retail, Financing, Community, Transport, 
export/import insurance, real social and storage and 
trades, restaurants estates and personal communication 
and hotels business services 
services  
1961 ~ ~ 4 ^ ~ ~ ( 4 0 % ) m n % # 265 87 
1971 677 (42.8%) 182 11.5% 26 312 115 
1980 892 (46%) 447 23.1% 127 167 75 
1985 849 (39.2%) 590 27.2% 179 203 95 
1986 870 (38.9%) 615 27.5% 191 207 98 
1987 875 (37.8%) 648 28% 210 214 104 
1988 845 (35.5%) 698 29.3% 231 222 113 
1989 803 (33%) 758 31.1% 249 234 125 
1990 730 (29.5%) 815 33% 273 250 130 
1991 655 (26.4%) 880 35.4% 289 262 131 
1992 571 (23.3%) 907 37% 308 263 144 
1993 508 (20.5%) 958 38.7% 336 275 153 
1994 438 (17.1%) 1051 41% 361 292 166 
1995 386 (15.5%) 1031 40.9 375 [_298 | j 7 0  
Table 3.2.: Number of Persons engaged bv major Economic Sectors. 1961-1995. selected vears 
Source: Hong Kong Industry Department, Hong Kong's Manufacturing Industries, various years 
#Figures have been included under wholesale, retail and import/export trades, restaurants and hotels 
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Year Manufacturing Financing, Wholesale, Community Transport, others 
insurance, retail, , social and storage and 
estates and import/export, personal communities 
business trades, services 
services restaurants 
and hotels  
1961""""^6 r M n^9 I s l ^ n 3 
1970 30.9 14.9 19.6 18 7.6 8.9 
1975 26.9 17 20.7 18.7 7.2 9.5 
1980 23.7 23 21.4 12.1 7.4 12.4 
1984 24.3 15.6 23.1 15.4 7.8 13.7 
1985 22.1 16 22.8 16.7 8.1 14.3 
1986 22.6 17 22.3 16 8.1 13.9 
1987 22 17.9 24.3 14.5 8.6 12.7 
1988 20.5 18.9 25.1 13.9 9.1 12.5 
1989 19.3 19.5 25 14.1 8.9 13 
1990 17.6 20.2 25.2 14.5 9.5 13 
1991 15.4 22.7 25.9 14.9 9.6 11.5 
1992 13.6 24.4 26.1 15.1 9.7 11.1 
1993 11.2 25.8 27 15.7 9.5 10.7 
1994 9.2 26.7 26.2 15.8 9.7 12.3 
Table 3.3: Contribution to Production-based Gross Domestic Product at current prices at percentage 
share bv Maior Economic Sectors. 1961 - 1994, selected vears 
Source: Hong Kong Industry Department, Hong Kong's Manufacturing Industries, 1989 - 1996 
Regarding to 1961, quoted from "Table 1.4 GDP by economic activity: HK (percentages)" in 
Hong Kong Business Environment, edited by David Lethbridge, 1980，Oxford University Press, 
pp.8. 
Year Gross Output Value-added of the Value-added per Value-added per 
(in Hong Kong clothing industry person engaged in person engaged in 
millions) (in Hong Kong clothing industry all manufacturing 
millions) (in HK '000) industry (in HK 
'000)  
1981 34979 10131 51 36 
1983 43170 12770 41 47 
1984 49453 15230 47 55 
1985 46891 14536 47 55 
1986 59452 17791 54 67 
1987 73910 21491 67 80 
1988 73874 21694 74 94 
1989 81652 23949 84 108 
1990 81954 23922 91 121 
1991 85095 23105 102 142 
1992 85164 24746 122 165 
1993 76764 21246 127 181 
1994 70866 18441 U4 m  
TabIe3. 4: Gross Output and Value-added of the garment industry from 1983-1994 
Source: Hong Kong Industty Department, Hong Kong's Manufacturing Industries, 1995 and 1996 
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Asia USS Index Latin America US$ Index 
Taiwan 14.87 U0 CostaRica 0 4 """ 6^6 
Hong Kong 13.55 100 DominicanRep 8.71 64 
Lidia 10.50 77 Guatemala 7.71 57 
Malaysia 9.23 68 Mexico (US 7.64 56 
Border) 
Thailand 8.48 63 Mexico 7.07 52 
Qfucatan)  
Table 3. 5: Cl0thin2 Production Costs per Standard Hour 
Source: KSA Report:7PP5 Techno-Economic And Market Research Study on Hong Kong's Textiles and 
Clohting Industries, Vol.l: Strategy for continued Leadership, p,30 
Year Total exports Domestic exports Reexports  
1989 2262 1538 724 
1990 2654 1737 917 
1991 3517 2261 1256 
1992 4594 3094 1500 
1993 5255 3526 1729 
1994 6040 4 ^ j^21  
(All in Hong Kong milUons) 
Table 3.6.1: Total exports, domestic exports and re~exDOrts to China for outward processing bv articles 
of apparel and clothing accessories - value from 1989-1994 
Total exports (in millions) Domestic exports to China Reexports to China for 
Year for outward processing (in outward processing % 
millions) (in millions)  
1989 23102 5234 (84.8%) 17868 
(71.5) 
1990 27975 5694 (84.2%) 22281 
(75.9) 
1991 35616 6330 (83.7%) 29285 
(77.1) 
1992 43658 6622 (87.4%) 37036 
(81.9) 
1993 44280 6042 (86.8%) 38238 
(81.0) 
1994 51766 5318 (79.4%) 46447 
(78.3) 
Bracket refers to the corresponding estimated proportion of outward processing trade 
Table 3.6.2: Total exports to China for outward processing bv textiles materials, varn. fabrics and 
textiles articles other than textiles garments, value and its proportion 
Source: CSD, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, June 1995 
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Year Value of domestic exports (in Percentage share of all 
HK$ millions) manufacturing industries in 
respective year  
1950 1 « 4,4 
1960 1010 35.2 
1970 4337 35.1 
1980 23258 34.1 
1984 46714 33.9 
1985 44912 34.6 
1986 52162 33.9 
1987 63321 33.5 
1988 67309 30.9 
1989 71874 32.1 
1990 72165 31.9 
1991 75834 32.8 
1992 77156 33 
1993 71857 32.2 
1994 73086 32.9 
1995 73801* n.a. 
1996 69447* n.a.  
Table 3.6.3: Value of domestic exports of the garment industry, 1950-1996 
Source: Hong Kong Industry Department, Hong Kong's Manufacturing Industries, 1995 
*Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 1997，Hong Kong'sMajor 
Manufacturing Industries, 13. 
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Chapter Four: 
Product strategy and the Mode of insertion of domestic garment 
manufacturers in the buyer-driven commodity chain 
Preamble 
In this chapter, I would Uke to describe the changes in the production strategy of 
local garment manufacturers and the mode of Hong Kong's insertion in the world 
economy through the buyer-driven commodity chain in the post-war decades. The 
purpose ofthis chapter is to demonstrate the ability of domestic manufacturers of capturing 
the market niche in the competitive environment during the 1990,s. As suggested by the 
resource dependency perspective in the organisation theory, domestic manufacturers, as the 
social actor for the organization, are not fuUy self-directed and embedded in the 
environment with other social a c t o r s � J n this light, the organization's activities and 
actions are constrained and influenced by the environment and other social actors. In 
order to enhance its autonomy and loosen its dependency on other social actors，an 
organization needs to acquire resources to maintain its ability of survival. In the context 
of the garment industry, I suggest that the development of the product strategy is very 
important to the manufacturers. How can they attract overseas buyers to the domestic node 
in the world economy is essential to their survival. Li fact, the fieldwork shows that 
domestic manufacturers are conscious to diversify their product strategies during the 
eighties as to strengthen their ability to compete with others in the market. While some 
interviewed manufacturers are doing the original equipment manufacturing (OEM) for their 
overseas buyers, some are aggressive to develop their own brand design or manufacturing. 
I would like to argue that the development of the own brand manufacturing in the 
commodity chains is a way to maintain their autonomy in the market. The organization 
of this chapter will be as follows: first, a general background of the thirteen garment 
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factories will be presented. The second part is an attempt to describe the experiences of 
garment manufacturers. Under industrial restructuring in the nineties and how they can 
obtain their orders in a competitive environment. We shall also look at their interaction 
with the buyers. Three types of production strategy in the OEM production will be 
identified in this section. The last part ofthis chapter examines the competitive edge of the 
industry in terms of "quick response", "flexibiUty" and "maintaining relationship" with 
customers. I hope that a sociological account of the above experiences of garment 
manufacturers in the nineties will help to shed light on the conditions of the industry and the 
changing production strategy in the context ofrestructuring. 
4.1. General profile of the thirteen factories 
Thirteen garment factories have been interviewed through the snow-ball sampling 
method from early July 1996 to early April 1997. Either the owner or management of the 
garment factories had granted me the opportunity to interview them. Different types of 
factory have been approached, ranging from the multinational group to a small-scale 
subcontracting factory. The sizes of the garment firms are defined according to the 
establishment size before relocation. Because there is a general trend of downsizing in 
the Hong Kong's factories after industrial relocation, the contraction in local production 
plant does not necessarily mean a reduction in their overall scale of production. 
Therefore, the establishment size before relocation is utilized to classify the size of the 
interviewed garment firms. Those firms with a workforce less than twenty people are 
classified as small-scale, while those under fifty are defined as small-medium, under five 
hundred is defined as medium-size, between five hundred to a thousand is medium-large 
size and over a thousand is classified as large-scale firm. Among these garment firms, one 
factory is small-scale, six are small-medium and the others are medium-large scale. Some 
have diversified their economic activities from production to retailing (Case G, H, L and M), 
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while others concentrate on manufacturing. It is not my intention to argue that data 
generated from these thirteen factories are sufficient to give a generalized picture. 
However, the factories being interviewed do cast light on the picture of stratified industrial 
structure in Hong Kong. Jn fact, I would like to use the experiences of these garment 
manufacturers to illustrate a more dynamic picture of the restructuring experience in 
Hong Kong. 
The factories I have interviewed are owned by local capitals, except one that 
belongs to a multinational group. They have different organizational histories. Three 
factories were set up in late fifties to sixties, five factories in the mid seventies, another 
five factories in the early eighties, and only one was set up in the nineties. Among them, 
nine factories have relocated the production line to China since the late seventies to early 
nineties. Two have overseas production in other South East Asian countries. Details of 
the factories are summarized in the table. 
Table 4 .1: General profile of the factories 
Cases year of nature of entrepreneur* establishment Economic activities 
set -up capital nationality O^fore relocatio 
relocation) Qfear)  
A 1987 local, private Chinese ^2 no assembling  
~B 1985 local, private Chinese 15 yes 1997 production,OBM 
C 1987 local, private Chinese ^ yes 1989 production  
D 1986 local, public Chinese 50 yes 1992 production  
E 1975 local, private Chinese 300 yes 1987 producticm  
F "1^78 local, private Chinese 300 yes 1989 production,  
G 1957 local, private Chinese 3 ^ yes 1981 production, trading 
H 1968 local, private Chinese ^22 52 production, trading 
J 1996 local, private Chinese 20 m production, trading 
_J 1986 local, private Chinese ^ no production  
K 1978 local, private Chinese 25 yes, but f production 
]992  
T 15^ local, public"""Chinese more than 300 yes 1978 retailing,OBM 
production,  
M 1968 local, publi Chinese 350 yes 1979 production, trading  
subsidiary  
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4.2. Product strategy ofthe local garment manufacturers in doing OEM and OBM 
All the manufacturers I have interviewed complain that it is becoming more and 
more difficult to get orders in the market, facing keen competition from other low-cost 
countries. In the early 1950's - 1970's, Hong Kong's garment manufacturers supplied low-
end, simple style garment products for the industrial countries like the United States and the 
European countries. With the emergence of low-cost countries in East Asia, Eastem 
Europe or Latin America, Hong Kong is no longer competitive in getting low-end orders. 
Manufacturers tried to secure medium-end to high-end orders in the eighties. Some firms 
manage to go beyond OEM by doing the orginal design or original brand 
manufacturing(OBM or ODM). Those firms succeed in doing OBM production usually 
have integrated into retail service and by doing so they do not have to rely on overseas 
buyers to get their orders. In the following, I would like to describe manufacturers， 
experiences in shifting their product line in the past ten years and their utilization of quick 
response to capture the market niches in the changing world economy. 
How the garment manufacturers capture the market niche in the GCCs through the 
OEM production 
4.2.1. Shift the product line to medium or high-end orders 
It is observed that there are different forms of reorganizing production strategy for 
the purpose of capturing market niches. Local garment manufacturers were very conscious 
about the necessity ofshifling their product line during the early eighties. 
Li the case of Factory F, the director is weU aware of the need of changing the 
product line to high-end products. Before such re-organization. Factory F produces 
jeanswear and jeans for overseas buyers for more than ten years. The orders are in mass 
volume but low-end. The director notes that, 
‘There is not much change in the style ofjeanswear. So is the price. The buyers know that the 
cost of this kind of garment You can't increase their price. Then how can you do itT 
As a veteran manufacturer in the industry for over twenty years, the director is very 
sensitive about new development in this industry. 
“I don't think getting orders is a great problem for me. Jf my product is of good quaUty, then we 
can still get the orders. I won't get the low~end orders. There are different prices. We can't 
compete with other low>cost countries. I think that there is an evolution process in the world 
economy. We do the cheapest product in the old days, and then the medium and high-end 
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product. The buyers come to Hong Kong and they know what they are looking for. K they want 
to find some low>end gcx>ds, they would go to Sri Lanka, Indonesia or India.” 
The director changed the product line from jeanswear to high fashions during the 
eighties. In case ofFactory F, they have two floors of working space with a workforce 
of over three hundred workers during late seventies. When the director decided to change 
their product line to high-fashion, he realized that that involved change in the quality 
control concept and the mentaUty ofthe workers. 
“In our indusUy we must overcome our mental block. I mean, sometimes we are rigid in this 
industry. We think that once you are specialized in certain product line and then that is. Your 
production line concentrates onjean and then you can't do the shirts. It seems that it's difficult 
to change the product Une. Previously you produce this kind of product and I do my mine. The 
product is so specialized. This is the same for the workers. Workers were not confident about 
mastering the skills in changing the product line. They think that they can't do it and resist the 
changes. They think that they can only make jeans and can't make blazers or coats. They 
don't accept the new arrangements when we change the product line at the initial stage.，， (The 
director offactory F ) 
Li fact, the director does not change the product line immediately. He divides the 
product Unes into two: one is jeanswear and the other is the high-fashion wears. The 
managing director explains that this enables the workers adapt to changes gradually. On 
the other hand, workmanship requires a better quality control system for high-fashion 
product. For instance, before proceeding to the next stage of production, each step is 
closely monitored to ensure the quality. 
Similar experience is found in Factory E, which was set up in 1975. At present, 
the product line concentrates on the medium-end ladies' executive garments, like blouses, 
skirts, shirts and trousers for the brand-named department stores in the US market. The 
sales price is around two to three hundred US dollars for the garment. In the seventies. 
Factory E produced ladies', children's knitwear, and jeanswear with simple style and 
low-end price. The owner realizes that they lose their competitiveness in the world 
market and therefore they diversify the product Hne to evening wear for the UK market. 
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Later they change the product Une to medium-end ladies' garment for the US market and 
give up the product line ofknitwear. 
As mentioned above, the shift of product Hne to medium-end or high-end orders 
required a change in the quaUty control procedure. To maintain product quality, some 
factories have applied the IS09002 to ensure quaUty assurance, (the factory L) To get 
the certificate ofthe IS09002, factory has to keep close inspection of different production 
procedures. 
4.2. 2. Specialization on specific market target 
The second strategy of capturing the market niche is by specialization of their 
product line on specific target. The following experiences of several factories could help 
us to understand this issue. 
The owner of Factory I started garment production in 1996, a latecomer in the 
industry. Having over ten years of experience in the industry, he specializes in doing 
children's wear and baby's wear for the European market in which not many suppUers do 
the same product line. His major buyers are mainly from Germany, whom he has been 
working with for over ten years before starting his factory. 
"Buyers are willing to offer an attractive price for the baby's wear and children's wear. A child's 
sweatshirt can be sold at some fifty Deutchmark in the market. The consumers are willing to pay 
for their children and the demand is quite stable. I don't worry about getting the orders in the 
market “ CThe owner of Factory I). 
While most manufacturers I have interviewed adopt OEM as their major product 
strategy, there are some exceptions. Another strategy is to do the original design 
manufacturing for the overseas buyers. (ODM) The owner of Factory B has been doing 
OBM before starting the production line in Hong Kong in the early eighties. As a fashion 
designer, she concentrates her product line on medium and high-end ladies' fashion in local 
and the European market. The order is very small which ranges from thirty pieces to several 
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hundred pieces. She describes her production is near "half-tailoring". Her own desi~ 
and the "half-tailoring" skills enable her to attract the East Asian buyers in the market. 
Apart from doing small-quantity, medium and high-end ladies fashions, the owne 
has always keep up her "sense of fashions" and knowledge on fabrics in the Europe31 
market. She visits Italy or Paris twice a year, look for updated and fashionable fabrics and 
to have direct access to the market. 
"This makes me sensitize of the needs of the buyers and their taste." (The owner of Factory B). 
4.2.3. Diversification of product lines with different price ranges 
The third product strategy is to diversify the product lines with different price 
ranges. It is quite a common practice for garment manufacturers in the nineties. Low-
end, mass volume orders are placed to the offshore or China's production plants while the 
Hong Kong's production lines deal with high-end orders. By doing so, the manufacturers 
can handle different types of buyers. 
The manager of Factory D tries to get the orders with more complicated styles 
like embroidery sewing on the garment. Specialized subcontracting to do the embroidery 
procedure is required in the organization of production. Such orders are usually medium-
end range. Meanwhile, they also receive the low-end orders in the market and send them 
to the production line in China. The manager suggests that although the low-end orders 
are not so profitable, they are important to support the production line in China because 
they keep a fixed cost in running a plant in China. So, orders from the low-end, simple-
style, medium quantity and low quality requirement will be placed to China's production 
line by offering the "made-in-China" option to the overseas buyers. In this case, the 
manufacturer can still manage to get the low-end orders and compete with other low-cost 
countries. 
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In the case of Factory G, their product lines are targeted at different markets in 
different prices so as to enhance their flexibility in getting the orders. Factory G is a 
veteran garment manufacturing group in Hong Kong with a history of over thirty years. 
Concentrating on making shirts and blouses in the past decades, it has enjoyed a high 
prestige and credibility to get orders from overseas markets. Their styles are become 
more fashionable and compUcated in the nineties. Order size remains several hundred to 
several thousands pieces. The group targets at those buyers' with price ranging, from 
low-end to high-end product, including Christian Dior, Cecilene, Banana Republic, Country 
Road, etc. Therefore, the group can enjoy a high degree of flexibility in getting the orders. 
Besides, this can help them to maintain the relationship with the various types ofbuyers in 
the market. 
Other factories have similar experiences. Factory C, J and K are smaU-scale 
factories, which have been set up between the seventies and the early eighties. There is 
no change in the product line after starting the business. They mainly produce ladies 
and men's knitwear. Factory J and Factory K have worked with the subcontracting 
garment factories in China through the outward processing arrangement while Factory K 
has a production line in China. The existence of the production network in South China 
enables them to compete with other low-cost countries for the low-end orders. (This part 
will be discussed in greater details in Chapter Six) 
I have interviewed a subcontractor ^"actory A) which concentrates on getting 
orders from other garment factories. Li the case ofFactory A, meeting rush orders with 
quality assurance is its competitive edge. The order size is relatively small, ranging from 
fifty bundles to a hundred bundles. 
"In many cases the parent factory asks me to finish the orders within ten days. It is quite common 
that some factories do not prepare well at the pre-production stage and this affects the production 
schedule. For instance, sometimes buyers are late to confirm the required size and color assortment 
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of the garment. It takes time to make the necessary arrangements for material sourcing before the 
production. So, it leaves Httle time for production." 
So, under such circumstances, the production lines in South China cannot totally 
replace the local factories when the subcontracting factories in Hong Kong can enjoy high 
degree offlexibility in the production. The owner suggests that orders received have been 
growing in numbers.. 
From the above observations, three types of product strategies through the OEM 
are identified in the fieldwork. The following table shows the typology of product 
strategy among the thirteen garment firms I have interviewed. 
Table 4. 2: Typology ofproduct strategy of the garment manufacturers in the 1990's 
1. Shift the product line to high-end fashions 
Cases Workforce Product line Characteristics Market  
E 350 from children's knitwear to medium-end private-labels in the US 
ladies' executive garment department stores  
F 300 men's and ladies' fashions mediumtohigh-end Brand-named company Uke 
Amami, C.K. Espirit  
H 300 ladies' and men's ladies medium-end brand-named companies 
2. Specialization in product line    
Cases workforce product line Characteristics Market  
I 20 children's and baby's wear medium and low-end Germany, specialty stores 
B 20 Ladies' fashions garment medium end, Europe (Sweden,Spain 
own brand manufk:turing small quantity England), East Asian 
(50%) as well as OEM market like Singapore and 
(50%) local  
3. Diversification in product line with different price range 
Cases workforce product line Characteristics Market  
G 300 Shirts, blouses low-end to high-end J^wn, US, Europe, 
buUc buyer Australia, brand-name 
companies  
C 50 Jeanswear, knitwear low-end to medium-end， US and East Asian 
medium volume  
L Morethan Jeanswear, ladies and low-end to medium-end^ JC Penny, GAP, Van 
300 causal volume 
wear  
J 20 Ladies' and men's knitwear low>end to medium-end^ no specific market 
small volume  
K 25 Ladies and men's knitwear low-end to medium-end^ European market and 
small volume East Asian market 
M 300 Men's woven and wool iow^endtohigh-end US and the European 
shirts orders, different market 
volume  
D 50 ladies and men's knitwear medium-end US and European, East  
Asian  
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The above shows that garment manufacturers manage to get orders in the 
market through the OEM production strategy. Besides, there are two factories doing the 
OBM. Here, I would like to explore their experiences of doing OBM and how this 
enhances the competitive edge of the factories. 
4.3. Experiences of doing OBM 
OBM differs from OEM in the sense that manufacturers do not only serve the 
buyers in accordance with the design of the products from the buyers, but also the 
manufacturers have developed their own design or own brands in the market. Usually, 
there is an integration of production, marketing, and retailing activities in the commodity 
chain when the manufacturer is prepared to do the OBM production. What are the 
experiences ofthe garment firms which are successful in doing the OBM? Why they can 
manage to do so? In what way that the experiences of doing OBM helps to enhance the 
competitive edge of the manufacturers? These are the questions that I would try to deal 
with in this section. 
First, before we look at the experiences of doing OBM in the market, I would like 
to argue that the embedded context as well as the organizational strength of the garment 
factories are quite important to do OBM. Factory B and Factory L are the two factories 
with its own brands selling in the market. I would Uke to argue that the background ofthe 
entrepreneur in case ofFactory B matters in explaining the successful experiences of doing 
OBM. 
Factory B was set up in 1985. Before starting the business, the owner is a fashion 
designer, graduated from the Design Department ofthe Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
in the late seventies. At first, she worked as a design assistant for the fashions firm and 
got the practical experiences there. Then she became a merchandiser in the buying offices 
for a few years. This enables her to build up the networks to obtain the orders. Having 
52 
few years' experience as a fashion design assistant and merchandiser, she joined with a 
partner to design ladies' fashion wear for local market. They gave the design sketch to the 
local factories and then distributed to local boutiques for sales. Later, she broke with her 
partner and continued her own business. She realized that it is difficult to maintain 
satisfactory quality control over the local subcontractors. She started garment 
production by herselfwhen her friend told her that they needed somebody else to takeover 
a smaU-scale factory in Cheung Sha Wan. Then she decided to take over the production 
plant and started her business. 
The establishment size is relatively small, only thirteen workers are employed at the 
production site. As mentioned above, having years of training and working experiences as 
a fashion designer, this enables her to develop own brand easier. At the initial stage of 
development, her own design was registered with a brand-name called "Marry". There 
were different collections under this brand-name, mainly on ladies' fashion wear. The major 
buyers were local boutiques and the East Asian buyers Uke Singapore, Malaysia. It was 
not until the early nineties that she is able to explore the European market. 
Recalling the experiences of doing own brand-name and how to build up the image 
for her own brand, the owner said, 
"I have to approach the buyers by mysetf, give them samples for inspection before confirming the 
orders. That's different now. I buy the fabrics, make the sample and then give it to the local 
boutique before we started the production. The customers come to visit our sample room to confirm 
theirorders." 
Usually, the buyers from the local market or the East Asian countries Uke Singapore, 
Thailand accept the original design and use her brand-name. Because the fashion trend in 
the East Asian market is a bit slower than the US or the European market, then it is likely 
they accept her locally-designed garment. But the European buyers are different. Although 
they depend on the design service from the owner, they still use their own brand-name. 
The owner perceives that she can still maintain her competitive edge when the overseas 
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buyers need her design service. She also recognizes having the retailing chain-store is a 
faster way to establish the image of the brand-name. 
"Having retail chain stores is a faster way to build up the image ofyour own brand- name, 
like the Giorando or G2000. But then I need enormous amount investment to do that" 
However, it is not financiaUy viable for the owner to set up her own retail chains to 
promote the image ofher own brand-name. 
The above experience shows that the background of the entrepreneur is quite 
important for the garment firms to develop their own brand. Similarly, other cases like the 
Brand name like "Sandy Liu" is also successfully developed by an international garment 
group during the mid eighties. The firm was started as an apparel trading company 
dealing with Italian buyers before it integrated garment manufacturing as its major business. 
It was not until 1986 the trading firm changed to a garment production firm, producing silk 
fashion wear for Italian buyers. The production managing director Miss Sandy Liu is 
responsible for the production. Graduated from the Hwa Dong Textiles University in 
China, she has expertise knowledge on silk garment production. Then, the company uses 
her name as the brand-name for silk production. The collection ranges from men's and 
women's wear, underwear. At present, her clothing have been sold in more than two 
hundred boutiques in France, Spain and Italy. (Textiles and Clothing: 1991 :Vol3:70-72) 
Factory L is very prominent in moving up the global commodity chain through the 
OBM in the nineties. The owner started as a small factory doing subcontracting orders 
from other garment factories at the initial stage ofdevelopment in the early seventies. The 
product Hne concentrated on jeanswear and denim jeans. The owner expanded the 
manufacturing base to other third world countries between the late seventies and the early 
nineties. The offshore production bases served as a subcontracting network for the group in 
its development. In the nineties, when one ofhis major buyers in the Australia encountered 
financial difficulties, the group grasped the opportunities to acquire a minority 
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shareholding interest in the buyer's company. It is a causal wear retail chain network, with 
a brand-name called Jeanseast. 1 In 1994, the Group fully controlled the management 
after they secured the acquisition of shareholding interest. Then the group continued to 
use since J eanseast as their own brand-name and developed vertical chain stores in Australia and 
Northern part of China since 1994. 
The integration of brand-name retail chain helps to support the group to do the 
OBM. After getting the existing brand-name from the Australian chain stores, the Group 
develops a group of over twenty designers serving the brand-name. Members of the design 
team attend trade fairs and fashion shows held in the US, Europe and Australia to assess the 
latest fashion trends. Then product samples will be prepared and orders for the 
forthcoming season. Besides, the Group also invests in the value-added activities of 
marketing, promotion of their brand-name through massive advertising and overseas 
promotion activities. The managing director of the Group suggests that it is necessary to 
make investment in all these activities. At present, they have 301 retail chain stores 
under the control of the Group. Over seventy percent of the apparel retailed by the Group 
are supplied by the manufacturing operations of the Group and its associated companies 
respectively. Other subcontractors supply the remaining 24 per. To get sufficient 
financial requirements for the rapid expansion of retail chains in China, the Group 
becomes a public-listed company. The capital being raised in the stock market is four 
hundred millions, which provides an enormous financial back-up for the expansion of retail 
chains in China's market. (The experiences of doing OBM and their significance in the 
sharing the retail market will be discussed in the next chapter.) In the experience of the 
Case L, the group itself has taken over the factories of the buyers and has moved towards 
directly selling its products. 
1 The brand-name for factory L is a faked name. 
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4.4. How buyers are attracted to the domestic node 
4.4.1. Make a perfect match in the market 
In the daily operation, the buying office or the trading company's merchandising 
department has an evaluation profile ofthe suppliers, which outlines the financial situation, 
quaUty of workmanship, turnover volume, terms of payments and past records of the 
garment manufacturers. Since there are so many garment manufacturers and anonymous 
buyers in the market, how do both parties make a perfect match in the market? Neo-
classical economists claim that "price" is the governing principle that binds the two parties 
together. Economic actors have perfect information about market signals and they can 
act rationally. However, it is observed that personal networks matter in the matching 
process. As Granovetter has clearly stated in his seminal article "Embeddedness and Social 
Structure", the action of any social actors is historically and socially embedded in on-going 
personal relations. (Granovetter: 1985) The "embeddedness" perspective is useful to help 
us to understand how economic actions are embedded in social relations. Now let us 
tum to examine the experiences of different garment firms in getting the orders through a 
personal network. 
First, few manufacturers depend on the formal channel to promote the image of the 
factories like the trade fair from the Trade Development Council. 
"You have to pay several hundred thousands dollars for renting an exhibition stall just for a 
few days. But it's not so useful. The area is too smaU and we can't show our samples to 
the customers. It's not so effective to get the orders there, except for exchange ofthe name-
cards. I prefer to advertise on the trade magazine or depend on the referral from my 
friends." (Mr. Tang, the owner 0fFact0ty I) 
In the case of Factory I，the owner started the business in early 1996. The pre-
established ties from his ex-employment is important to help him to get orders in the 
market. Having working in a garment factory for over ten years, he was responsible for 
the production as well as other trading-related activities. When his ex-employer decided 
56 
to emigrate to another country in 1995, Mr. Tang took over his employer's business. 
Having over ten years' production and merchandising experiences in the industry, he can 
manage to secure his orders from previous buyers he knows of. This ensures him ofstable 
order at the initial stage ofdevelopment. At present, Mr. Tang works with three frequent 
buyers that occupy some seventy percent of the production capacity of the whole 
production line. 
The experiences from other factories are very similar. The order source either 
comes from their friends in factories, agents or designers in the industry. The managing 
director of Factory F suggests that getting orders in the market depends a lot of 
"referral" from friends and designers from other brand-named companies. 
"It is meaningless when you boast how good is your product quality. The referral from the 
designer is more effective. TheyVe their own circle and meet constantly to discuss which 
garment suppliers have good workmanship. Sometimes the old generation told the young 
generation which garment supplier is credible. The designer from Armani used to work 
for Calvin Klein. Because we worked together previously, it is a better way to get the 
orders." (Mr. Cheung ofFactory F) 
By the same token, when the new buyers approach the owner, it does not 
automatically lead to a successful deal for both parties. My informant suggests that they 
must examine the background of the new buyers before deciding to supply goods for him. 
"When somebody phones to me and wants to do business with me, the first question I must 
ask is "How do you know my factory?" "Who introduces my factory to you?" and the financial 
background of the buyers. You know, we also have to take the risks because we pay for the 
production cost before we can get their payments. 
In the case ofFactory I, the owner has similar response, 
"Ifthe new buyers are recommended by my friends, then I'll do his orders. Otherwise I may 
reject him. 
At the initial stage of starting up the business, the owner ofFactory I gets the 
orders in a cautious manner. As mentioned, when he can secure orders from his 
network, he does not want to bear the risks ofcontacting other new buyers, especially 
ifhe is not sure about the background of the new buyers. 
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"In this world, some buyers are cunning. Theyjust want to make quick money and cheat us. 
I know a friend who receives order from an overseas buyer with massive orders. Evetything is 
OK at first. The buyer pay for the goods for the first and second time. Then this buyer 
rejects the goods before deUvery because he was dissatisfied with the workmanship during the 
third time. He insists on rejecting the goods and makes claim towards my friend. 
Finally, another third party comes to purchase the goods at a very lower price. Later my 
friend knows that the buyer and the third party work together to press down the prices." 
To avoid the loss from this kind of "cunning buyer", the owner recognizes that it 
will be more secure to get orders from the friends, rather than through an anonymous buyer 
in the market. 
Jn the industry, the manufacturers have their own network, meet together and share 
information about which buyer is demanding, troublesome, or which buyer is good partner. 
While it is not my intention to go deep into details about how this network is formed among 
the manufacturers, it is interesting to note that the information pool ofthis network serves 
as one ofthe order sources for the garment factories. The experiences ofFactory A and 
Factory D can illustrate this point. 
Factory D is a subsidiary company of a Multi-national Group which was set up in 
the mid eighties. Although it is a subsidiary for a multinational group, the business 
operation is quite independent. The manager says that he has to get orders by his own 
means, without the assistance from the Group. 
"The Group has only very Umited assistance to us in getting the orders. We only enjoy some 
advantages because the group is financially viable and the buyers are confident to give us the 
orders. But I have to rely on my own network in the trading company or other factories to get 
the orders. For instance, you interviewed me today and you know some of the garment factories, 
perhaps one day I need your help to refer some factories that you know in getting the orders. For 
instance, you interview me today and you know some of the garment factories. Perhaps one day I 
need your help to refer some factories that you know in getting orders. “ CThe manager ofFactory 
D) 
In case of the subcontracting factory, the horizontal network among different 
factories in the industry is important to maintain the survival of the small-scale factories in 
Hong Kong. Factory A is the only subcontractor I have interviewed. The owner neither 
gets the orders from the trading companies nor from the buying office in the territory. 
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However, he manages to survive solely by depending on the orders from other parent 
factories in the past ten years. The parent factories offer the orders to Factoty A during 
peak season. Some manufacturers would discuss with him about the expected order 
size in the coming year while some do not. Therefore, the tie between the factories and 
Factory A is very weak in this manner. It is worthwhile to examine how this network is 
established by the owner. 
"I can know new friends in doing the Cut-Trim Manufacturing (CTM) for other factories. It's 
like a spider's net. Now this factory can't give me the orders, but then he knows some ofthe 
friends from other factory and he introduces his friends to me. His friend then gives me 
the order and become my network. Again, when his friend can't offer me the orders, then I 
would ask them to refer their factories to me. Such ongoing relationship enables me to know 
more Mends." (Mr. Lam ofFactory A). 
Apart from getting orders through the estabUshed social relations, it is observed 
that it is likely that large-scale factories are willing to invest a lot in promotion and 
marketing activities in order to build up their image for the overseas buyers. The 
experiences ofFactory G and L are as follows: 
The L Group's manager says that they do not have much difficulties in getting 
orders from new markets because of their established image in the industry. "Word of 
mouth" from the existing buyers is a way to find new buyers. This is because new buyers 
are confident about the quality of the product assurance when other famous brand-named 
companies and department stores purchase goods from the group. Although they enjoy 
such reputation, the group stiU spends an enormous amount in marketing. 
The group constantly participates in trade fairs organized by the Trade 
Development Council every year. The manager realizes that it is a way to show 
themselves before the new buyers. Besides, the group holds overseas exhibition in the 
United States, Japan and Europe and contacts new buyers directly. 
"Even we don't get the orders in the trade fair, it doesn't matter. We can give an impression 
to the buyers. We go to the US and lock the door of the buyer. It's difBcult for you to get 
business there. But then you can give him the impression that you tune in the market and 
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have the sense. You don't just stay in Hong Kong. Then after you lock the door in the US, 
then you contact the agent in Hong Kong. Because weVe taUced to the buyers before, left 
our namecard to him. The buyer will have some ideas about our image. When the agent 
tries to find their supplier, at least weVe some advantages over other factories."( The manager 
ofFactoty G) 
4.4.2. How to maintain relationship with the buyers 
Hong Kong's garment industry is famous for its good service to overseas buyers in 
such a way that many overseas buyers would like to see Hong Kong as a sourcing center 
QAH Report:1997:147). M the informants suggest that quick response, flexibility, good 
service and keeping good relationship with their customers is a "Must" to compete with 
others. But how are these elements socially organized in their everyday practice? I would 
try to bring out the contents of "flexibility" and "quick response", which are anchored in 
the everyday practice of the manufacturers. 
First, I would like to examine the notion of "quick response". Today, overseas 
buyers are very careful to confirm the orders at the latest moment. Unless they are very 
certain about the market trend and what kind of garment sells well in the market, they 
would not make the decision. It is observed that many manufacturers encounter great 
pressure to compress their production cycles and the lead time is very short. After the 
buyer confirms the orders, they have to deliver the goods within forty days, including the 
sourcing of all the necessary materials. Then, the manufacturer has to ensure a smooth 
coordination ofmaterial sourcing, production and delivery in order to meet the deadline of 
the buyers. Quick response to the requirements ofbuyers and being on time are important 
for keeping relationship with the buyers. Perhaps the experience of Factory F can 
iUustrate this point. When the buyer has a design sketch on a specific garment, he wiU 
fax the draft to the factory and asked for the quotation price. After receiving the draft, the 
manufacturer checks all the necessary production cost of materials, accessories and give the 
quotation price to the buyer within a day. 
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"The buyer gives me the draft in the moming and then I give the quotation price to him in the 
aftemoon. This is my objective, I don't want to have any delay. I make the point that you 
give me the draft and I told you in the aftemoon, after getting all the fabrics' information 
fi:om South Korea or other East Asian countries. This is our competitive edge. Many 
overseas buyers have trouble in finding suppliers in China, even the price is vety low. But 
they (the Mainland factories) do not guarantee you about the schedule. That's why we still 
maintain our competitive edge in getting the orders, CThe managing director ofFactoty F) 
Besides, quick response also means the manufacturer has to be very sensitive to the 
marketing trend ofthe garment products and master the marketing information. Knowledge 
of the market trend, about which kind of fabrics is popular, and where he can do the 
sourcing for necessary materials within a short period are important. 
"Buyers give me the fabrics sample from Florence. Then I have to do the sourcing and find the 
same quality of fabrics at a lower price, maybe in South Korea or Taiwan. This is the rule of 
thumb, ffyou're not familiar and quick response, how can we compete with other countries?" 
In the case of Factory M, their product line is the woven and wool garment. 
Before they get the orders from the buyers, the owner will discuss with the producer ofthe 
spinning factory in advance to prepare different kind ofyams for the prospective orders. 
"We arrange different color combination of spin yam. I have an estimate of the buyers' 
needs. Of course, sometimes it is out of our expectation when the color combination is not 
the same as the requirements of the buyers. It seems that some of our effort is wasted 
because of the idle fabrics. But it's not a waste as such. I can save the time and start the 
production immediately with the support of the spinning factory. “ (The managing director 
ofFactoryM) 
The support from the sourcing suppliers is important to enhance the production 
planning capabilities and the ability of quick response for the garment manufacturers in the 
market. 
Besides, giving the sample to the overseas buyers within a very short time is crucial 
in the garment industry. Before the confirmation of order, buyers would ask the factories 
to make the sample for them before determining which supplier can grasp the orders. In 
some cases, even though management has relocated its sample room to South China, they 
can still finish the sample within a few hours and give it to the buyers. The experience of 
Factory F, doing fashion-oriented jackets like Armani, CaIvin Klein, Esprit, is illustrative. 
"They give us the draft, I tell my craftsman to make the sample~draft. Then I fax to 
Shenzhen's plant to ask the worker to do the sample. I go to the Shenzhen's plant in the 
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aflemoon and get back the sample in the evening. That's convenient and I'm happy to meet 
the buyer's requirement. 
Good service and flexibility of the manufacturers in Hong Kong also enable them to 
get orders in a competitive environment. Almost all the informants take full 
responsibility of quality control. When contingencies arise, local manufacturers are willing 
to share the burdens and risks with the overseas buyers. 
The managing director ofFactory L, as a multinational group for over twenty years, 
explains why they can keep stable relationship with the upper-end brand-named companies 
for years, 
"Sometimes there is communication problem between the sales department and their buying 
office about the stock delivery. Then their department store is out of stock. We're 
informed of an earlier delivery date. We deliver the goods by flight and share the additional 
flight cost." 
However, manufacturers also realize that the buyers take advantage over them on 
this point when the manufacturers take full responsibility for the orders. Whatever 
products are not well sold in the market, the buyers shift the burden to the manufacturers by 
claiming discounts on them. 
Apart from quick response, when the quotation price exceeds the buyers' 
budget, ,manufacturers are willing to help the buyers to find alternative method to 
overcome this problem. Like the case of Factory E, they have established long-term 
relationship with their frequent buyers. In the usual practice, every buyer has their own 
budget to purchase goods for department stores every year. They purchase the goods 
from the manufacturer within this budget. However, when the production cost exceeds 
the buyer's budget, the manufacturer is trying the best to find the solution for the buyer. 
"We come across a situation that the buyer finds a good quality fabrics, but the cost for this 
kind of fabrics is quite expensive and exceed the budget We try to fmd the alternative to 
help the customers. Sometimes we even make a loss in the transaction. We're willing to 
do so. Because this buyer always support us by giving the orders to our factoty."( Miss Cheng, 
the general manager ofFactoty E) 
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The manager is willing to give up their profit in the short term in exchange for a 
long-term relationship with the buyer. To a certain extent, she expects that there is a 
reciprocity relationship between both parties. This form of relationship is not purely an 
exchange or both parties are trying to act in an opportunistic manner. In fact, both parties 
are expected to have long-term relationship that makes the cooperation possible. 
I would like to contend that there exists a power relationship between the buyer and 
the manufacturer. However, the emergence ofthe power relationship between the buyers 
and the manufacturers is in a latent form, and that depends on the importance of the 
buyers to the manufacturers. If the buyer is the main order source for the manufacturer 
(in other words, the more the resource dependent on any particular buyer) it is more Ukely 
that there emerges an imbalanced power relationship between the two parties. Perhaps the 
following episode given by a medium-size factory owner can illustrate the above argument. 
"The overseas buyers give the orders to the manufacturers in other Asian country because of 
their lower price. Sometimes the Asian manufacturers don't finish orders because they get 
another with higher quotation price. Since the quotation price for this particular order is for 
the Asian supplier, it must be very low. The buyer ask us to finish the orders for them 
within a rush period. Of course, because we want to keep our prestige，we're willing to do 
so. ” (Mr Yiu, owner of the Factory C) 
He suggests that such demand from the frequent buyer is unreasonable and unfair to 
them. But he also realizes that since the frequent buyer is their major order source, 
they have to keep good relationship with them in exchange for long-term order stabiHty. 
Jn case of the contingencies or conflicts with the buyers, local manufacturers are likely to 
compromise with the buyers. 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
To summarize the experiences of the garment firms, it is noted that they 
capture the market niche through three types of product strategies. While some firms 
shifl the product line from low-end to high-end, some have diversified the product 
Hnes in different price ranges to target at different types of buyers through the OEM 
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production. Besides, some garment manufacturers manage to do the OBM or 
ODM to move up to the commodity chain. The more aggressive manufacturers, 
with more organizational resources, try to develop their own brands to capture the 
market niche. This chapter also brings out how an order is matched in the market 
through the utilization of ongoing social relations of the owners and management in 
the industry. Besides, it is also found that manufacturers' flexibility and quick 
response to the customers' needs as weU as keeping good relationship with the 
customers are important to ensure them to compete for orders. Their experiences 
demonstrate that domestic manufacturers are conscious to respond to the external 
demands and restructure the product strategy to maintain their competitiveness in the 
market. Then, the next question is，after product strategy is being identified by the 
garment manufacturers, how they do connect themselves with the overseas buyers 
through the local trading network, or with the direct linkage with the overseas buyers? 
Besides, there emerge different types of interfirm Unkage with the buyers. This will 
dealt in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five: 
Interfirm Linkages in the Buyer-Driven Commodity Chain 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the nature of the interfirm linkages between domestic 
manufacturers and buyers in the buyer-driven commodity chain. As stated in the 
previous chapter, Gereffi has argued that in the buyer-driven commodity chain, there is 
a governance structure that in which buyers are influential in shaping the organization 
of production network. In this process, there is an authority and power relationship 
behind this buyer-driven governance structure that determines the flow of financial, 
human and material resources in the commodity chain. However, Gereffi has not 
given a clear and substantial account on the content of this governance structure. In 
what way is the power and authority relationship constituted in the nodes (network) in 
the commodity chain? I would suggest that we need a more substantial examination 
of the nature of the "nodes" in the commodity chain for unravelling the nature of the 
buyer-driven governance structure. Relating this discussion to the study of industrial 
restructuring in Hong Kong, the economic actors that are active in the commodity 
chain of garment making are local manufacturers, traders and the overseas buyers. 
Their interaction in the "product world" implies that there are different types of 
interfirm linkages to connect the parties together in the GCCs. My field observations 
show that there are many types of interfirm linkages in the commodity chain, an issue 
neglected in the GCCs literature. 
The resource dependency theory discussed in Chapter Two states that it is 
more likely the influencer who possesses more resources can exert control over the 
organization when the resources are critical and important to the organization. This 65 
leads to a power and dependence relationship between the influencer and the 
dependent organization. However, the dependent organization also tries to enhance 
its autonomy by altering the conditions that facilitate them to acquire more resources. 
In the context of the garment industry, I would suggest that the critical resources of 
overseas buyers include their knowledge on the product and marketing information 
and the power of allocating the orders to different suppliers in the market. They are 
important to influence the survival of domestic manufacturers. However, I would 
contend the resources possessed by the overseas buyers lead to the power and 
control relationship between the organizations under some conditions.(I would 
elablorate this point at Section 5.3) We need to examine the interactions between the 
parties as to unravel the conditions that create a power and authority relationship. 
Therefore, I would firstly examine: when the manufacturers are incorporated in 
the world economy, what functions do the local trading network perform in the 
GCCs? Under what conditions do the manufacturers bypass the traders and have 
direct linkage with the buyers? The remaining part will examine the diversity of 
interfirm linkages between overseas buyers and local manufacturers in the commodity 
chains. There emerges two types of ties with the buyers which are anchored in the 
interaction between the two parties in the buyer-driven commodity chain. I will bring 
out the nature and characteristics of these ties. How do local manufacturers interact 
with the buyers in the product world? What kind of resources do both parties 
possess? What kind of bargaining power do local manufacturers enjoy in dealing 
with the buyers? How do domestic manufacturers strengthen its autonomy as to 
loosen their dependencies on their buyers? These are the questions that will be 
answered in this chapter. 
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5.1. Local trading network as mediator in the GCCs 
Big buyers are embedded in the export and distribution networks in which they 
establish with overseas suppUers and trading companies in the global commodity chain. 
Jn the early days, few US retailers set up direct buying offices in Asia. Only a few big 
buyers, Uke Sear Roebuck, Montagmery Ward and Macy's, set up their buying offices 
in Hong Kong in the earlyl960's (Gereffi:1994:119). Most garment manufacturers did 
not directly contact overseas buyers because of the language barrier. They need 
to rely on the trading houses or agents. In the early days, the local trading network 
consists of the Indians trading firms, British firms and local Chinese. The Indians 
established sales network to open up the Middle East and South Eastem markets and 
acted as a linkage for the manufacturing business while the British trading companies 
worked for the XJK market^Iong Kong Fashion History:1992:110). 
On the other hand, because foreign buyers were not familiar with the Hong 
Kong's manufacturers, they also had to rely on the buying office or trading houses' 
knowledge of local producers. In my fieldwork, a veteran garment factory reported 
great difficulties in establishing direct link with the US big buyers during the sixties. 
"hi the sixties HK was very new for US buyers who sourced goods mainly from Italy. The 
A.H..Macy's was a famous US department store and I wanted to do business with them. The buyer 
visited our factoty several times, accompanied by their representative in their Hong Kong office. But 
he never gave us orders. I was so eager to do business with them. I asked him whether he could give 
us orders. It's worthwhile to make a Uttle loss for the time being. Theyjust gave two types ofwoven 
wear with three colours, for only ten dozens and a hundred pieces per style. The buyer said that they 
didn't have the budget. Anyway, it's a good start for me then. Their response was positive. I 
delivered the goods on schedule. After a week I was told that the goods were sold out. They accept 
our workmanship and realize that clothes made in Hong Kong are of good quality. Then our 
relationship starts." (Mr. Hong, the managing director ofFactory M recalled his experience ofstarting 
direct Unk with the overseas buyers during the sixties.) 
My field observations show that some manufacturers ^^actories A, B, E, G, 
and I) do not depend on trading company. 
5.1.1.Coordination function in order matching and production stage 
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To ensure an order match between the buyer and the manufacturer, the trading 
companies usually have their own vendors' list to decide the order allocation. This 
Ust includes the past records of the manufacturers, the workmanship, the financial 
situation, etc. The manufacturer is required to give a quotation price to the traders. 
Since buyers do not know who is the best supplier, they need to rely on the network 
and knowledge of the trading companies. The trading companies are responsible to 
ensure an order match between the local manufacturers and overseas buyers. 
On the other hand, the trading company has to help the buyers to work with 
the manufacturers in the pre-production stage. For instance, when buyers give a 
sketch to the trading company, then the trader finds appropriate manufacturers to 
make the sample. Once the order is confirmed, the manufacturer starts to source the 
fabrics and accessories. The trader has to help the manufacturers to do the sourcing. 
5.1.2. Financial function of the trading house to the factories 
The financial function of trading houses is another important service to the 
factories with limited organizational resources or working capital, especially among 
the small-scale firms. For instance, local manufacturers always need to acquire 
quotas for exports. In the industry, the quota allocation depends on the manufacturers' 
past export performance. Therefore, manufacturers who are the pioneers in the 
industry usually accumulate a large amount of quota ownership. Quota becomes an 
asset when they can be sold in the market. When any specific category of the quotas 
are in short supply, local manufacturers without this category have to obtain it either 
through the local trading houses or sourcing agents. (Chu:1988:215-6) Because of 
price fluctuations, sometimes it is difficult for the small-scale factories with Umited 
financial resources to purchase the quotas. In this process, trading houses or sourcing 
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agents holding quotas can help the small manufacturers to solve the problem. 
Factory J was set up in 1986. The owner worked as a garment machinist 
before starting the business. The venture capital mainly came from her sister and other 
family members. She gets the orders only from one frequent buyer and one sourcing 
agent. The manager complains that it is quite difficult to estimate the quota price 
because of its fluctuation. He relies on trading houses to get quotas. 
"It's difficult to estimate the quota price. Once you confirm the orders from the agent, you need to 
prepare for everything, including looking for quotas. We can apply from the Industty Department 
evety year. But it's rare for us to use it because the quantity is very small. The categories we're 
looking for are always in tight supply. Then sometimes we're looking for orders ofEQ." (Mr Pun, 
general manager ofFactoty J) 
EQ orders means that the orders exclude the calculation of quota price and the 
agent bears the cost of acquiring quota. This helps to alleviate their financial pressure. 
Besides, manufacturers have to purchase the fabrics and to source 
accessories before getting payments from their buyers. Again, the trading companies 
give a deposit in advance as part of the payment, usually about thirty per cent of the 
order price. The manufacturer can purchase the fabrics with such cash available to 
them. Other costs like sending samples to the buyers and communicating with the 
buyers are bome by the traders to relieve the financial pressure of the small-scale 
garment firm. 
My field observations suggest that for those factories which have built up the 
close tie with the trading companies, it is quite rare for them to bypass the latter and 
directly contact with the buyers. 
"ff we directly contact the buyers, they will ignore you. They have their own agents in Hong Kong. 
Besides, you need to invest time and effort to develop the relationship with the buyer. But you are 
not assured to get the orders from him. That's why we deal with the agent." (Mr Pun, general manager 
ofFactoty J) 
5.1.3. Managing conflicts and contingencies between two parties 
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When there are conflicts or any contingencies, Uke late shipment or a problem 
in workmanship arising between buyers and local manufacturers, the trader has to 
play a negotiating role for both parties to find a solution. 
"It is more convenient to taUs: something with a third party. For example, we have different opinion 
with the buyers, then it is easier to let the third party to speak for us. Sometimes after we have 
conflict with the buyers, even if they want to work with you in business, it's rather difficult to do so 
unless there is a third party. When conflict emerges, the third party bargains for the manufacturer.“ 
(Mr Yiu, owner 0fFact0ty C) 
Another factory shares similar experience, the general manager of Factory D 
explains how the traders can help reconcile the conflicts, 
"In our industty, it is easy to get into conflict with the buyers about product quality. 
Although the agent is responsible for quality control, we need to sign a letter of guarantee to ensure 
that buyers could claim goods against us. But then the sourcing agent or the trading houses try to 
make a 50-50 and bargain for us. It's natural because they cannot get any commission from the 
buyers if their goods are claimed by the buyers." 
5.2. Building up direct link with overseas buyers in the GCCs 
Fieldwork data show some manufacturers are less dependent on local trading 
houses and have direct linkage with overseas buyers. It is interesting to note that the 
background of local manufacturers and their trading business background are quite 
important to explain why they can bypass trading company and contact overseas 
buyers directly. 
The owner ofFactory B graduated from the Institute of Textiles and Clothing 
of Hong Kong Polytechnic in the late 1970's. Having years of fashion design and 
merchandising experiences before starting the business in 1985, she has built up good 
network with overseas buyers. She visited Europe twice a year to keep close contact 
with her customers. Her buyers are not brand-named companies or chain-store mass 
merchandiser. Listead, they run retail shops in the European market. 
"Most of our buyers are small retail shops with only a few persons, just like our factory. I can 
better understand their needs and have quick response to them directly. It would be difficult to rely 
on trading houses. Buyers have to pay commission to the agent The cost will be higher." (May, 
owner ofFactory B) 
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Factory I shares similar experience. The owner is a veteran merchandiser and 
production manager before starting the garment business in 1996. When he decided to 
start the garment production last year, he discussed with his old buyers to secure the 
order. Having this pre-estabUshed tie, he needs not rely on other trading houses. 
Good credibility is also essential to make direct linkage with overseas buyers. 
My observation is that garment firms with long histories in the industry or those which 
produce high-end fashions usually have direct links with overseas buyers and are less 
dependent on local trading houses OFactories E, F, G, H, L and M). There are two 
meanings for "good credibility." First, garment firms provide high product quality 
goods and can deliver their products on schedule. Second, the manufacturers are 
willing to take full responsibility for the goods. If any quality failure arises, local 
manufacturers share the claims from the buyers. 
Besides, it is observed that factories with a trading house background also tend 
to bypass trading houses and have direct links with overseas buyers ^Factory E and H). 
Factory H was set up in 1968 as a trading and manufacturing-related business. The 
trading company was mainly responsible for export and import businesses between 
China and the European markets. The manufacturing operation is on ladies' and 
men's fashion-oriented clothing. Because of this trading background, they do not 
need to rely on other trading houses. 
5.3. The emergence of "close" and "loose" ties between local manufacturers and 
overseas buyers in the GCCs 
To enter theoretical dialogue with Gereffi on the buyer-driven governance 
structure, I would unearth the nature of interfirm Unkages between buyers and 
domestic manufacturers in the GCCs. I would examine the dynamics and 
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complexities of the relationship between these two parties in the buyer-driven 
commodity chain in this section. Two patterns of ties emerge in Hong Kong. The 
first is the close-tie pattern, which is characterized by its negotiated and contested 
nature. Another is loose-tie pattern, which is dominantly characterized by its 
instrumental nature. Every domestic manufacturer has a network of order sources, 
which may include frequent buyers and non-major buyers. Frequent buyers give 
orders to manufacturers on a stable basis, and non-frequent buyers do not. I would 
mainly use two criteria to classify what the tie is. The first is whether the 
manufacturer can clearly state the number of frequent buyers and its share of the 
>~^ 
production capacity. Second, the manufacturer's subjective perception on the 
relationship with buyers. If the manufacturer can clearly state the number of major 
buyers who would assure order stability to support the production capacity, and 
describes the relationship with each other as close (or other similar meanings), I would 
then classify their relationship as a "close-tie" pattern. On the other hand, if the 
manufacturer cannot state the number of frequent buyers and perceives the 
relationship with the buyer as "loose" or "no relationship at aU", then I would classify 
the tie as a "loose-tie"V 
I would then examine the characteristics of these two types of "tie" in the 
following dimensions: form of co-operation, governing principle in order match, 
how do they resolve conflicts and contingency, and the manufacturers' subjective 
perception on their relationship. These dimensions are anchored in the everyday 
interaction between both parties. This would shed Hght on the nature ofties between 
1 But there is one case (Pactory F) that falls in between these two categories. Although the 
manufacturer ofFactoty F can clearly state out the number of major buyers and worked with them for 
over ten years, he described that he has a very loose relationship with the buyers. But I still classify 
this case into the category of "loose-tie" pattern. 
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both parties for our understanding of the substance ofthe governance structure in the 
buyer-driven commodity chain. 
5.3.1. Close tie pattern 
Local manufacturers have built up long-term relationship with overseas buyers 
for eight to twenty years, depending on the histories of the garment firms ^"actory B, 
C, E, G, H, I，L and M). Stable relationship with buyers guarantees order stability to 
the manufacturers. This enables them to plan ahead in organising the production. 
Manufacturers usually discuss with their frequent buyers at the beginning of a year 
about the orders and the required production capacity. Then the manufacturer plans 
their production schedule and the required quota. Perhaps the situation described by 
the managing director ofFactory M can help us to understand the situation, 
"Every year weVe plan on the use of quotas and decide which categories we are going to sell, which 
categories to be reserved for our factory. We gather information firom the buyers and from the market 
when we formulate our plans. So at the beginning of every year, we discuss with the buyers on their 
order sizes." 
Again, the manufacturers also inform their frequent buyers in advance the 
production capacity will be full that year. They try to look for other alternative ways, 
like subcontracting. 
Frequent buyers are usually major sources of orders (accounting for 70 to 90 
percent of all orders) for garment firms. Large-scale factories are likely to have 
larger number of major buyers, each with a different price range (G, L and M), while 
the small factories having few major buyers (Factory B, C, E and J). 
Governing principle- network matters 
Li the close-tie pattern, price is not the only governing principle for both 
parties for order match, which counters the economic efficiency argument. Local 
manufacturers do not necessarily reject orders even if the price does not reach their 
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expectations. Instead, the expectation of "reciprocity" exists between both parties. 
Besides, manufacturers handle in a different manner towards frequent and non-
frequent buyers in case of rejecting orders. The foUowing experiences can illustrate 
this situation. 
Factory G has built up over ten years' relationship with several major buyers in 
the past decades. The manager maintained that they received orders which are not 
profitable from major buyers. 
"When their business is not good, we support them. We eam less in those occasions. When their 
business is good, the buyers will raise prices for us. It's difficult to be too calculative The buyer has 
to look after other suppliers as well. You give him the mercy and do him a favour and they will do 
you a favour as well some other time." CThe manager ofFactory G) 
"Doing a favour" for each other implies that they expect a long-term 
relationship. This prevents them from acting in an opportunistic manner. Neither 
party is pushing too hard to maximize their own interest at the expense of another 
party. In fact, it is quite costly for major buyers to look for other suppliers if they 
keep switching sources of supply. Other factories share similar experiences under the 
close-tie pattem. The owner of Factory I，before starting the business last year, 
worked with the buyers for nearly eight years in his previous job. He explains that 
personal relationship matters in getting orders. 
"We offered a price to a buyer but he couldn't give us the order. We discussed for several times but 
still he couldn't give us. I received the orders eventually and told him this was not a prior instance. 
WeVe worked together for so long, we know each other weU. I understand that "this time I do you a 
favour and then you can't take advantage over me every time. He gives me a reasonable price the 
next time. They'U give me reasons why they can't accept my price. I accept this if it's reasonable. 
This is due to friendship." (Owner ofFactory I) 
Here, the notion of "friendship" is not in a pure sense of "fellowship" or social 
intimacy. There exists a symbiotic meaning behind the meaning of friendship. Just 
Hke "doing favour for each other" as mentioned above, it shows that local 
manufacturer also expects a reciprocity with his buyers in the long term. It is less 
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likely that he would maximize his own interests in an opportunistic manner. 
Similarly, the general manager of Factory E maintains that she has many 
similar experiences, 
"There comes a time when the retail market is not good and the buyers offer a very low price for our 
goods. We still need to survive, l f l don't protect the customers (through accepting a lower price), then 
we'U be adversely affected, ffbuyers do not constantly press down our price, we still accept a lower 
price." 
Besides, the headquarters give buyers a budget to purchase goods every year. 
Then the buyer purchases the goods within the budget. Sometimes the cost of 
purchase exceeds the budget. In case of close-tie pattem, the manufacturer is 
willing to help the buyers. 
"The buyer chooses the fabrics with vety high quality, but the cost is quite expensive and exceeds the 
budget. We try to help the customers and source the required fabrics. In some cases we may make 
a loss in the transaction. We're willing to do so. The buyer always supports us by us stable orders. 
We would like to support them. So even the situation like this we're willing to help them. CThe 
manager ofFactory E) 
Besides, local manufacturers accept low-price orders from their frequent 
buyers occasionally when these orders are originally given to other East Asian 
countries. The Asian manufacturers cannot complete the orders for some reasons. 
Factory C has such experiences in their daily operation. 
"Our frequent buyer also source goods from other Asian countries. Some manufacturers are not 
responsible enou^. They don't keep their promise when the price from other buyers are more 
attractive, then theyjust give up the original orders. Our buyer asks us to help them within a wcry 
rush period. Ofcourse, since we have to keep our reputation,, we'd like to do sa.. "I think, well, let's 
subsidize him (the buyer) this time. We're farsighted enough about our cooperation. This time I help 
him, it's not a great problem" (Mr Yiu, the owner ofFactoty C) 
In this process, the owner is very conscious in evaluating the importance of the 
buyer to his business. The owner only accepts those orders from frequent buyers. 
l£ this is the new buyer, the manufacturer does not accept such orders. Getting 
"residual" orders is a way for local manufacturers to keep the relationship with their 
buyers. 
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Besides, the manufacturers would assess the importance and potential 
cooperation with prospective buyers in his network in their consideration of whether 
he gets the orders or not. Therefore, if the buyer is new，it is more likely for the 
manufacturer to apply the price principle, and vice versa. 
The following experiences of some garment firms can illustrate the situation. 
"ffthe quotation price is low, we assess whether the customer is important to us. Usually we receive 
orders with different assortments and style, perhaps some are profitable while some are not. 
Sometimes we don't accept this. But we need to consider the relationship with the customer. H" this 
buyer is important to us and we want to keep long-term relationship with him, we would accept it." 
(Miss Merry, owner ofFactory B) 
The above shows that network is quite significant for the manufacturers to 
determine an order match with the buyers. But in case of rejecting orders, the picture 
is more diverse. My field observations suggest that both price and social relations 
arise as the governing principles in order rejections, even though the manufacturers 
have long term relationship with the buyers. Like the case ofFactory M, the director 
maintains that they do reject orders if the buyer, a major buyer though, suppresses 
the order price. 
"We have a frequent buyer from Germany and we have worked with him for over five to six years. 
He asks me for a price cut because of the difference in the exchange rate. The Deutch Mark 
becomes weak. He asks me to subsidize the difference of the exchange rate. It's impossible. I tell 
him that I understand his difficulty, I can help you by not increasing the price. But I can't subsidize 
the difference in the exchange rate. What if the Deutchmark is strong in the market? At the end, we 
reject the orders." (Mr Hong, the directory ofFactory M) 
Managing conflict or contingency with the buyers 
In this aspect, power relationship as well as contested relationship exist in 
handling contingencies or conflicts with the buyers. First, I would describe how 
contested relationship exists under the close-tie pattern. Li the industry, both buyers 
and manufacturers concem about the quality of goods, production schedule and 
delivery of the goods. Local manufacturers believe that there are many conditions that 
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are beyond their control. This include technical problems in the production, 
delay in material sourcing and so on. Both parties in the close-tie pattem come to 
discuss how to deal with the problems. They are cooperative rather than acting in 
an opportunistic manner. Keeping on-going social relations between both parties 
are important in this light. Manufacturers discuss with the buyers and look for 
other alternatives that both parties accept. Buyers do not necessarily make claims 
against their suppliers. 
"There are many things beyond our control. Sometimes it is difficult to predict an accurate date 
of delivery. It's not something like machine-making that can be standardized. We may overlook 
something in such a labour-intensive industry. Sometimes we're a bit late. Old buyers understand 
our situation and tolerate us. "Don't do this next time." It's different in case of infrequent buyers, 
they would complain and insist in making a claim against us, threaten to cancel the orders in case of 
late-shipment. It is certain that we can't handle the new buyers as smoothly as the case of the old 
buyers. “ C h^e manager of Factoty G) 
The above shows that if there is anything wrong in the garment production, 
frequent buyers are more tolerant than the infrequent buyers. Likewise, it is more 
likely that frequent buyers can tolerate the quality difference. Instead oftuming to 
disputes between two parties, they could negotiate and look for alternative. 
Besides, contingency can always arise in the whole process. For instance, 
there is communication gap between merchandising department and marketing 
department of the brand-named company and they need an earlier date of delivery. 
The buyers need to discuss with the manufacturer to get an earlier delivery. In the 
close-tie pattem, local manufacturers are willing to work with them. 
Case L, a multinational group, has built up relationship with the major 
buyers from the US for over five years. Mr Pao, the managing director of the 
group, explains how they handle contingencies in their daily operation. 
"Whenever there's trouble on either side, we sit down and frankly taUc with each other. What 
difficulties do they encounter and how I can help them. Once the buyer told me that their department 
store had a big sales promotion but they were out of stock. Then we needed to rush our production 
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and delivered the goods by flight. But the problem was that the buyer did not include the flight 
cost into his budget. The merchandiser confirmed the order. So, they didn't have such budget. All 
right, I helped them by sharing part of the flight cost. Why did I do the buyer a favour? Because I 
may face late~delivery of the goods for some reasons next time. and the buyer will help us. This is a 
kind of mutual help, ff the transaction is only a one-shot game, how can I help him?" 
Again, the expectation of "reciprocity" between both parties enables the 
continuation of mutual-dependent relationship. Jn this way, the economic actors 
are locked into a relation that the mutual benefits wiU be achieved only if transaction 
takes place but the interests of the partner counts. Both parties do not easily 
switch to another party in the industry. 
Emergence of power relationship in latent way 
Apart from the symbiotic relationship as shown above, power relationship 
between the buyer and the manufacturer is manifested in a very latent way. K the 
frequent buyer is the major order source of the manufacturer, it is more likely that 
the manufacturer follows the instructions of the buyers even though sometimes the 
demand is not so reasonable. Meanwhile, if the manufacturer has limited 
organizational resources, it is likely that they are in a subordinate position in handling 
conflicts with the buyers in the close-tie pattern. It is observed some 
manufacturers complain that their frequent buyers take advantage of them. This refers 
to those big buyers in the retail market. I will explain how this power relationship 
emerges in conflicting situation. 
It is known that the retail markets in the North America and other European 
countries have been undergoing major changes in the 1990's. The 1996 KSA report 
shows there is continued growth and consolidation of the larger retailers in the US 
market ^CSA:1996:n7). The top ten retailers in North America account for 70 per 
cent of the total sales of the 115 publicly listed retailers. Giving the growing 
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consolidation in the retail market and keen competition in the market, buyers are 
facing great pressure that the goods must be well-sold when buyers have a 
budget which is approved by their headquarter. Jn some cases, they would shift the 
burden to the manufacturers in the NICs. 
"Sometimes the buyers make a wrong decision to purchase inappropriate goods which are not well 
sold. The buyers have to be responsible to their boss and then they shift the burden to us. They 
pick up some minor mistakes in the garment. For instance, the tolerance form of the garment size 
is hatf an inch, they find that the length is longer by half inch, which is beyond the tolerance form. 
This is common in garment production because of the fabrics' shrinking rate. Consumers do not 
care about this. But then the buyers lay claims to us because we have gone beyond their tolerance 
form. In many cases, it is because the goods are not well sold. Then they shift the burden to us." 
Ofr Yiu ofFactory C) 
Most manufacturers realize that when the goods are not sold well in the retail 
market, it is easy and convenient for overseas buyers to shift the burden to local 
manufacturers. The owner of Factory C realizes that it was not so common for 
overseas buyers to make claims towards them in the 1980's. In the nineties, overseas 
buyers make claim over local manufacturers more frequently when competition is very 
keen in the retail market. 
"There's a joke in our industry. Previously we have reserved about five to eight per cent of the sales 
amount for the claims. We take it as a service charge for the buyers. However, this trend is rising 
when buyers almost make a discount on our goods on every orders. It depends on whether you are 
lucky or not The buyer also faces great pressure to ensure their budget is balance. Therefore they find 
his own means to cover the deficit Making claims against us is the easier and convenient way." 
CThe manager ofFactory C) 
This kind of unreasonable claim over manufacturers is a kind of power 
relationship over local manufacturers. Factory C depends on three major buyers that 
occupy near ninety per cent of the production capacity. H' the manufacturers are 
dependent on few buyers, it is more likely that this kind of power relationship 
emerges. Factory C is forced to compromise and accept the claims if the buyer is a 
long-term partner. 
"H" we don't accept the discount payment, the consequence will be that the buyer will not do business 
with us next time. The goods are already delivered to the buyer. K" we insist, what is our chance 
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of success? Perhaps it will take longer to settle. That's costly. It's difficult for small and 
medium scale factories to fight with the buyers, they are large-scale importers or buyers in the 
US," 
Nonetheless, some garment firms can enjoy more bargaining power in facing 
the unreasonable claims from overseas buyers. Like the case ofFactory M. When the 
buyer inspects the goods before packing, he is dissatisfied with the workmanship 
and is prepared to make a claim against the factory. The manufacturer ofFactory 
M rejects the claim and does not send the goods to the buyer. He can do so 
because the group has thirty frequent buyers. He does not care to lose this buyer. 
It is noted that he is not tied by any particular buyer in the market and enjoys more 
bargaining power in facing the unreasonable claims from overseas buyer. 
Factory G has established a practice of limiting orders from each frequent 
buyer to not more than ten percent of the total production capacity. By doing so, 
they can enjoy more autonomy in organising the production. 
"ff the buyer is demanding, then we need to follow his idea. But sometimes the customer has his 
own idea of organising the production line but we disagree.. ..We want to set the production that can 
meet the requirements of most of our buyers, instead of any particular buyer." (The manager of 
Factory G) 
Local manufacturers attempt to diversify their order source to avoid control 
from any particular buyers. This would allow them to have more autonomy in 
organising the production. 
Control on competitors' orders in the GCCs 
When both parties are locked into a relation, it is worthwhile to examine 
whether or not overseas buyers exert control over manufacturers in getting orders 
from other competitors. It is noted that in a close-tie pattern, the relationship 
between both sides is not purely a market exchange. To a certain extent, the close-tie 
pattem is characterized by a network form of cooperation in such a way that trust and 
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indebtedness is involved in their interaction. Powell has mentioned that in the 
network form of interaction, the preferred option is often creating indebtedness and 
reliance over the long haul. The sanctions towards each party are typically normative 
rather than legal. OPoweU:1992:210) Concerning buyers' control over the 
manufacturers, there are two forms of control. They are formal and informa;. 
Formal control means that the buyer gives explicit instructions to local manufacturers, 
either through legal contract or verbal agreement, so as to prevent them from getting 
competitors' orders. Informal control is more latent and normative. The buyer does 
not clearly tell the manufacturers how he should handle the competitors' orders. 
Instead, the manufacturer perceives the signals from the buyers. Nonetheless, it is 
also found that local manufacturers are very conscious to seek for autonomy and 
resist such control from their buyers. 
Factory G，s frequent buyers are brand-named companies. They explicitly told 
the manufacturer not to get orders from their competitors. This is because they are 
afraid that product information may be leaked to their competitors. For instance, 
when the competitor visits the shopfloor to inspect the garment, he may know what 
kind of fabrics the other firms are using. Therefore, it is quite common that the 
buyers do not like their supplier to be the same supplier for their competitors. But 
Factory G is cautious and avoids any control from their major buyers. As 
mentioned above, the proportion of orders from each frequent buyer does not 
exceed ten per cent of the total production capacity. Besides, the group 
supplies different types of product lines for their buyers to avoid conflicts between 
competitors. In the US market, Banana Republic and Tommy Filfigers are 
competitors. Factory G supplies causal wear to Banana Republic, and formal shirts 
81 
to Tommy .Filfigers. In this way, the buyers will not restrict Factory G to get their 
competitors' orders. Resisting control from any particular buyer is quite common in 
the close-tie pattem firms. M the manufacturers I have interviewed say that they 
are unwilling to be tied to and controlled by any particular buyer. This means they 
lose their autonomy ifthey become too dependent on one buyer. 
"I know a fiiend who works with Marks and Spencer. They have vety close control over 
production and they even instruct how sewing machines should be placed. They send their people to 
the workplace and monitor the process. They act as if they were the boss. It is inconvenient and 
troublesome ifthe buyer has too much say about production. I don't Uke to be tied by any single buyer. 
This makes me feel like a puppet and lose the diligent spirit." (Mr Tang, the owner ofFactory I) 
In other cases, overseas buyer does not explicitly restrict the manufacturers 
to supply goods to their competitors. They give local manufacturers more subtle 
signals. This kind of informal control is subtle. In the case ofFactory B, the owner 
thinks that buyers do not want her to get orders from their competitors. 
"They do mind if we supply goods to their competitors. They won't explicitly tell us about this but 
this is understood. Even when they are selling different products, they don't want us to supply goods 
for their competitors. But I have my autonomy. We can't say I just supply for one buyer and reject 
others. I don't like to become a main supplier for one buyer; it's too risky. H" there is anything 
happening to this buyer, we'll be controlled by them. I would try to avoid the clash of design if two 
buyers are the competitors." 
All the informants say that they are not willing to become the main vendor 
for any single buyer although this guarantees stability in order. This means "putting 
aU the eggs in one basket". Rather, they prefer to diversify their buyers and 
markets and avoid being controlled by any particular buyer. But in some cases 
buyers would not restrict manufacturers from getting orders from their competitors. 
Cooperation with Buyers 
I would classify the form of cooperation between local manufacturers and 
buyers by two forms. One form is the sharing ofinformation in product development, 
marketing and technical knowledge transfer through the OEM experience. This 
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facilitates the manufacturers to move beyond the OEM production in the commodity 
chain. The second form is that buyers and manufacturer have mutual development 
goals in their business. These two forms represent different degrees of 
cooperation. The first form is manifest in the daily interaction between two parties 
and the second implies a stronger tie. 
Regarding the first form, almost all manufacturers have shared product 
information with their buyers. Local manufacturers discuss with their buyers 
design, marketing trend, use of fabrics and other accessories. The designer, 
merchandiser and manufacturer keep constant communication and cooperation in 
the whole production process. It is a learning process for both parties to share their 
expertise knowledge in production and marketing. Especially when manufacturers 
supply goods for famous brand-named buyers, this can help them to improve their 
workmanship and build up reputation in the market. 
For instance, Marks and Spencer has built up close tie with their suppliers 
for ten to twenty years and their relationship is characterized as a "close-tie" 
pattern. Since the quality requirement towards the supplier is very demanding, 
garment manufacturers have to take full responsibility if quality is not up to the 
buyer's standard ^Iong Kong Economic Times, 26.3.1997). This enables the 
suppliers to enhance their reputation in the market. Moreover, transfer offirm-specific 
knowledge from buyers to local manufacturers is possible in the close-tie pattem, 
especially when buyers have a manufacturing background. Although the garment 
industry is very labour-intensive, there exists some technological innovations in 
garment production and management like in the styles and composition of fabrics 
or sourcing materials in the past ten years (Quick Response Report). Local 
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manufacturers need to acquire updated knowledge in garment-making and sometimes 
they need to make use ofthe firm-specific knowledge ofthe buyers. 
The manager of Factory G recalls his experience of making wrinkle-free 
garments. This concept came from Japanese buyers a few years ago and few 
manufacturers knew the technique. The Japanese buyer can transfer his firm-specific 
knowledge in making wrinkle-free garments to Factory G, given they are in a close-tie 
relationship. Nonetheless, the manufacturer does not depend on the buyer's specific 
knowledge. He is active to acquire updated knowledge by keeping in touch with the 
Textiles and Clothing Department ofthe Hong Kong Polytechnic University. 
"We develop knowledge as long as keep in touch with the market trend. We keep the market sense 
and leam by our own means. We can leam the technical knowledge through the academic 
institute. Perhaps it takes some time to take up the new techniques, but we don't want to be tied by 
the buyers, led by the buyer. We prefer to master our own business." (the manager ofFactory G) 
In other cases, the sharing of product information is less important. This is 
especially so when local manufacturers integrate retailing and garment production 
and handle the OBM. For instance. Factory L is doing OEM and OBM. They have a 
strong team of twenty-five designers to support their own brand retailing and 
production. They can serve overseas buyers by providing a whole package of service 
Uke product design and marketing activities. 
"When they come to buy goods from us, we provide the whole collection and ideas ofpromotion to our 
buyers. Our designers even design the display window for the department stores." (Thc managing 
director of Case L) 
With regards to the second form of cooperation in which both parties have 
mutual development goals, only Case L falls into this category and others do not 
have such cooperation. Case L cooperated with his buyer when the group prepared to 
develop its retailing business in the 1990's. When the buyer's company faced financial 
crisis, the buyer asked the group to give them financial assistance. The group 
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decided to acquire the company's shares at that time. They attempted to improve the 
financial situation by sending a financial expert to the buyer's company in Australia. 
The retail business enjoyed a favourable growth after the Case L has acquired the 
buyer's company. It is noted that the strategic aggressiveness of the group, 
accompanied by the financial crisis of buyer, makes the cooperation between two 
parties possible. 
Li some cases, overseas buyer keeps his suppliers informed about the 
company's development and asks the Asian supplier to act as his agent for sourcing 
other goods. Case I falls into this category. One of his frequent buyers from 
Germany keeps him informed of the progress of trademark registration in the EEC 
market. The buyer is prepared to develop different product lines in the market. In this 
process, the buyer asks the owner of Factory I to be his agent in Hong Kong and 
help him to find new suppliers for other products in Hong Kong. 
To sum up the characteristics in the close-tie pattem in the buyer-driven GCCs, 
it is noted that price is not the only governing principle in determining order match. 
Rather, personal network which is embedded in ongoing social relations and 
expectation of reciprocity between both parties ensure the order match. Besides, it is 
also shown that the relationship between buyers and manufacturers is more complex 
and dynamic. Power relationship emerges in the close-tie. Symbiotic relationship 
also exists in their interaction. Meanwhile, local manufacturers try to search for their 
own autonomy by making contacts with different types of buyers and avoiding being 
controUed by any particular buyer in the market. 
5.3.2.Loose-tie pattern 
Jn this section, I would examine the characteristics of the loose-tie pattern. 
85 
The loose-tie pattem is characterized by its short-term relationship and order 
instability with overseas buyers. If they cannot state the exact number and their share 
of order, I would classify that as an indicator of order instability. In addition, if the 
manufacturer sees that they keep detached (or similar wordings) relationship with 
the buyers, I would classify that as a loose-tie pattem with the overseas buyers. 
Order instability and price as the governing principle for order match 
Jn the loose-tie pattem, it is difficult for local manufacturers to maintain long 
term relationship with overseas buyers. It is quite common those buyers are looking 
for low-end to medium-end products in mass volume. We can look at the experiences 
ofseveral firms in the loose-tie pattem in the following section. 
Factory D makes knitwear product like trousers, sweatshirt, jackets for men's 
and ladies wear. Price range is low-end to medium-end price. The major market is the 
US at the initial stage of development. The manufacturer diversified the market to 
the European, UK and East Asian markets in the early 1990s. The manager suggests 
that "personal network" is quite important in getting orders from the sourcing agents 
or trading companies. He also gets orders from his friends from other factories. 
However, personal network does not guarantee stability in the source of order. Any 
change in the personnel in the agents can end this relationship. This in tum afFects the 
order stability. Management describes the relationship with buyer as very loose. 
"WeVe only very loose relationship. We only keep with them at a maximum of three years. After 
three years, person who used to be in charge left and the new one has his own list of suppliers. These 
suppliers replace us." CThe general manager ofFactory D) 
The manager says that it is difficult to keep relationship with the buyers. Due 
to keen competition, the sourcing agent or buying office can not guarantee constant 
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order flow after the first transaction. Moreover, since his factory is not the major 
vendor ofthe overseas buyer, the relationship remains weak. 
"Our relationship with the buyer is very loose. It's really loose. Unless your factory is large, it's 
difficult for us to have equal position. It depends on whether we can match the buyers. Just like us, 
the buying office is bigger than us and we are not their main vendor, then our bargaining power is 
relatively small, ffour buyer is the speciaHty store, then our bargaining power is relatively bigger." 
In contrast with the close-tie pattem, order match or rejection are primarily 
based on the price principle and technical efficiency consideration in a loose-tie 
relationship. The manager considers the order quantity, coordination of production 
flow and profit margin when the buyer gives him the order. Moreover, he is also 
concerned about whether he can fully utilize the labour power in the production. 
"We intentionally get the orders with drag, cover and sew. ( ) For instance, the garment 
with round collars, short-sleeves with no stem. There are different production stages. The price is 
not high, but workers can finish the whole process quickly. This production flow enables us to 
increase the output and keep the productivity. Especially in China's plant, we need to pay fixed cost 
there. Workers live there and eat there, they work as if they were at home. I need to keep them to 
work." 
The manager is willing to accept low-end orders in order to support their 
production in China. Since the relationship between both parties is so weak, the 
manufacturer has to seek different types ofbuyers in the market in order to support his 
production. 
The above also applies to Factory K. Factory K is a small-scale factory 
producing ladies and men's knitwear. Its order is mainly secured from several trading 
companies and sourcing agents. Although the manufacturer has been working with the 
buyer for over ten years, orders are not stable. 
"Sometimes they give us the orders irregularly. Sometimes once or twice a year, (Mr Chu, the 
owner of Factoty K) 
The instability in order source makes the manufacturer difficult to maintain 
close tie with the buyer. So, Factory K tries to diversify the market by looking for 
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more buyers to ensure the order. 
Meanwhile, the second-tier producers who are located in the bottom of the 
stratified industrial structure have different experiences. Factory A concentrates on 
doing cut-and trim for parent factories and the owner has never got orders from any 
foreign buyers or local traders. The owner rarely meets the overseas buyers, except 
when buyers are accompanied by the parent factory's representative visit his 
factory. 
I observe that in some cases, although the garment firm can maintain stable 
relationship with buyers, the manufacturers stiU apply price principle to determine the 
order match. Factory F produces for several famous fashions brand names like Armani, 
Espirit, Calvin Klein. It has maintained stable relationship with its buyers for over ten 
years. But the manufacturer only consider those orders which can make a profit. He 
deals with frequent buyers and new buyers in the same manner. 
"It's very rare, ffthe orders are not profitable, how can I be accountable to my shareholder? Every year 
we have a cost breakdown for evety order. K" it is not profitable, why should I get it? I only choose 
the orders with greater profit." CThe managing director ofFactory F) 
He suggests that he does not have any problem in getting orders. This kind of 
bargaining power enables the manufacturer to have greater autonomy in choosing their 
buyers. 
Managing conflicts or contingency with the buyers 
Whenever there are conflicts between both parties in the loose-tie pattern, it is 
more Ukely that they tend to act in an opportunistic manner than that of the close-tie 
pattern. Each party tries to maximize their own interest without considering the 
other's party interests because they only expect a short-term exchange. Usually, the 
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conflicts are over issues about workmanship or discount claims in case oflate delivery. 
Again, in case K, the owner has dealt with unreasonable claim from their 
buyers in a loose-tie relationship. He says that since the competition is very keen in 
the retail market, buyer shifts the burden to the manufacturers once the former makes a 
wrong decision that the goods are not well sold. It is quite common that the buyer 
would make claims against the manufacturer on the product quality. 
"Sometimes they claim us some thirty to fifty per cent ofthe goods. It's so unreasonable to us.. Like 
the sizing of the garment. We accept the workmanship but they just force you that is unacceptable. 
They require us to remake the products. We won't do the business with such troublesome buyer next 
time. We're so dissatisfied with each other, why should we work together next time, I just look for 
another buyer in the market." CThe owner ofFactoty K) 
The experience ofFactory K is quite similar to that in the close-type pattem. 
But the difference is that in the close-tie pattern, the manufacturer still keeps the 
relationship with the buyer. But in the loose-tie, the manufacturer terminates the 
cooperation. It is because the manufacturers in the loose-tie tie prepare to look for 
other new buyers in the market, rather than being tied up by the buyer if they do not 
have good working relationship. 
Control over competitors orders 
In this respect, buyers do not care whether the manufacturers get orders from 
their competitors. It is because neither party need to depend on each other and 
buyers do not restrict whether manufacturers supply goods for other competitors. In 
contrasts, some buyers would like to get information about their competitors 
through the direct contact with manufacturers. 
"They won't care whether we supply goods to their competitors, instead the buyers are interested in 
knowing the information about their competitors from us. For instance, what kind of fabrics the 
competitors use, the style of the collection, and so on. I serve like an information pool for them. Of 
course I'm careful not to leak so much information. Ijust tell them what kind offabrics that the others 
use in the market. The US buyers would like to know something from the European buyers and so do 
the European buyers." CThe managing director ofFactory F) 
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It is noted that instead of restricting the manufacturers in getting orders from 
their competitors, they depend on the manufacturers to gather information from their 
competitors. 
Minimal cooperation with overseas buyers 
The cooperation between local manufacturer and overseas buyers is only at the 
form of purchase and sales of goods and there is no common goals between two 
parties. The manufacturer does not pay attention to the share of product development 
or knowledge transfer. When asking what kind of experience being leamt in the OEM 
in the industry, manufacturers in the loose-tie pattem has completely different 
perception from those in the close-tie pattem. They have little incentive to get product 
innovation or technology transfer from the buyers. 
In the case ofFactory D, there is no great change in the product type in the 
past ten years. When asked what kind of OEM experience they leam from the buyers, 
the manager admits that they pay little attention to this issue. 
"To us, there's nothing special about the brandname of the product We don't need to do the design. 
The buyers gives us the design sketch and then we produce the samples for them. They are almost 
the same. The most important thing is to make the production flow faster and balance the 
production." CThe manager ofFactoty D) 
So is the case ofFactory J. The frequent buyer supports less than ten percent 
of the total production capacity. Having served the European buyer in the past ten 
years, the tie remains very weak and instrumental. The interaction between the two 
parties only takes place during the purchase and sales ofgoods. 
"The buyer come to visit us once a year, discuss with us about the price and the order quantity. That's 
all. We make the sample for him, send the sample for their approval and then start the production." 
CThe manager ofFactoty J) 
To recapitulate, the relationship in a loose-tie pattem is instrumental in 
character. The following table gives a summary on the characteristics of these two 
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pattems. 
Dimensions in the interaction Close-tie pattern Loose-tie pattem 
between two parties O^actory B，C，E，G，H，I，L，M) (Factory A，D，F，J，K) 
Order stability and years of • long-term • short-term 
relationship • stable • unstable  
Governing principle in getting • network form • price matters 
and rejecting order • price is not the • profit-making is the 
mechanism, rather major concem 
relationship matters  
Managing conflicts between • negotiated and bargaining, • act in an 
both parties trust emerges opportunistic 
manner  
Control on competitors' order • diverse response, some • no control 
control while some do not 
care  
Control on production line • loose • loose  
Form ofcooperation • share of product concept • exchange 
and product development relationship 
• certain degree of technical 
knowledge transfer 
• share of marketing  
information  
Manufacturer's subjective • internlependent • instrumental 
perception  
Table 5.1. Characteristics of the close-tie and loose-tie pattern between buyers and local 
manufacturers in the buver-driven commodity chain in Hong Kong's garment industry 
5.4. Discussion and implications on the governance structure of buyer-driven 
GCCs 
The unravelling of these two pattem of inter-firm linkages with the buyers in 
the buyer-driven GCCs sheds light on the substance of the governance structure in 
Hong Kong. Gereffi suggests that there is power and authority relationship within this 
governance structure that determines how financial, material and human resources 
are allocated within the chain (Gereffi:1995:57). Jn my study, I would suggest that 
the picture is far more complex and dynamic in HK. There are mainly two types of 
inter-firm linkages between buyers and manufacturers in the GCCs, which represents 
two different kinds of relationship with the buyers and connect them in the product 
world. Informed by the resource dependency perspective, it is found that the 
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interorganizational relationship between buyers and manufacturers is a constant 
struggle of control and discretion. In the close-tie pattem, on one hand 
manufacturers are able to maintain stable relationship by getting orders and trust 
emerges in governing the order match, on the other hand, there are instances that 
overseas buyers tend to exert control over the manufacturers when they get the 
competitors' orders. The power relationship only exists very latently between the 
two parties when they need to handle contingencies or conflicts. It is also observed 
that domestic manufacturers are conscious of the need to acquire resources (like 
technical information on product development in case G) elsewhere in order to avoid 
dependency on any particular buyer. Their experiences demonstrates that domestic 
manufacturers try to maintain their autonomy and avoid control from any particular 
buyer when they interact with overseas buyers. The close-tie and loose-tie patterns 
embedded in the Hong Kong's context help us to fill the gap on the substance ofthis 
governance structure and leads us to rethink the thesis of "authority and power 
relationship" inside this governance structure. 
First, regarding to the role of the buyer in the GCCs, I would suggest that 
while Gereffi places emphasis on how big buyers shape the global production network, 
it is unclear how buyers of different market niches and characteristics produce the 
same effects in terms of power and authority relationship over local garment 
manufacturers in the governance structure. Different types of buyers have different 
ways in keeping close or loose ties with local garment manufacturers. The following 
table summarizes the nature ofbuyers and their ties with manufacturers. 
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Cases Close-tie or loose-tie Types ofbuyera Form of cooperation  
A loose-tie no frequent buyers, depend on the mediated by the parent factories, no 
p a r e n t f a c t o r i e s , medium-end direct interaction with the buyers 
k n i t w e a r garment  
^ close4ie Frequent b u y ^ highrend to mediutn^d m-ders design service to overseas buyers, transfer 
fashiooKMiented retail shops, 
smaU bundks of fabric knowledge to buyers 
C Close-tie Frequait buyCTS, medium^d orders, knowledge transfer to the East Asian 
department stores buyers through the interaction with the 
US buyers  
D Loose4ie no frequent buyers, mediun>end to minimal cooperation, only on production 
iow-end, speciality stores  
"1 Close-tie Frequent buyers, medium to high^d knowledge transfer from buyers, 
ordcra> department stores, private labeb share ofmarketing information  
~F loose-tie have frequent buyera, medium to buyers depend on the expertise 
high^fashions knowledge of the manufacturers in 
garment-making  
~G Close-tie frequent buyers, buUc buyers, different Uttie product knowledge transfer, the 
price range of the difiFerent product lines manufacturer depend on their own 
competitive edge  
~S Close^e Frequent buyers, medium^d fashion OTders, share of marketing information 
brand-named companies  
I Close4ie Frequent buyers, medium^d orders, children's design function to buyers, share of 
wear, no special brand-named marketing information, keep on the 
progress of trademaric registration from 
the buyer  
J Loose4ie A frequent buyer, a sourcing agent, share of mariceting information 
medium-end knitwear products  
K LoosC"tie medium-<nd CM-ders, European buying share of marketing information 
office  
L Close-tie Frequent buyers, medium-end orders from the value-added activities like design and 
US brand-named compajiies, speciality mariceting services to the buyers 
如彻 takeover of the retail business of the 
buyer in Australia  
M Close4ie Frequent buyers, medium-end for share of mariceting information  
woven wear, department stores 
Table 5.2.; Types ofbuvers and form ofcooperation in Hong Kong*s garment induStrv 
We note that in the close-tie pattern, buyers are usually the brand-named 
companies, or private labels of department stores in the buyers' market which supply 
medium and high-end orders to local manufacturers. Li the loose-tie pattern, the 
buyers are usually the medium or low-end orders, or without any specific brand-names. 
To give a possible explanation for such difference, I would suggest that buyers in 
different strata have different global sourcing strategy in the NICs and other periphery 
countries. This may affect how they keep ties with the overseas suppliers in organising 
their production network. In case of bulk buyers (like mass merchandisers) that sell 
low-priced store brands, buyers can source the goods in more remote tiers and low-
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cost, mid-quality producers in China or other South East Asian countries like 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Bulk buyers are not necessarily locked into 
a relation with the Hong Kong's garment manufacturers when other East Asian 
manufacturers can do it as weU. Regarding the brand-named companies or fashion-
oriented buyers, they require more high-quality workmanship and need quality 
assurance from local manufacturers. Then it is more likely for them to develop a 
relation with local manufacturers. 
Second, regarding to the role of local manufacturers, I would suggest that 
these two patterns of ties serve as the governing principle for both parties in getting 
orders, managing conflicts, orders' control and form of cooperation for both sides. To 
engage in a dialogue with Gereffi's buyer-driven governance structure, the empirical 
findings show that the picture is far more dynamic and contested. Local manufacturers, 
whether in the close-tie or loose-tie, try to maximize their autonomy and avoid 
subordination and dependency on any particular buyer. Some garment factories even 
managed to move ahead and become buyers, (like Case L) 
Drawing out two types of ties between overseas buyers and manufacturers in 
the GCCs not only helps us to unearth the nature ofbuyer-driven governance structure, 
but also leads us to ask the following questions: How do these two different patterns 
ofties affect the manufacturers' decision on industrial relocation? Do overseas buyers 
push local manufacturers to relocate? These are the questions to be examined in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six: 
Relocation Strategy oflocal manufacturers in different ties with buyers 
Jn this chapter, 1 will examine the relocation strategy of the garment manufacturers 
and assess the buyers' role in influencing local manufacturers' relocation decision. Gereffi 
highlights the importance ofcommerciaI capital in initiating the production network in the 
buyer-driven governance structure. As mentioned in the last chapter, local manufacturers 
have close-tie and loose-tie with the buyers in the commodity chain. This represents 
different types ofinter-firm relationship in the governance structure. While the inter-firm 
relationship of the close-tie type is relatively mutual-interdependent, that of the loose-tie is 
more instrumental. Then, how do foreign buyers affect the relocation decision of the local 
manufacturers in different ties? I would bring out the relocation experiences of the 
manufacturers in this chapter. How do local manufacturers make the relocation decision in 
the past decades? How do they perceive the environment? Why is "relocation" perceived 
to be the "the only-option" of restructuring strategy ？ How do they interact with the buyers 
in the relocation decision? On the other hand, it is observed that some garment firms retain 
the production base in Hong Kong. This is also an interesting area to be examined. 
According to the resource dependency perspective, social actors (the influencer) 
must possess resources that are critical to the organization and power relationship exists in 
inter-organizational relations. The organization's activity will be constrained and 
controlled by the influencer. In discussing the relocation context, it is worthwhile to 
examine Gereffi's buyer-driven thesis by utilizing the resource dependency perspective. As 
stated in the last chapter, our findings show that while power relationship exists in the 
close-tie pattem, manufacturers are aware of the need to maintain their own autonomy in 
the everyday interaction. As regards to the relocation decision, under what kind of 
conditions do overseas buyers exert influence over the manufacturers? If it is not the 
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buyers who play the critical role in leading the relocation, how is the relocation decision 
arrived? 
Our findings also show some manufacturers relocated their production in the late 
eighties. In what way and under what conditions do the domestic manufacturers leam from 
other manufacturers' action as to take relocation as their major restructuring strategies? 
How does the mimetic isomorphism occur among the late-comers? 
The chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part describes how the 
manufacturers interact with the buyers on their relocation decision. It is found that there are 
diverse responses from the buyers upon the relocation strategy in different ties. I would 
suggest that this raises critical questions to Gereffi's thesis about the critical and dominant 
role ofbuyers in shaping the production network within the buyer-driven commodity chain 
framework. Besides, the relocation experiences ofthe domestic manufacturers also help us 
to challenge the neoclassical economic explanation that “relocation” is solely an 
efficiency-maximization consideration. 
The second part will examine what forces that motivate local manufacturers' 
moving their production to China or overseas production. I would compare those garment 
firms which have different timing in relocation. I would identify the institutional factors as 
well as the subjective perceptions of the manufacturers that shape their restructuring 
strategy. This section aims at posing an alternative argument against the buyer-driven 
argument suggested by Gary Gereffi. 
The third part will describe the experiences of the factories that do not participate in 
the relocation. Some local manufacturers retain their production bases in the territory and 
manage to survive in the industry. I am interested in examining why and how they survive 
without relocation. What is their restructuring strategy of enhancing their competitive 
edge in the market? By unraveling the restructuring experiences of the garment firms, I 
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develop a typology of restructuring strategies of different garment firms. It helps us to shed 
light on Hong Kong's way of restructuring and rethink the thesis ofbuyer-driven role in the 
commodity chain. 
6.1. Relocation decisions in different types of tie 
Lidustrial relocation of production lines to South China becomes a major strategy 
for local garment manufacturers who want to maintain their competitive edge in the 
industry since the 1980's. Official statistics show that there is a rising trend of doing 
outward processing activities for the garment industry in the past few years in China. There 
is an increase of 159% in re-exports to China for outward processing trade in textiles 
materials and 107% in apparel articles and clothing accessories during 1989-1994. (See the 
table) 
Of the thirteen garment factories that I have interviewed, nine have offshore 
production or relocated their production to China while four remain in Hong Kong. (See 
the table 1.1) The earliest relocation started in 1978 and the latest one is in 1997. Those 
factories with longer history in the industry usually have an earlier relocation or offshore 
production, while those factories which were set up in the mid eighties have relocation in 
the late eighties or the early nineties. The restructuring experiences of the local 
manufacturers show that irrespective of a close-tie or loose-tie pattern, the buyer is not a 
significant factor in relocation decision of the local manufacturers. Nor is the buyer 
important for shaping the production network in the commodity chain. The buyer can have 
influence only under very specific condition. The extent that the buyer is influential in 
shaping the manufacturers' relocation decision is very dynamic and complicated. I would 
firstly describe the interactions between local manufacturers and overseas buyers on the 
relocation decision in different ties. 
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6.1.1. Close-tie pattern with relocation 
Ofthe close tie pattem, three types of reactions from buyers can be identified in the 
relocation process: resistant, disinterested and encouraging. They all have implications on 
the buyers' role in initiating production in a dependent economy like China or other 
developing countries. I find that the local manufacturers are conscious of avoiding 
control from any particular buyer. They enjoyed autonomy in organizing the production 
network in China and in Hong Kong, though they face different responses from the buyers 
on the relocation decision, 
a. Resistant and negotiated pattern 
This pattem is characterized by a resistant attitude ofthe overseas buyers related to 
manufacturers' relocation plan. Local manufacturers need to persuade the buyers to accept 
the reorganization of production resulting from the relocation. When the manufacturers 
decide to move their production to China, they have to seek approval from their buyers. 
However, the buyers do not participate actively in the relocation process. They only reveal 
their negative attitude towards the relocation plan. The relocation experiences of factory E 
and G illustrate this pattem. 
FactoryE moved the production line to Shenzhen in 1987. They further expanded 
two factories in Jiangsu and Beijing in 1993 and 1994 respectively. At present, almost 
ninety per cent of Factory's garment products are in these three plants. The plants in 
Jiangsu and Beijing produce silk blouses and trousers. The plant in Shenzhen focuses on 
ladies' executive wear, including suits, skirts and blouses. 
During the mid eighties, Factory E offered different prices to its buyers, ranging 
from low-end to high-end orders. Buyers were either resistant or cautious about accepting 
its relocation plan. The buyers at the high-end orders did not allow their products to be 
made in China because they were not confident about the quality. However, low-end 
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buyers were less resistant about their relocation plan because they always complained about 
the price. Relocation implies a lower production cost for the manufacturer. 
"Our buyers at the bottom level complained that our price is too expensive. At that time (mid 
eighties) many other factories in China could make low>end products. The buyers always 
complained. WeVe to think about this." CThe general manager ofFactoty E) 
However, buyers at the lower end do not give them any explicit signals that show 
any encouragement for its relocation. On the contrary, the manufacturer takes the initiative 
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and gives the signals to the buyers, hoping that they can accept their relocation plan. | 
"Before we have the final decision on relocation, we have to estimate the number ofbuyers who 
allow us to make goods in China, ff the orders are high^nd, the buyers won't allow us to do so. 
They insist that the goods must be made in Hong Kong. Therefore, we haven't persuaded this type 
ofbuyer. Then, we would taUc to the buyers at the lower price first. We gave them the signals, then 
we taiked to those with lower quality requirement buyers. On the other hand, we need to find other 
new buyers who would accept the goods that are made in China." 
A negotiated and persuasion process emerges in the relocation process. But on the 
other hand, Factory E’s manufacturer is not sure whether orders are sufficient to support a 
factory in Shenzhen. 
"We have an objective in mind... then we prepared to persuade customer A, customer B and 
customer C. Wejusttry. On one hand, we move the production line and ask them simultaneously. 
We discussed with the buyers about the possibility of giving us orders to support the plant in China \ 
because we can't start our production if we don't get their approval, ffthe product is made in China, 
you must gain their acceptance. At that time they were not confident in China-made product. Then 
some buyers agreed and say "Alright, that's good, the price is attractive. Then they allowed us to 
put the orders to China's factory. Some customers could support us some thirty per cent of the 
capacity. We make a loss at the early stage of the relocation." 
In the close-tie relationship, the management is very cautious about seeking the 
approval from the buyers upon their relocation decision. There emerges a negotiated and 
contested interaction between the buyers and the manufacturers. After years of 
production experiences in Shenzhen, the buyers gradually accept the garment made in 
China. When the manufacturer further expand two plants in North China, the buyers again 
do not play any active role in initiating the production there. The manager explains that they 
can easily access to silk fabrics in setting up a plant in Jiangsu. 
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"One of our main export items are siUc blouses and trousers. Jiangsu is the origin of siUc fabric. It's much 
more convenient for us ifwe have a plant there. Then we can export the goods to other countries directly 
fromJiangsu," 
Besides, the manufacturer perceives that the rising trend of massive relocation of 
other factories exerts great pressure on them. 
"Evetybody goes to China. There is a trend of relocation to the south. You must follow this trend, ffyou 
don't go, then you can't survive. We have to relocate our production and do the product with lower quality 
requirement." 
When the manufacturer thinks of the possibUity of relocation in 1987，they were | 
very cautious about their plan. The manager explains that they were initially not so 
confident in the policy of the Mainland government in the early days. But then when they 
faced skilled labour shortage in Hong Kong they planned to have relocation . At that time 
they made ladies' evening wear for the UK market. Labour-intensive process, like sewing 
"butterflies" or decoration on the wear, was carried out. They faced great problems of 
recruiting labour at that time. Besides, the relocation ofother factories exerted pressure on 
them. They perceived that they might lose the competitiveness in the market. Following 
other manufacturers' action is a way to survive in facing the uncertainty about the business ) 
environment. There exists a kind of mimetic isomorphism in this case. I would discuss this 
point in details in the next section. 
The experience ofFactory G is quite similar to factory E. Factory G relocated the 
production line to Shenzhen in 1981，earlier than most other factories. The buyers' 
resistance to Factory G about the relocation plan was more obvious and stronger than that 
ofFactory E. Its frequent buyers discouraged it from relocating its production line. 
"Their answer is very negative. They told you that we can't have the relocation, otherwise I won't 
give us the orders. These are the European buyers and they don't like China. They think that 
China-made means Red China| The US buyers told us "don't go to China and and don't put our 
orders to China. They are not confident in the quality ofthe goods and the stability ofits policy. 
They worried whether the production efficiency could meet the deadline and shipment" The 




Factory G, as a veteran shirt producer in the industry, maintained very close and 
stable relationship with their buyers in the past decades. It is among the first batch of 
relocated plants to move the production Unes to China in 1981. While the industry enjoyed 
prosperous growth during the early eighties, there were not many manufacturers choosing 
relocation. The manager ofFactory G realized that going back to China could diversify 
market and expand the organization. 
"The labour cost keeps uprising. Garment industry is a labor-intensive industry. It cannot be replaced by any 
machinery. Therefore keeping low wage is vety important for us. It's a long-term project for us to invest in 
China." 
The manager suggests that relocation during the early days is a great burden to the 
manufacturers because the buyers' response is negative and resistant. They have to 
persuade the buyers to accept their decision. Again, there emerges a negotiated process 
with the buyers under the close-tie pattem. The buyer is not as a pushing force for the 
manufacturer to relocate their production in the commodity chain. Instead, the 
manufacturer must take the initiative to persuade the buyers to accept their relocation 
- j 
during early eighties. The buyers do not influence on the relocation decision on the 
manufacturer ofFactory G. 
Factory G is also a licensee of a brand-name shirt called Manhattan and is 
responsible for its manufacturing, marketing and promotion in the East Asian market in the 
past decades. The brandname retailer leaves a freehand to the manufacturer and therefore 
he is free to organize the production base for the shirts. Therefore, the manufacturer 
produces its first order of the Manhattan shirts in Shenzhen's plant as to avoid conflicts 
with the existing buyers. The manufacturer successfully shows to the overseas buyers that 
the quality ofthe shirts is acceptable even when they are made in China. They manage to 
diversify their market to the non-quota countries like Japan and Austria in the mid eighties. 
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The overseas buyers gradually accept the quality and allowed the goods to be made in 
China. 
To recapitulate the relocation Factory E and G, it is found that the experiences are 
different from what Gereffi's discussion of the buyers' significant role in affecting the 
relocation and production network in the commodity chain. On the contrary, it is the 
manufacturers who take the active role to persuade and encourage the buyers to accept the 
relocation plan and the reorganization of production network. There emerges a contested 
. { 
and negotiated interaction between the manufacturers and the buyers on the relocation 
plan. It is not necessarily just a coercive and power relationship between two parties as 
'i 
suggested by Gereffi. | 
b. Disinterested and detached 
This pattem is characterized by the disinterested attitude ofthe buyers towards the 
manufacturers' relocation plan. Both parties are detached from each other and there is no 
persuasion process involved. The buyers do not give any signals to encourage or 
discourage the relocation plan. Rather, they just complain about the price. The 
manufacturers, on the other hand, intentionally avoid discussing the relocation decision 
with the buyers. I would describe the following experiences of several manufacturers. 
Factory M is another pioneer in relocating the production lines to South China in 
the late seventies. The entrepreneur takes a very cautious approach in the relocation 
process. Being a parent factory, he financially supported his five small subcontractors in 
Hong Kong to move the production lines to Dongguan in 1979. The subcontractors 
specialized in templates-knitting process for the parent factory in the past ten years. Their 
plants were in the New Territories (such as Yuen Long, Tsuen Wan and Taipo) before their 
relocation. The manufacturer bought new machines to support them in Dongguan. The 
subcontractors continued to do the templates-knitting for the Factory M. Then he 
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deducted five percent from every order payment of the subcontractors received. Since the 
subcontractors are dependent on this parent factory, coercive isomorphism emerges in the 
relocation process. The manufacturer explains why he prefers the subcontractors to 
relocate in China during the late 1970's. 
"It's not so certain at that time. It's better somebody acts as an explorer for us and build up the 
social network with the local officials there before we have our own plant there." (JhQ managing 
director ofFactory M) 
It was not until in the late eighties that the manufacturer began to think that it was i 
mature enough to build up social network and to establish their own production plants in 
South China. At present, Factory M has three production plants in South China. The 
.1 
1 j 
manufacturer does not ask the buyers for approval in advance. He says that since he i 
'I 
t 
complies with the country of origin regulations and he does not need to inform the buyers. 
"The buyers don't want to know too much about the manufacturer. Our relationship is based on 
the selling and purchasing of goods. It is based on the fact that they can assure us stable orders, 
we can eam money, provide goods with good quality for them. That is. If any part of this i 
process fails, then our relationship will be interrupted." j 
: i 
I 
Factory C has similar experiences when it relocated the production line to | 
Dongguan in 1989, two years after starting up the business. Like other manufacturers, the 
owner ofFactory C faced the problems of recruiting skilled labor in Hong Kong. Because 
ofthe presence of outward processing arrangement system, he decided to open a plant in 
Dongguan so as to capitalize on the abundant source oflabor supply in South China 
Again, the buyer is not a significant and enabling factor for the relocation decision. 
The buyers were not interested in the manufacturer's relocation plan although they 
maintained close tie with the manufacturers in the past years. 
"No，no, the buyers don't care about that. What they are concerned about is whether they can buy the goods 
in Hong Kong. They don't care about the relocation, neither do they give any opinion about this. They only 
teU us that they would offer a price within their budget. They press down the price because other East Asian 
suppliers can make it at a lower price, tfwe want to get the orders, we have to accept the price. Otherwise, 
they would shift to other countries that can make the same goods for them.” ^The owner ofFactoty C) 
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Keen competition with other low-cost countries pushes the entrepreneur to look 
for their competitive edge. Although the buyer is disinterested in the relocation plan of the 
manufacturers, local manufacturers are forced to think of a solution when they constantly 
face the price signals from the buyers. It is the manufacturers who perceive the price signals 
and sort out their problems. The manufacturer ofFactory C also refrained himself from 
informing the buyers about his relocation plan in Dongguan. 
"They won't expUcitly say whether they Hke you to make the goods in China. They just give us the price. 
Then we find our own means to complete the orders. They would like to source the goods in Hong Kong. j 
Because they know there's a lot ofproblem in other countries. But they can't teach me what I should do. We j 
find our own means of survival. “ CThe owner of Factoty C) 丨 
j 
j 
Factory B has similar experience. As a late-comer in the relocation process, the 
;i j 
；丨 
owner started to run a larger plant in Guangzhou in early 1997. The factory makes 
fashionable ladies' garment for the local, the East Asian and the European market. Given 
I 
that the production scale is not large, about seven hundred pieces a month, the owner 
realizes that there will be no big difference in the production cost in Hong Kong and in 
China. Besides, because the orders are high-end, which requires high quality workmanship, 
the manufacturer is unwilling to move production to China before nineties. It was not until 
1992 when she succeeded in getting into the European market that she consequently faced 
the problem of expanding the production capacity in Hong Kong. Only thirteen female 
workers were employed then and she faced great difficulties recruiting skilled labor. 
Before relocation, she subcontracted out some orders to other garment factories in Hong 
Kong. So, she decided to relocate the production line to Guangzhou. Again, the buyer did 
not play an active role in the relocation. The owner did not talk to her buyers about her 
relocation decision. 
"I don't intentionally tell them that I have a plan to relocate our production line to China and then ask them 
for more orders. You know, I tell them that our factory will be relocated to China and then ask them to give 
me more orders, it seems that I have to beg for their orders. I don't like this. I have to let them feel that you 
(the buyer) are not the only customer in my clients' list. This is a way of playing the game in the business. 
I have to bear the consequences ifI persuade or ask them to give me more orders for the relocation." CThe 
owner ofFactory B) 
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The manufacturer does not want to give the buyers an impression that she is 
dependent on any particular buyer. Therefore she intentionally avoids discussing the 
relocation plan with the buyers. 
The owner took a very cautious approach in the initial stage. She only purchased 
five sewing machines and employed few female workers at her friend's factory in 
Guangzhou. She trained the workers by herself. 
"Although they know the sewing skiUs, IVe to brainwash them by giving my own idea of making 
high-fashion garment, which is near half-tailoring." 
The owner spent three days a week in Guangzhou to train the workers. In the early 
1997, she started a plant with eighty workers. 
To briefly summarize the relocation experiences ofFactory B, C, and M, we note 
that all of them keep a detached relationship with the buyers particularly on matters 
concerning their relocation plan. They try to maintain their autonomy and avoid being 
over-dependent on any particular buyer in the commodity chain, 
c. Active participation and encouraging 
It is observed that bulk buyers have encouraged the manufacturers to initiate 
production in the developing countries. For example, Nike encourages its affiliated 
factories to set up factories in the developing countries in the East Asian countries by 
actively participating in the relocation project. Many garment industry buyers also 
encourage local manufacturers to set up production bases in the developing countries. 
Whether the buyers can push the manufacturers to relocate their production depends on 
the extent to which the manufacturers are dependent on the buyers. According to some 
informants, occasionally there are cases that the big buyers of the US enjoy great 
bargaining power. They can really force some manufacturers to move their production to 
the developing countries and they need not bear great risks. This can be taken in form of 
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joint-venture, or the buyers assure a stable flow of orders to the manufacturers, participate 
in the production set-up and control the organization ofthe production flow. 
The managing director ofFactory F explains how the bulk buyer gives signals to him about 
setting up a plant in the developing countries: 
"The buyer told me "you help me to set up factories in Vietnam or Cambodia, because we can produce mass 
volume with very low price there. I give you the orders and I won't need to go there." 
Bulk buyers usually look for low-end, standardized and mass volume order, about 
ten thousand pieces or above. The garments are sold in the mass discount stores without 
brand-name or private labels. Therefore, mass production and economies of scale are 
being utilized in organizing the production. 
"They can't source the goods even in China. The price is so low. Some buUc buyer like the K-Mark can't 
make it in China. Then they want to go to Vietnam, Cambodia or Malaysia. 
Bulk buyers can secure stable supply of goods at low price if their overseas 
suppliers are willing to take the risks to set up plants in the developing countries. Therefore, 
it is quite common for them to encourage their Hong Kong's suppliers to relocate their 
production to Vietnam or Cambodia. 
"The buyer from JC Penny (one ofthe US buUc buyers) asked us to open a factory in Vietnam previously. 
But I have to think about the advantages and consequences. In Hong Kong JC Penny gives me twenty 
dollars per piece. He gives me ten dollars only in Vietnam. Then why should I go there? I have to work for 
them for good... It's a way oftaking advantage over me and making use ofthe cheap labor force there. I'm 
only responsible for the management but then I can't make great profit. I eam ten per cent out ofthe twenty 
dollars in Hong Kong; that is, I get a profit oftwo dollars. I eam only a dollar in Vietnam. It's stupid to do 
such a thing. That's why I won't go to Vietnam, I don't want to work for the US buyers for good." CThe 
managing directory ofFactoty F) 
Although the buyer has encouraged the local manufacturer to develop overseas 
production, the manufacturer does not necessarily accept the suggestion. He is unwilling 
to be bound by the buyer when he clearly stated that he did not want to work for the buyer 
for good. Setting up factories in the developing countries with the buyer implies that both 
parties need to have long-term commitments to each other. Unless the garment producer is 
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doing low-end and mass volume, he lacks the incentive to follow the buyers，suggestion. 
In this case, the producer realizes that his market niche is on the brand-name high-end 
products like Calvin Klein, Armani and Esprit. It is not necessary for him to be bound by 
the low-end bulk buyer. Li other words, he needs not depend on the bulk buyer. 
Therefore, the bulk buyer does not create any coercive pressure to the manufacturer in 
initiating the production network. 
I suggest that even in the case of bulk buyers, if the relationship between both 
parties is not a dependent nature, the buyer cannot create any coercive force for the 
manufacturers in organizing their production. This contrasts with the argument that buyers 
have power relationship over manufacturers in shaping the production network in a 
buyer-driven governance structure as suggested by Gary Gereffi. We need to clearly 
specify under what conditions the argument still holds true. It holds true when the local 
manufacturer depends on the buyers and between them there exists a close-tie relationship. 
Then the buyer can be a powerful agent to shape the organization of production. But it is 
less likely for the buyer to influence the production network when the relationship between 
the two parties is symbiotic. Listead of a power relationship, a negotiated and contested 
pattem emerges between the buyer and the manufacturer. 
Besides, some buyers do set up their own production plants in the developing 
countries instead of encouraging domestic manufacturers to do so. The Esprit AsiaHolding 
Limited is an example. ESPRIT is a brand-name which was established by a San Francisco 
fashion company in 1968. In the early Seventies, Ying Lee Yuen (the chairman of the 
Esprit De Corp OFar East) Ltd) was their buyer and purchased goods for Esprit in Hong 
Kong. In the early Eighties when the Esprit International expanded the retail business in 
Asia by setting up the Esprit Asia Holding Limited, it was also responsible for the garment 
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production for ESPRIT. Two production plants were established in 1983，producing 
knitted and woven garments for retailing. 
To support the production for its retailing. Esprit also depends on a group of 
subcontractors to supply ladies' wear, children's wear and men's wear, which shares about 
eighty percent of the supplies. Apart from this local production network. Esprit itself set 
up two production plants in Shenzhen and Dongguan in 1991 and 1992 respectively. They 
produce hundred thousand pieces per month, which occupy twenty per cent of the total 
sales. (Textiles and Clothing:1993:Vol.6) This case shows that it is not necessary for the 
buyer to encourage any production in China, it can integrate the garment production in the 
commodity chain and initiate the production in the dependent economy. 
Another example is the development experience ofFang's Brother Knitting Limited. 
Mr. Fang Hung, a Shanghainese by origin, succeeded his father's textiles and garment 
business by starting the sweater production in the early Sixties. (HK Fashion 
History: 1992:76-79) In the early Seventies, the group purchased the Toppy shop in Central 
district, a retail shop selling low-end products for the export markets. Then it succeeds in 
developing its own brand like Episode, Jessica and Excursion in the past decades. It also 
expands the retailing in the European and East Asian market in the UK, France and Japan. 
Similar to ESPRIT, the group has a group of overseas subcontractors in Malaysia, 
Philippines, Mexico, Panama, Ireland, Dominica which support about thirty percent of the 
garment production. The other seventy percent ofgarment production is left to the control 
of the parent factory in Hong Kong, Thailand and China. Recognizing the increasing 
production cost in the territory, the group expanded the production base in Thailand and 
China. (Hong Kong Economic Daily:1996, Oct 10) 
The examples of Esprit and Fang's Brother show that when the buyers are also 
engaging in production, they can take an active role in organizing their own production 
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bases. They can do that either through a group of overseas subcontractors in the developing 
countries or setting up their own production bases in China or in other dependent 
economies in the global commodity chain. In this manner, they possess the buyer-driven 
governance features in which the buyer becomes a major driving force in organizing the 
production network in the commodity chain. 
I observe that Factory L has internationalized its production bases in the East Asian 
developing countries and inNorth China between 1978 to 1996. Before developing the 
retail business in the Nineties, the manufacturer started as a subcontractor to supply 
jeanswear for other garment factories in 1975. In 1978, the factory expanded the 
production bases in the Philippines to get the quota advantage in the third world countries. 
When China opened up its economy in the same year, the group started to work with 
compensation trade and outward processing activities in North China like Hubei and Hebei. 
They have built up very good relationship with the Chinese officials by doing this. The 
company profile shows that the group directors hold official titles in the political bodies of 
the Chinese government/ 
In the past twenty years, it has been very active in initiating the production bases in 
North China, by running joint-ventures with the local officials. Thejoint ventures are either 
garment production or dyeing and weaving of fabrics. The group sends stafFto China and 
other developing countries to assist the associated companies to set up the production lines. 
The assistance includes purchasing the necessary machinery and equipment and ensuring 
that the factory set-up is up to the group's standard. During the early stage of setup, the 
staffwas stationed at the site to oversee the production so as to keep close control on the 
quality and the cost of production. Senior managers are appointed by the Board to be 
1 The company profile shows that the directors have officials' title in the Chinese political consultative 
body or as major members of some China's business association. Some senior management staff is also 
a member ofthe Beijing Committee ofPolitical Consultative Conference ofthe PRC. 
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responsible for the day-to-day operations of the production bases in PRC or in other 
developing countries. At present, the group owns garment production plant in Huizhou 
with an establishment size ofover one thousand workers. At the same time, the group has 
shares participation in seven other apparel production plants and four fabrics factories in 
Guangdong, Hubei, Changiin, Beijing, etc. 
Apart from the production Unes in China, the offshore production bases in 
Indonesia^ Malaysia, Philippines, Cambodia and Bangladesh also support the production 
capacity for the group. The group itselfbecomes a buyer by taking over the retail apparel 
business in Australia in 1994. It uses the buyer'sbrandname to sell casual wear and to enter 
the retail market in North China. This is an opportunity for the growth of the organization. 
The managing director ofFactory L realizes that good connection with the Chinese officials 
is an advantage to the group. 
"WeVe eighteen years of experience in garment production there and established close connections and 
goodwill there. Our strategy is to start the retail business where weVe established advantages. That's why 
we choose North China." 
At present, the group runs 203 retail chain shops in North China. It wants to 
expand the number to 330 by 1998. In operating the franchises and retail chains, a 
computer-based information and inventory control system has been installed in each outlet. 
The system has point of sale data recording the location of sale product category, size and 
colour in details. This enables the group to get the latest information about the retailing and 
decide the production accordingly. The production bases in the developing countries as 
well as in China provide products ofabout 41 per cent of the apparel retail business. 
To explain why the group is active to have forward and backward integration in the 
commodity chain, the managing director suggests that the "cost" minimizing is the group's 
major concem. 
"Let's say an overseas buyer or the department chains want to find the overseas suppliers to supply goods for 
them, he needs to find an agent in Hong Kong to find a supplier for him. The manufacturer gets the orders 
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and put the orders to be made in China. There involves cost in every stage. That's costly for us. Direct 
order, direct production and direct sale. That's more competitive than others, we can save at least twenty 
percent of the cost by the integration." 
From the experience of Factory L or other OBM garment firms stated above, 
several characteristics can be discerned. First, the manufacturer becomes a buyer by 
developing his own brand-name in the commodity chain. Second, the manufacturer 
integrates the retaiUng, the export and the manufacturing activities to minimize the cost and 
utilize the flexibility. It appears that this kind of vertically-integrated value-added 
activities among the large-scale apparel groups in the buyer-driven commodity chain are 
somewhat similar to that of the features of producer-driven commodity chain. As stated in 
Chapter Two, Gereffi highlights the role of the large-scale multi-national group in 
coordinating the production and retailing activities with forward and backward linkages. 
The headquarters does the high-value added activities like research and design for product 
innovation. Similarly, the manufacturers possess the producer-governance features when 
the brand-name garment group succeeds in integrating the forward and backward link in the 
commodity chain (like the case ofFactory L, Esprit, Giodano, Theme or the Wing Tai, etc). 
The value-added activities remain in the hand of the headquarters and labour-intensive 
production process is shifted to the overseas production network in the commodity chain. 
Therefore, regarding the argument of the buyer-driven role in shaping the 
production network in the commodity chain, there are several conditions under which this 
thesis holds true. First when the manufacturer depends on the buyers, then it is likely that 
buyer can exert coercive pressure on the manufacturers to relocate their production. 
Secondly, when the buyer becomes a manufacturer and develops its own production base, 
the buyer itself takes an active role in integrating retailing and manufacturing in the 
commodity chain, (like the case ofESPRIT) Thirdly, when the manufacturer develops the 
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retail business and becomes a buyer himself, he could take a very active role in shaping the 
global production network in the commodity chain. 
6.1.2. Loose-tie with relocation - disinterested response from buyers 
Li the loose-tie pattern, I would suggest that buyer is not a significant factor for 
enabling the relocation of local manufacturers in the commodity chain. The buyer is not 
interested in the relocation plan of the manufacturers. By the same token, local 
manufacturers do not discuss their relocation plan with their buyers. They keep a detached 
manner with each other because their relationship is very "instrumental". This 
instrumentality is anchored in their daily operation, as stated in chapter five. It leaves the 
manufactures to perceive the market signals in the market. Domestic manufacturers 
emphasized the importance of "survival" in their situation. They have a strong sense of 
uncertainty of whether they can secure stable orders from the buyers and compete with 
others in the market. Facing such uncertainty, the emergence of"mimetic isomorphism" is 
very dominant among the manufacturers in the loose-tie type. Li this section, I would 
examine how the manufacturers make the relocation decision and interact with the buyers in 
the whole process. 
Factory F has produced high-end fashion garment for several brand-named buyers 
in the US and the European markets. The producer says that he faced great difficulties in 
recruiting skilled labor and so he moved the production to Shenzhen in 1989. In this 
process, the buyers did not say much about the relocation. 
"Buyers didn't discuss with us about the relocation, ffthey told us to relocate the production line to China, 
it seems that it would victimize themselves. K" he told you to go to China, he doesn't know how to be 
responsible for his boss. He is responsible to source goods with Made-in-HK label, ffhe can't offer the price, 
there is no way. He has to survive. But he can't taUc about the relocation. So, the smoothest way for them is 
that he would taUc to us, 'well, guy, I don't care where you make the goods. The thing is that you have to meet 
my budget price and then 1,11 buy the goods from you. They won't encourage us whether to produce the 
products." CThe managing director ofFactoty F) 
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The managing director suggests that buyers were not interested in participating or 
even knowing anything about his relocation. In the loose-tie pattern, instrumental ethos 
dominates the relationship. Neither party has any interest in the cooperation in the 
relocation. 
"There's no such stoty. They don't want to have any participation in the relocation. They come to us to buy 
goods. I supply the garment for them. That's it. It's our problem, (about the relocation) They don't want to 
know our problem. It's so pragmatic. We make friends (with the buyers) for some twenty years, but the point 
is that we're in opposing position. Buyers have their own position. And so do I. There's no such friendship 
in a pragmatic worlcL.. Eighty per cent ofthem are money-seekers. This is a material world. It doesn't 
matter how long we have been working with them. We don't expect to get their cooperation." 
Therefore, the manufacturer did not discuss with his buyers about his relocation 
plan, nor did he persuade the buyers to give him more orders to support the Mainland 
production. He thought that this would jeopardize his bargaining power ifhe did so. 
"I won't tell them about the relocation. It's useless. We beg for the orders and they would further press down 
the price. They would only think that the production cost in China is lower and offer us a lower quotation 
price. Ifsjust like taDdng to a "tiger" (^ ^ % 1 ) ifwe told them about the relocation. I won't do this. This 
is a world in which one swallows another one, we have to protect ourselves." 
In the loose-tie relationship, as stated in ChapterFour, the market principle govems 
the relationship between both parties. It reflects how thejungle law ofthe market works in 
the product world when the manufacturer views his buyers as "money-seeker". The 
manufacturer also perceives that the other party would act in an opportunistic manner and 
maximize their interests with greatest possible gain. This instrumental relationship 
between buyer and local manufacturer means that it is difficult for both parties to have 
long-term commitment. It is not possible for buyers to take any active role in relocation in 
this light. 
Again, Factory D has the similar situation . The buyers only complain that the price 
is too high. This signal, to a certain extent, exerts pressure to the manufacturer about the 
relocation problem. The manager of Factory D, who moved the production line to 
Dongguan in 1992, explains: 
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"The buyer won't tell us what we should do or ask you to open a plant in China. Theyjust complain that the 
price is too high and said they wiU find other suppliers. They won't guarantee stable flow of orders. Even 
if they give us orders this year, they won't promise to give us next year. It's not a long-term business 
relationship that we can discuss about the relocation plan." 
Owner ofFactory K, who relocated the plant to China in 1992, shares similar experience. 
"They don't encourage us to relocate our production. Theyjust offer the price and leave it to us to handle. 
K you can do it with his required price, they won't care where you make the goods. If we get the orders, we 
make our own way." 
It is obvious that because orders are not stable, it is difficult for the local 
manufacturers to build up strong tie with the buyers. But the manufacturers need to 
compete for the orders in the market and the buyers，complaint creates an indirect pressure 
on the manufacturers' relocation decision. 
Suffice it to say that the dominance of the instrumental relationship between the two 
parties leads to buyers' disinterested attitude towards the manufacturers' relocation plan in 
the loose-tie pattem. In this case, there is no evidence to support the view that buyers have 
played a critical role in affecting the relocation strategy oflocal manufacturers and shaping 
the production network in the commodity chain. 
Concluding remarks on close-tie and loose-tie pattern in relocation 
To recapitulate the overall picture of the buyer-driven thesis in shaping the global 
production network in the commodity chain, I would argue that the relationship between 
the buyers and the manufacturers in different ties is complicated and dynamic. Under the 
close-tie pattem, a buyer is not necessarily active and critical in the relocation decision of 
the manufacturers. The buyer~driven thesis holds only when the local manufacturers have 
to depend on the buyers. Li this case, it is more likely that the buyer is able to exert 
coercive pressure on the manufacturers' relocation plan. This, in tum, affects the 
organization ofthe global production network in the commodity chain. Or else when the 
buyer simultaneously becomes a manufacturer, he becomes more active in initiating 
production in the dependent economy. The fieldwork also shows that when local 
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manufacturers are not dependent on the buyer, a contested and negotiating process 
emerges between both parties ifthe buyers show resistant attitude towards the relocation 
project. Local manufacturers have to persuade the buyers to accept the relocation. 
Besides, the manufacturers can diversify its order source during the relocation as to avoid 
being controlled by the buyers. In this case, buyers' resources are not critical to the 
manufacturers and the latter can enjoy more discretion power on the relocation decision. 
However, some buyers are disinterested in the manufacturers' relocation plan and do not 
have any active role in shaping the relocation decision oftheir suppliers. 
In the loose-tie pattem, the dominance ofthe instrumental relationship weakens the 
role of buyers in affecting the relocation decision of the manufacturers. It is the 
manufacturers who take the relocation decision. They keep a detached relationship with 
their buyers. 
Therefore, the buyer-driven thesis holds under several conditions as mentioned 
above. However, it fails to explain what kinds of force that affect the relocation plan of the 
local manufacturers and how they shape the organization ofproduction network. Gereffi's 
buyer-driven GCCs discussion shows that there is an institutional framework that identifies 
how local, national and international conditions and policies shape the globalization process 
at each stage ofthe chain. (Gereffi: 1994) We need to have a more in-depth examination on 
the interaction between the institutional factors and the local manufacturers and see how it 
shapes the relocation strategy of the manufacturers. 
The foUowing table summarizes different types ofinterfirm linkages with the buyers 
that affect the relocation decision of local manufacturers. 
Close-tie with relocation/ Buyers' response Manufacturers' action Cases (nine cases with 
Characteristics relocation)  
Pioneer Resistant Negotiated and Factory E and G 
contested  
Mimetic isomorphism in Disinterested Detached Factory B，C, M  
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case C 
coercive isomorphism in 
case M  
Pioneer, has Active acceptance Factory L, Espirit, 
governance features participation Theme, Marks & 
producerKiriven GCCs aggressive Spencer  
Loose-tie with relocation Disinterested Detached Factory K, F, D 
Mimetic isomorphism 
Table 6.1: Characteristics in relocation and buvers，response in close-tie and loose-tie 
6.2. Intra-organizational comparison on relocation - triggering ofrelocation 
I would try to explain the forces that trigger the relocation decision of the local 
manufacturers in this section. Firstly, I would try to conceptualize the relocation decision 
on a time horizon by using 1987 as the dividing line. Those manufacturers who relocated 
their production before 1987 are defined as "pioneers" and those after 1987 are as "late-
comers". The reason for my using a time horizon conceptualization is that the institutional 
and business environment before and after 1987 is quite different. The garment industry 
reached the peak in 1987 in terms ofthe number of establishments, the quantity ofexports 
and the gross output performance. (See the table 3.3. in Chapter Three) Secondly, there 
are some institutional changes like the government's role, quota restrictions ofthe industry 
and condition ofthe labour market, all ofwhich are important for shaping the restructuring 
pattem of the garment industry. 
It is also interesting to note that reasons for the relocation of the pioneers and the 
late-comers vary. For instance, the manufacturers in the old days are not necessarily facing 
rising production cost or severe labour shortage as compared to the manufacturers today. I 
would examine how the local institutional forces interact with the local manufacturers in 
the relocation process among the pioneers and the late-comers. This leads to unravelling 
the forces that trigger the relocation. 
6.2.1. Pioneers in relocation - search for organizational growth 
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I observe that there are three garment factories that have early relocation or 
offshore production bases in China or in other East Asian developing countries in the late 
Seventies to early Eighties, ^'actory G, M and L) They have long history in garment 
production and rich experience in contacting overseas buyers in Hong Kong since the late 
Fifties to the early Seventies. 
Factory G planned to open a factory in Shenzhen during 1981. But the manager 
recognized that it would induce loss at that time when the economy in China was still very 
backward and the infrastructure of electricity, water, Ughting and road were poor. 
Besides，"back door" activities were common at that time. Therefore it was not attractive 
for the garment manufacturers to relocate their production ion in China in the early 
Eighties. They were not certain ifthey could get sufficient orders to support the production 
in China. Besides, their buyers did not support their relocation plan. However, the 
manufacturer insisted on relocating their factory to China. 
“It was a trial and error at that time. We held a belief that in the long run we can produce good quality goods 
and get orders from the overseas buyers. We couldn't have an accurate estimation on the source oforders. 
][fI said yes, we have accurate estimation, then I must be cheating you. But what was certain is that we have 
this direction, (expansion in China) We had to overcome a lot ofproblems ofhaving a factory in China at 
that time. We made a loss in the early time. I mean we spent a lot oftime and effort running the factory in 
Shenzhen. The cost was the same as that in Hong Kong. But it's a long-term project, a kind of managerial 
decision." CThe majiager ofFactory G) 
How can we explain the aggressiveness of the manufacturer? I suggest that we 
need to go back to the organizational history of the garment group. As a veteran shirt 
producer since 1957, the group diversified its business in apparel and leather trading with 
over 3,000 employees worldwide. The establishment size for shirt production was over 
one thousand workers in the Kwun Tong's production site in the late Seventies. 
Meanwhile, the group diversified its business to property development when the property 
market was booming in the early Eighties. The group rebuilt a new commercial building to 
replace the thirty-year-old industrial building in Kwun Tong. Then, the garment production 
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moved to a nearby factory building in Kwun Tong but the manufacturing workforce 
gradually fell to three hundred workers only. At present, they have an internationalized 
wholesale and retail network of branded apparels in Germany, Singapore and the US 
markets.2 In this respect, the organizational development of Factory G shows that the 
management is ambitious to search for capital accumulation by diversifying the business. 
Regarding garment production, they diversify the product lines with different price 
ranges and with mass volume production of both low-end and high-end orders. The 
manager explains that "there's nothing special in sewing a shirt. The garment is divided into 
different parts and everybody can do this." The garment production is locked into a 
labour-intensive manufacturing, therefore the abundant cheap labour supply in the 
dependent economy enables the manufacturer to organize production for the low-end 
orders. The production bases in China support the product for mass volume, low ends 
orders while that in Hong Kong remains to be a centre for medium to high-end, small-batch 
production or for urgent orders. 
Besides, labour shortages as well as the escalating product cost are quite 
problematic to the garment industry in the late Seventies. The local, manufacturers who 
have early relocation explains that they move the production to South China because they 
face severe labour shortage. The manager explained why they prefer to utilize the cheap 
labour in South China. 
•*The main consideration is that the labour cost keeps uprising. Garment industry is a labour-intensive 
industry of which the labour cannot be replaced by machinery. Therefore, how to lower down our 
production cost is the most important thing." 
Another manager encouraged his subcontractors to move production lines to 
South China in 1979. The managing director of Factory M recalled the difficulty of 
recruiting workers for the factory. 
2 The company profile ofFactoty G shows that they have retail and wholesale business in Singapore, 
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"At that time, I dared not to receive more orders from the buyers. I couldn't find sufficient workers to 
support the production." 
The above quotations show that the local manufacturers always complain about 
labour shortage. The labour cost occupies about 22 per cent of the total production cost in 
the early Eighties whereas the materials, supplies and other industrial services occupy 67 
per cent OHK Industry Department:1995:54) . It is more convenient for the local 
manufacturers to control the labour cost than other costs such as the cost ofraw materials. 
Apart from the imported workers, the availability of abundant cheap labour supply in 
South China is a great attraction for local manufacturers. 
The presence ofthe quota system is also conducive to the relocation. It is because 
the quota system imposes a quantity constraint on Hong Kong, s garment industry ifthe 
local manufacturers want to expand the exports to the quota countries. Local 
manufacturers can grasp the opportunity to get more orders from the quota countries by 
initiating production in the developing countries which are adjacent to the quota countries. 
For Factory G, the manufacturer expanded the production lines in Panama and Mauritius 
during the early Eighties. Panama is quota-free for the US while Mauritius is quota-free for 
EEC market. The quota free privilege is an opportunity for the manufacturers for further 
expansion. 
This is similar to the situation of Factory L which produced jeanswear in mass 
production, low-end and simple-style during the early Seventies. Their frequent buyers 
were the US bulk buyers like the GAP and the Limited. The quota price for jeanswear 
soared sharply and the group suffered a big loss in purchasing the quotas in 1977. 
"The quota price was even higher than the quotation price at that time. When the jeans-skirt was 
fashionable, the quota price for this catalogue is spiraling. The quota price for a dozen was over a thousand, 
which means over a hundred dollar for ajeans-skirt But the buyer did not offer a higher quotation price— 
Germany, the US, Malaysia. 
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The quota system makes us feel that we need to depend on others. That hinders our development. That's 
why we decided to expand our production lines to the overseas." C h^e managing director ofFactory L) 
Regarding the garment industry's development in the East Asian developing 
countries, like the Philippines and Lidonesia, there is no quantity constraint on the export 
volume of any particular manufacturers during the Seventies. In the Philippines, the 
government encouraged foreign investment by offering tax exemptions or used the Export 
Processing Zones ^PZs) to attract the "quota refugees" in the Four Dragons, ^*ineda 
Ofreneo:1994:163) Therefore, the quota privilege of the developing countries, to a certain 
extent, is attractive to the aggressive manufacturers who want to start overseas production 
for further expansion. The production bases enable the garment firms to have more 
flexibility in organizing the production. 
6.2.2. Late-comers in relocation - emergence of mimetic isomorphism 
Concerning those who moved the production lines to the Mainland or other 
developing countries after 1987, I would explain why I see them as late-comers in 
relocation. Jn fact, it is only a relative concept for distinguishing those manufacturers who 
locate their production recently from those did so earlier. The business ecology after the 
mid Eighties is markedly different from that before. For instance, garment manufacturers' 
perception ofthe condition in the labor market and the external challenges, to a certain 
extent, is quite different from the pioneers. I observe that the ethos of "survival" in the 
mentality ofthe manufacturers is very dominant factor for their considering the relocation. 
A process of"mimetic isomorphism" on relocation emerges in due course. In other words, 
it seems that relocation has become the "only-option" of the local manufacturers for 
survival. ‘TVQmetic isomorphism" is used to describe the process of "homogenization" of 
responses among the organizations when they face the environment conditions. As 
suggested by Powell and DiMaggio "modeling is a response to uncertainty"CHawley:1968, 
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Powell and DiMaggio:1994:66), Li the context of relocation, this sense of uncertainty is 
anchored in two aspects. The first is the interaction between the manufacturers and the 
buyers. The second is the subjective perception towards the institutional context by the 
manufacturers. ..... 
Regarding the interaction between the buyers and the manufacturers, I observe that 
whether the tie between the overseas buyers is close-tie or loose-tie, it is still far from the 
"strong network form ofmutual cooperation or relational subcontracting". The relationship 
between the buyers and the manufacturers is built on an exchange basis. Close-tie 
relationship between the buyers and the manufacturers in Hong Kong means both parties 
have shared marketing information and the buyers guarantee stable orders for the 
manufacturers. The transfer of technical or firm-specific asset information on product 
development from the buyers to the manufacturers takes place occasionally. 
Let us tum to examine some ofthe relocation experiences ofthe manufacturers in 
the mimetic isomorphism. As mentioned above, in either close-tie or loose-tie pattem, 
buyers are disinterested in the relocation plan of the domestic manufacturers. 
Manufacturers perceive the environment and decide to relocate as they have a strong 
shared belief that "relocation" is the only means of survival. This is very dominant 
phenomenon among the manufacturers that I have interviewed. I argue that this shared 
common belief is anchored in their interaction with the buyers and with other 
manufacturers. 
"We're the late comers in China. At first we're not famiUar with the Chinese government policy and 
hesitant to go to China. But now everybody goes to China. There is a trend of relocating the production 
Unes to the South China. We have to follow this trend, ffwe don't go, then we can't survive." CThe general 
manager ofFactoty E) 
The general manager ofFactory D said: 
"When there is limited chance to survive here, we must find the way out. Production cost in Hong Kong is 
ten dollars for a dozen. But in China, it is only six dollars. The buyers only tell us "I won't offer you a higher 
price. I will offer a lower one." So we have to think about this._We"re lagging behind as compared to other 
factories. We' re not sensitive enough.. well, it's a rising trend that evety garment factory has relocated their 
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I. 
production lines to China. You must do that. Now the operation cost gets higher. Kyou want to survive, 
you have to control the cost." 
Another manufacturer ^'actory C) emphasizes that "survival" is the force that 
motivates him to have relocation. He relocated the production to the PRC in 1989, with 
the following explanation: 
"Survival, the core issue is the price. We have labor shortage. We can't find workers and then the price for 
our goods becomes lower and lower. Under such environment, we need to find alternative means of 
survival. How can I get the orders?…They won't explicitly teU us that they mce the goods to be made in 
China. They give the price to us. Then we find our own means of "survival" to compete the orders. They 
would Uke to place the orders in Hong Kong. They can't teach us what we should do. You find your own 
means ofsurvival. No matter ofwhat way, provided that the means is legal and fit their price requirement." 
The owner stresses the word "survival" several times during the interview. Factory 
C is not the only case. Other manufacturers do the same. The collective perception ofthe 
threat to "survival" creates a very strong sense of uncertainty among the manufacturers 
that I have interviewed. 
As Powell and DiMaggio argue, uncertainty is a powerful force that creates 
imitation. When the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, it is more likely for the 
organizations to model themselves on other organizations. Q3imaggio and Powell:1991:69) 
Modeling serves as a convenient source of practices that the borrowing organization may 
use. Local manufacturers perceive that it is more difficult to compete orders with other 
MCs countries in the past ten years. The fieldwork shows that buyers，constant complaint 
about the price during the Eighties creates a "symbolic uncertainty" to the local 
manufacturers. This uncertainty is perceived to be a threat to the factories，survival. On the 
other hand, the manufacturers perceived relocation to South China is a "take-it-for-
granted" strategy, as a "convenient source of practices" because other garment 
manufacturers do the same. Factory K moved the production to Dongguan in 1992. 
Having a small factory in the industry, he perceived that he has to model on others so that 
he can get the orders. 
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"The buyers did not encourage us to have any relocation. But I want to compete with other factories, then I 
go there. Other competitors do relocate their production lines. I have to follow them (Jian Xia Feng^ ftO 
Evetybody goes there, and we foUow. lf we don't go, how can we manage to survive? Evetybody goes, 
everybody goes. There's no room for Hongkong's industry, CThe owner 0fFact0tyK) 
Besides, organizations tend to model themselves after the similar organizations 
which are perceived to be successful in their field. The above case shows that the 
manufacturer perceived "foUowing others" as a way to secure his survival, especially when 
he did not find any other alternative. The loose-tie buyer would not tell him what to do or 
develop any substantial cooperative in product design or development. The manufacturers 
had to find their own way. Following others' footsteps in relocation was seen as a way out, 
although it did not guarantee success. However, the manufacturers decided to move the 
production to China. They were cautious about the plan. They worked with the outward 
processing factories in the Mainland, which were run either by the local Chinese or the 
Hong Kong people in order to get acquaintance of the local officials before their relocation 
to South China. 
The government keeps an arms-length approach towards the industry and is not 
very helpful. The outward processing arrangement(OPA) was introduced during the 
Eighties. It allows garment products to be partly processed in China under the origin rules. 
This measure is also conducive to shift the labour-intensive process to the Mainland China. 
Therefore, this creates a momentum of strong force for local manufacturers to have 
relocation. On the one hand, the lack of government support in the industry implies that 
the local manufacturers have to take their own means for survival in the industry. On the 
other hand, the perceiving the environment as "unfavourable" such as the labour shortage, 
rising production cost and increasing protectionism, creates a strong sense ofuncertainty to 
the manufacturers. Successful garment firms are either doing their own brandname or 
having their production bases in China in the early days. However, it is not easy for most 
small and the medium garment firms to take the OBM production strategy as this strategy 
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requires huge capital investment and organizational resources. Therefore, "relocation" 
becomes a legitimate practice when the garment producers perceive that it can enhance 
their competitive edge in Hong Kong. 
6.3. Factories without relocation 
Four factories have not chosen relocation as their restructuring strategy. Rather, 
they retain the production bases in Hong Kong and utiUze the fIexibiUty in the production 
network in South China. CFactory H, I，J and K) Besides, a second-tier producer (factory 
A) doing the capacity or specialized subcontracting orders was interviewed. In this 
section, I would examine why domestic manufacturers choose this strategy, which I wiU 
describe as “ an industrial flexibility", as distinguished from the relocation as stated above. 
Apart from this, the experience ofthe second-tier producer will also be examined. 
6.3.1. Support of the subcontracting network in South China 
The common characteristic of those factories without relocation is that they are 
very small in scale. Their establishment size is less than twenty people. I would argue 
cautiously that establishment size affects the restructuring strategy of the garment 
manufacturers. Although my fieldwork observation shows that some small-scale firms have 
chosen relocation as their restructuring strategy, I would like to highlight two points on 
this issue. The first is the subjective perception ofthe garment manufacturer. The second 
one is the presence of the production network in South that is favourable to the local 
manufacturers to retain the production base in Hong Kong. Hopefully it would help to 
throw light on the reasons why some manufacturers do not choose relocation as their 
restructuring strategy but still manage to survive in the industry. 
First, regarding to the manufacturers' subjective perception about the business 
environment, they are conscious to refrain from location. It is interesting to note that their 
perception is resemble somewhat that of those manufacturers who relocated. For instance, 
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they also faced skilled labor shortage, rising production cost, and having difficulty to get 
orders in the market. Some manufacturers have previous relocation experience in South 
China and realize that there are inadequate protection for the Hong Kong businesses in 
ChinaCFactory I). Some factories refrain from relocation because oflack oforganizational 
resources, (like the case ofFactory A, J & K) 
Second, the subcontracting network in South China can enhance the competitive 
edge ofthe local manufacturers. This production network comes from the subcontractors 
in Hong Kong, or from the newly built up in China. The social capital of the manufacturers 
acts as a mechanism mediating between the overseas buyers and the subcontractors in the 
buyer-driven commodity chain. Li this way, Hong Kong's garment manufacturers not only 
act as a manufacturer but also as traders in the commodity chain. There also emerges a 
process oftriangular manufacturing in their cases. I suggest that the production network in 
South China provides a strong backup for the local manufacturers. The following 
experiences of several factories illustrate the above points. 
Factory H is a veteran garment factory which manufactured the ladies' fashion wear 
for the European buyers. The owner started in garment production and trading business in 
1968. Therefore, they worked with the Chinese officials for a long time even before the 
economic reform in China. They cooperated with them initially in Shunde with a 
compensation trade agreement in the late 1970's. Compensation trade is an agreement 
between the officials and the manufacturers with which the Chinese officials provide the 
factory site and workers while the Hong Kong manufacturers provided the machinery. The 
Shunde's factory constantly supplied garments to Factory H on a contract basis. Payment 
was deducted by the Hong Kong's manufacturers as the installments for the machinery. 
The compensation trade agreement is one of the very popular forms of cooperation 
between the Chinese officials and the Hong Kong businessmen at the initial stage ofChina's 
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economic reform. The owner can exert control on the quality of the product and the 
production cost by using the subcontracting network in Shunde. 
Besides, the social capital ofthe manufacturer enables her to have cooperation trade 
with China at that time. Mrs Leung, the owner ofFactory H, recalled their experience. 
"My husband was familiar with the Chinese officials. He had trading business with them before the open 
door policy. So, he already knew some ofthe officials well. They encouraged us to do business in Shunde. 
We're the third entrepreneur who started business in the countryside." 
She mentions that when she had compensation trade with the Chinese officiab in the 
early days, she did not think about relocation as other manufacturers do today. She 
intended to depend on the production network in Shunde so as to enable them to do more 
business with foreign buyers. 
The terms of the compensation trade expired several years later. The manufacturer 
started the outward processing arrangements with the Chinese officials. This was another 
popular form ofcooperation between the Chinese and the Hong Kong manufacturers in the 
1980's. Local manufacturers export raw materials to the Chinese subcontractors for 
processing. They signed the contract with the Chinese subcontractors and sent finished 
goods back to Hong Kong for re-exports. 
To ensure the product quality, management keeps close control over the 
production in subcontractors' factories in China. A production manager has to be stationed 
in Shunde for four to five days a week and coordinate the production among six 
contractors. She explained: 
"We send the manager to organize the production activities of different subcontractors. He helps them to 
solve the technical problem arisen from the production.... the subcontractors are responsible for managing 
the workers. We deal with skills, techniques and quality control for the production." 
At present, the factory depends on a network ofsix contractors in South China that 
supports near ninety percent of the production capacity ofthe factory. There is a spatial 
division of labor between those in Hong Kong and in Shunde. In Hong Kong, the 
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production site remains a base for technical support for the subcontractors in China. For 
instance, sample-making, materials sourcing, merchandising and other trading-related 
activities are retained in Hong Kong. In cases when the quota price for any particular 
garment category is too high or when the origin rules appUes, the orders are placed to Hong 
Kong's production base or to other subcontractors in Hong Kong. Factory H not only acts 
as a manufactures but also acts as a trader in the commodity chain during the process. The 
process oftriangular manufacturing as suggested by Gereffi emerges. The manufacturer 
can manage to survive and enjoy a high degree of industrial flexibility through this 
production network in South China. 
Factory I has the similar experience. The owner of this factory prefers to make use 
ofthe flexible production network in South China rather than having his own plant. 
Before the owner took over his ex-employer's factory in 1996，he had been 
working at a plant in Dongduan with the workforce ofthree hundred workers. But he gave 
up that factory and concentrated on the production in Hong Kong. He realized that he has 
to spend a lot oftime and effort controlling quality ofthe goods and monitoring workers in 
the Dongguan's production plant. Besides, the previous experience ofworking in China 
made him feel risky and insecure in having production lines in China. 
"hi China they emphasis the "guanxi"(^i), and "Renshi". IfI want to buy quotas in China, then we have to 
depend on the state-run company. There's no market price for the quotas, just depends on whether we have 
the relationship. Those guys who are in power can control the quota allocation, ffwe don't have this guanxi, 
the price is much higher. “ Mr. Tang complained ofthe difficulties in dealing the officials in China. 
He stated that some high-ranked officials got a faked seal chop, produced fake 
documents and sold them to the businessmen. There were several occasions when his 
goods were held by the Customs officials even though he had the necessary documents. 
This bitter experience makes him hesitate to have production in China. 
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Current research shows that when the officials can control the procedure and 
resources, giving personal gifts to the officials in doing business is very common in China. 
(Smart and Smart:1992) Some manufacturers maintained that they have to give "red 
packets" or gifts to the Chinese officials of various departments (like the Chinese Customs, 
and the local government) every year in order to build up a good "guanxi" with the 
officials. The owner of Factory I is not confident in running his own factory in the 
Mainland. 
Meanwhile, the production network in Dongguan can support the factory in 
competing orders with other firms in the market. Before starting the business, the owner 
has been working with three subcontractors for six to seven years when he was employed as 
a production manager. The subcontractors in Dongguan used to have production in Hong 
Kong before their relocation in the mid Eighties. But then they wind up the factories in 
Hong Kong and concentrate their efforts on the Mainland. The establishment size is 
medium size, with a hundred to five hundred workers. The production capacity for each 
subcontractor is about 30,000 to 50,000 pieces per month. In other words, the total 
monthly production capacity can reach a maximum of over a hundred thousand pieces. This 
increases his flexibility in organizing the production. 
"Sometimes the buyer gives us an order of over ten thousands, but we don't have the shipment. It's 
impossible to make it in Hong Kong within thirty days. Then the buyer will understand why we put the 
orders to China....or ifthey have a large volume order which is beyond my production capacity here, ask my 
friends in China to do it for me. It's so flexiblel" (Mr Tang, the owner ofFactoty I) 
In this manner, the manufacturer ofFactory I also acts as a trader mediating the 
overseas buyers and the producers in China in the global commodity chain. Having built up 
close tie with three frequent buyers in Germany for the past years, his buyers also depend 
on the owner to source other garment products in China's production network. The goods 
include gloves, jeanswear, children's wear and ladies' wear. 
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"Sometimes the buyer asks me whether I can find other supplier to make the gloves or other types of 
garment products. Then I asked my friend to receive the orders, and I became the exporter. That's why you 
can see that we have two brands - one is trading, the other is manufacturing." 
Besides, the manufacturer can make use of the flexibility of quota in China. No 
quota is needed for some categories of garment product if they are made in China. The 
orders are given to the subcontractors in Dongguan in this case. The owner explained: 
"We don't need quota for category 74 (ladies，woven coat) in China for exporting to the EEC market. But we 
need that ifthey are made in Hong Kong, then I will put the orders to China's subcontractors. Or the cat. 
68 orders, (children's wear), ofwhich the quota price in China is vety cheap, only several cents per kilo, are 
also put to China. That depends on the quota price and our production capacity." 
Again, Factory J, which does not relocate the production, has shared the similar 
experience of the above two factories. The manager explains that they do not choose 
relocation as their restructuring strategy because they think it is too risky to do so. They 
are afraid that they cannot get sufficient orders to support the capacity in China. Their 
order is only several hundreds to a few thousands pieces per order. The manager realized 
that the production cost in Hong Kong and in China is more or less the same. 
"Transport cost for the Sino-HK is quite high now. Even we open a production line to do the outward 
processing arrangement, the cost is similar to that in Hong Kong. Unless you are doing the "submarine 
goods"3 CThe manager ofFactory J) 
Being a small factory, Factory J lacks the organizational resources such as the 
working capital for relocation. The owner was a machinist before she started the business. 
She invited her sister to join the business. The setup capital was raised by the familial 
means. Having entered into the industry for over ten years, they have only maintained quite 
loose tie with an European buyer who purchases goods from Factory J twice per year. 
Apart from purchasing and selling the goods, the buyer is disinterested in the development 
3 Under the counUy oforigin rule (c/o) ofthe quota restrictions, part ofthe production process is 
aUowed to do outside the Hong Kong territory through the outward processing arrangement (OPA). It 
is defined as the major transformation ofthe garment product in which assembUng, label sewing must 
be done in Hong Kong. Then, the Hong Kong manufacturers need to apply the OPA from the Hong 
Kong IndusUy Department before doing the outward processing activities in China. However, some 
manufacturers make use ofthe loopholes ofthe OPA by finishing the garment in China's plant, and 
then reexported to HK to change the country origin label. This is illegal. These kind of goods are 
called "submarine goods". 
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plan ofthe factory. When there is a massive relocation of factories to China in the past 
years, the buyer did not say anything about relocation. 
"He doesn't care about this, (relocation) What he is concerned about is whether the products are made in 
Hong Kong. He doesn't care how we manage to do it But the label must be made in Hong Kong and we 
must use Hong Kong's quota. He doesn't care about where we make the goods, or he doesn't want to know 
about it. Quality is the most important thing, ffwe're brave enough, then we can do the 'submarine goods', 
he doesn't care and won't inspect this." C^e manager ofFactoty J) 
Like other cases, the production network in South China helps to maintain the 
factory's survival. At present, the subcontracting network consists of five garment 
factories in South China, including two in Huang Yuen(^^), three in Pun Yue(fe) and one 
in Zhong San (H ). These five factories are owned by the local Chinese manufacturers. The 
establishment size ranges from three hundred to five hundred workers. This network was 
estabUshed by the manager in his previous employment. He had to work with the Chinese 
subcontractors in South China since 1982. This kind of social capital of the manager 
facilitates the competitive edge offactory J. Since then, when the manager competes for 
the orders from the sourcing agent, he also considers the production capacity ofthese five 
subcontractors in China and offers different price options. 
"I give them several options through my agents when we get order - made-in-hong-kong, made-in-HKbut 
with the OPA, and made-in-China option. That depends on which option is more profitable and more 
acceptable to our clients, ffmade-in^hina option is chosen, then I call my friends there (China) to finish 
the orders, hi this process, the materials are sent to the contractors and using the quota in China." CThe 
manager ofFactoty J) 
Then Factory J changes its role from a manufacturer to a middleman mediating 
orders for the second-tier producers and the sourcing agent in the global commodity. 
Perhaps it is worthwhile to explain why sourcing agents have to depend on the first-tier 
producer to get the order match instead of directly contacting the second-tier producers in 
the PRC. I suggest that the social capital ofthe manager is an invaluable asset ofthe smaU 
factory which cannot be easily replaced by the sourcing agent. The manager could keep 
close relationship with the subcontractors in South China in the past years. His relationship 
with the subcontractors has been established in his previous employment. 
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"I phone them, tell them that I would send fabrics and the marker there. I ask them to finish the goods, that 
is. It's a matter ofRen Chen ( )，that means relationship, tfwe're not well acquainted, why do they work 
forme?" 
He recalled the days when his factory and the subcontractors worked together to 
finish the rush orders. Late-shipment or sending goods by flight can be a great loss to the 
manufacturer. The manager maintained that there is conflict of interests between the 
sourcing agents and the manufacturer. But the manufacturers can understand each other's 
situation when they are in the same boat. There is a mutual construction of "trust" that 
govems the operation of this network. 
"We do suffer if we fail to meet the deadline. Late shipment means I have to send goods by flight. It's so 
annoying! The agents won't care about this. He leaves it to us. We can understand the difficulties. We're the 
friendship there. So I do the favor for them and they do it for me next time." 
Apart from utilizing the subcontracting network in Guangdong, the manager also 
applies the flexible labor strategy to organize the production in Hong Kong. It is a small 
factory, only with twenty workers at the assembly line. Besides, outworkers are employed. 
The factory is situated in an industrial building in Kwai Chung, which is near to the 
working-class public estates. The manufacturer usually subcontracts out parts of the 
garment like collars to the female workers. The manufacturer can flexibly use the labor in 
accordance to the orders' urgency. 
6.3.2, Buyers* participation in the South China's subcontracting network 
I observe that buyers do not actively participate the production Une, even when 
some orders are subcontracted out to the production network in South China. Even in the 
close-tie pattem (like Factory I), it is rare for the buyer to have any say about the 
organization ofproduction. He leaves it to the manufacturer. 
Jn regard to the quality control ofthe production line, that depends on the product's 
style and the price-range. If the order is medium-end and the style is rather complicated, it 
is more likely that buyers would have a relatively closer quality control. For example, the 
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buyers ofFactory I visit the subcontracting factories in Dongguan for one or two days to 
check the workmanship. On the contrary, if the orders are low-end and simple style, like 
making T-shirts, then the buyer leaves it to the first-tier producer to do the quality 
inspection. Again, buyers are not interested in participating in organizing the production in 
the loose-tie pattem. 
Concluding remarks on factories without relocation 
It is suffice to say that the subcontracting network in South China provides a 
backup for those garment factories to compete for the orders in the market. The 
manufacturers can make use offlexibility when they organize their production in both Hong 
Kong and China. Besides, the social capital ofthe manufacturer supports the operation of 
the network. My fieldwork observation also shows that the local garment manufacturers 
become traders in the global commodity chain through the triangular manufacturing. They 
act as middlemen mediating the orders between the overseas buyers and the producers in 
China. This role change also enhances the competitive edge ofthose garment factories 
even though they do not relocate. 
6.3.3. The experience ofasecond-tier producer in the commodity chain 
A small-scale factory doing cut-and-trim (CMT) has been interviewed. It has no 
relocation or any production network in China. The subcontractor has been working for 
parent firms in Hong Kong for the past ten years but is unable to move up to the 
commodity chain as the first-tier producer. It is worthwhile to examine why it cannot move 
up to the first-tier while still managing to survive in the nineties. Through the unearthing of 
the experience of this subcontractor, I hope that this will help us to shed light on how 
subcontractors' activities are connected with the first-tier producers in the domestic node of 
the commodity chain. 
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Most of the garment manufacturers have dropped subcontractors in Hong Kong 
after relocation, according to the fieldwork interviews. As mentioned above, they have 
their own plants or utilize the subcontracting network in South China after relocation. So, 
the massive trend in the industry exerts pressure over Factory A. The subcontractor 
previously worked with a parent factory for three years since 1988. Their cooperation 
stopped when the parent factory relocated to the Mainland in 1991. The owner had to find 
other factories. Since he only keeps loose tie with the buyers, buyers have not discussed 
with him about any relocation plan. Meanwhile, some manufacturers from the parent 
factories encouraged him to move production to the Mainland in the late Eighties. Mr Lam 
recalled how other manufacturers from the parent factories encourage him. 
"They said that there's no future of running a factoty here. It's better we'U be back to the Mainland. There 
is abundant cheap labor supply and the rent is low. They said that they receive the orders from buyers and 
then asked me to manage the production line in China ifI relocated there. But I have to assess my abUity, 
I don't need to do this. My wife doesn't like me to go to China. Besides, I don't have much working capital. 
Unless he (the buyer) joins with us, then it's different. Say, he invests some a hundred thousands and so do 
I." 
However, there is no "coercive isomorphism" in this case. DiMaggio and PoweU 
hypothesizes that the greater the dependence of an organization on another organization, 
the more similar it will become to that organization in structure, climate and behavioral 
focus. Li this manner, coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal 
pressures over organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by 
cultural expectations in the society in which organizations function. ODiMaggio and 
PoweU:1991:67-9) Factory A needs to depend on his parent factories but the owner does 
not necessarily follow the suggestions from the parent factory even though they guarantee 
the orders to him. 
"Sometimes they discussed with me about the relocation. In reality, it is another matter. For instance, the 
producers said that they would give me the order if I moved the production line to the Mainland. They 
remain in words only. They won't financially support you, CThe owner ofFactoty A) 
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The verbal promise of assuring orders is not sufficient to motivate the owner to 
relocate. Without any financial backup from the parent factory, it is not viable for Factory 
A to relocate. 
Besides, lack of financial resources makes Factory A difficult to move up as a 
first-tier producer in the commodity chain. He does not have any direct access to the 
foreign buyers or sourcing agents. He needs larger amount of working capital and 
organizational resources ifhe intends to do so. 
"I need to pay for the quota, the fabrics and the commission. I need large cash flow to do the F.O.B. Now 
our production cost is about forty thousands a month. Ifwe do the F.O.B., then the cash flow must be twenty 
times by now. I have to employ the salesman, merchandiser, shipping clerk, accounts clerk." 
The owner started the factory as a family business in 1986 after quitting hisjob as a 
master in fabrics cutting for over twenty years. His wife was a machinist in the past. The 
couple run the business with about a hundred thousand dollars and invited his wife's sister 
as the partner. At first, they purchased several second-hand sewing machines and rented a 
smaU unit inside an old private building in Cheung Sha Wan. The owner got the orders 
from his ex-employer or other friends. The initial establishment size was very small and 
only fewer than ten workers were employed. At present they have twenty workers. 
The orders come from his personal network, which consists ofsome twelve to 
thirteen factories supporting their production capacity. At present, the production capacity 
is some seven hundred pieces per month. The owner says that he has constant cooperation 
with those factories. "Constant cooperation" does not mean orders are stable, instead they 
are very precarious. Some factory owners discuss with him about the orders quantity in 
advance every year. But this kind ofagreement is not in black and white contract, rather it 
is based on "trust" between two parties. When the parent factory cannot keep his promise, 
the subcontractor need to find order sources from his own network. 
However, the subcontractor can still capture the market niches by utilizing the 
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flexibility in getting orders Uke rush orders, small quantity or specialized contracting 
orders. 
"Sometimes the orders are very urgent, they urge us to finish the orders within ten days, but we can't. Then, 
the parent factory only gives us a single color, other colors are subcontracted to other subcontractors." 
Once the parent factory gives him an order that is sufficient to support the 
production capacity for over six months, he need not worry the business. At present, the 
owner has worked with a medium-size factory for three years, which produces cotton Polo 
shirts for the US market. The parent factory subcontracts out some orders to him because 
ofthe quota restrictions. 
Besides, the subcontractor also gets the specialized subcontracting like collar-
assembling or sewing the trimming^) at the assembly line. He can utilize its flexibility to 
support the garment production for the first-tier producer in the commodity chain. It is 
interesting to note that subcontracting out ofspeciaUzed parts ofthe garment is similar to 
the use of intemaI subcontracting inside the factory. The owner described himself as a 
"Pau-Tau"4 and considered him as ifhe were the employee for the parent factory. 
His perception can help us to understand the nature ofthe relationship between the 
subcontractor and the first-tier producer in the commodity chain. Since "Pao-kau" 
provides the service for the factory on a very flexible basis. That means that management 
can flexibly utilize them in accordance with their needs, which can be quite precarious in 
nature and do not require a long-term mutual obligation and commitment. 
Besides, the subcontractor manages to survive by utilizing the familial strategy in 
organizing the production. The family members contribute their effort in running the whole 
business, responsible for the management and active participation in the production 
4 Pau-Kau ( ^ , it is a kind ofintemal subcontracting which is mostly used as a form ofinformal labour 
in organizing the production in the garment workplace like ironing, buttoning, cutting department or 
packing department. Pau Kau is a gang leader who has employed a group ofcausal workers to perform 
specialized tasks for the management However, since they provide service to the management, there is 
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process. There is sexual division of labor between the owner and his wife. The husband is 
responsible for getting orders from other garment factories, dealing with the customs 
officers and keeping accounts. His wife is responsible for quality control and the 
supervision of the assembly line. In case of urgent orders, his wife also works as a 
machinist at the assembly line. The owner used to deliver garments to the outworkers a few 
years ago. When I interviewed the owner, he was ironing collars for assembling. The 
participation of family labour is also a way to save on operating costs for the 
subcontracting business. 
The above experience shows that lack of organizational resources makes it difficult 
for the subcontractor to move beyond the commodity chain. However, its survival 
depends on flexibility in getting rush orders from a network of garment firms in Hong 
. 
Kong. On the other hand, the case also shows that capacity subcontracting becomes less 
important due to massive relocation of the industry. This makes the subcontractor expand 
his order sources. Besides, the subcontractor has to utilize the familial strategy in 
organizing the production in order to manage to survive in the industry in the nineties. 
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
The findings in this chapter show that there are variations in the restructuring 
strategy among the garment firms in the 1990's. Some manufacturers have chosen 
relocation or overseas production bases as their major restructuring strategy while some 
retain the production base in the territory. The following table summarizes the variation of 
restructuring strategy and its characteristics as follows: 
no employment relationship between the causal workers and the management, which means, the 
management doesn't need to give any workers' entitlements in the Employment Ordinance. 
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Restructuring strategy Characteristics Cases Their position in the GCCs 
Type I: Relocation and • Pioneer during late L, G, becoming buyer and able to 
overseas production in the seventies to early eighties Fang's accrue more profit through 
third countries . aggressive share of the Brother the high value-added 
market (Esprit), activities 
• doing ODM or OBM as the Theme 
production strategy 
• vertical integration in 
forward and backward link 
intheGCCs 
• possess the governance 
features of producerKiriven 
GCCs.  
Type n： Relocation to • LateKX)mers during mid- B，C，D，E, first-tier producer, 
PRC eighties to nineties F, K, M sometimes change to atrader 
• mimetic isomorphism for the buyer through the 
• stick to OBM production triangular manufacturing 
• remain at garment 
production 
• sometimes change to the 
middleman for the buyers 
through the triangular 
manufacturing  
Type m： Without • No relocation H, I, J first-tier producer, but also a 
Relocation but utilize • depend on the flexibility of middleman for overseas 
production network in the production network in buyers through the 
PRC PRC triangular manufacturing 
• social capital of the 
entrepreneur to govem the 
operation of the network  
Type rV: No relocation • No relocation A second-tier producer in the 
and no production • depend on the first-tier commodity chain 
network producer to get orders 
• use of femilial strategy in  
organizing production  
Table 6.2. Variations in differenttvpes of restructuring strategies oflocal garment manufacturers in 
the nineties and their position in the buverKiriven commoditv chain 
The v^ations in the restructuring strategy of the garment firms reflect their 
bargaining power with the buyers and their ability in accruing profit in the global 
commodity chains. Obviously, the manufacturer of the first type strategy is the most 
aggressive one and they succeed to internationalize the trading and production activities in 
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the commodity chain. In this manner, they even possess some governance features of 
producer-driven commodity chain that Gereffi has neglected. 
I also like suggest that the restructuring experiences of local garment 
manufacturers in Hong Kong show that the interaction between foreign buyers are more 
dynamic and complicated. The driving role of the buyer in shaping the restructuring 
strategy ofthe manufacturers is significant only under very specific conditions. It is found 
that under the close-tie pattem, the buyer is significant in affecting the relocation decision 
ofthe manufacturers only when the manufacturers are dependent on the particular buyer. 
Or when the buyer is also the manufacturer, then they would initiate production in the 
dependent economy and shape the production network. When the manufacturers are not 
solely dependent on any particular buyer, then the picture is more dynamic. There emerges 
a contested and negotiated process between both parties in the relocation process. 
In the loose-tie pattem, local manufacturers have to find their own way of 
competing for orders in the market, then they keep a disinterested and detached manner 
with each other on the relocation plan. Both in the close-tie and loose-tie pattem, there 
emerges a "mimetic isomorphism" in the relocation process among the manufacturers, 
especially for those who move the production to Mainland after the mid eighties. 
Following others by taking "relocation" is a more secure way for local garment 
manufacturers when they manage to survive in the Nineties. Besides, I also observe that 
buyers do not interfere with the manufacturers in organizing the production network during 
the restructuring process. 
138 
Chapter Seven: 
Social outcomes after relocation in the commodity chain 
In this section, I would delineate the social outcomes that relocation brings to the 
garment firms and the work organization in the current era. I would engage in a dialogue 
with Gary Gereffi about the garment manufacturers' role and the social implications on 
the territoriality dimension which involves a spatial dispersion or concentration of the 
production units in the commodity chain. Since then, Gary Geriffi has mentioned that 
the process of"triangular manufacturing" is the most important mechanism for maturing 
export industries in East Asia. (Gereffi:1994:224) The first-tier producers of the MCs 
become the middleman for the overseas buyers. They get the orders from the buyers and 
shift them to other offshore factories in the dependent economy. Besides, some garment 
manufacturers succeed to move up the commodity chain by doing the OBM. Meanwhile, 
relocation leads to changes in the work organization and labour process. As suggested 
by Gereffi: "the change in the economic organization is not just a geographical or spatial 
change in economic activities in the globalized product world, but rather the mobility of 
capital becomes a perennial problem confronting the labour force in industrial societies." 
(Gereffi and Hamilton:1996:21) Again, it projects social implications for the social 
relation of labour and capital in the current era, which is not examined by Gereffi. 
Therefore, this chapter addresses the above issues by tracing the following dimensions of 
the social outcomes after relocation. First, what are organizational changes of local 
garment firms that enhance their competitive edge after relocation? I explore this in the 
first section. The second dimension is a close scrutiny on the change in the social 
organization of production and work organization in Hong Kong after relocation. The 
spatial division of labour and economic activities in the world economy changes the 
labour process in the industrial restructuring process. This will be dealt in the second and 
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third section. By unearthing the above dimensions, it would throw light on how 
restructuring exerts social outcomes on work and industry. 
7.1. Three types of outcomes emerge within organizations - Expansion or 
contraction? 
In the fieldwork, three types of outcomes of relocation for the garment firms are 
found: horizontal expansion, vertical expansion and relocation but with failure. 
Horizontal expansion means that there is an increase in order size and production 
capacity. This is either an expansion of production scale or backward integration in the 
commodity chain. 
The second outcome is expansion by vertical integration, i.e. the manufacturers no 
longer utilize the Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) production strategy. 
Rather, they extend to the Original Brand Manufacturing (OBM). The firms integrate the 
retailing, marketing, raw materials manufacturing and garment production. They 
become the buyer to capture higher share of surplus in the GCCs. In this manner, they 
even possess the governance features ofthe producer-driven commodity chain when there 
is a vertical form ofproduction and trading network in the GCCs. 
The third is failure in relocation. My fieldwork observation shows that a factory 
owner (Case K) had production in the Mainland during the early nineties but he has to 
wind up the plant. However, he still retains his production in the territory. Due to lack 
of official statistics, it is difficult to know how many garment firms fail in the relocation 
process. However, the informants say that some manufacturers fail to benefit from 
relocation and shift the production back to Hong Kong.^  Therefore, I do not intend to 
1 The US Customs enforced the factoty control in Hong Kong to prevent illegal transshipment 
activities in September 1996. The US Customs and the Hong Kong Customs had visited a total of 
139 factories. The action has drawn strong reaction from the industry. Garment Manufacturers 
Right-Concern Association, represents some eight hundred factories, complained the difficulties 
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treat this case as "exceptional", but I suggest the case still represents one type of 
garment manufacturers' experiences in relocation. 
7.1.1. Relocation with horizontal expansion 
Some factories enjoy a favourable organizational growth after relocation. First, 
there is an increase in production capacity. The Mainland's production base helps to 
alleviate the production cost in Hong Kong. Labour-intensive production process is 
shifted to the China's plant under the OPA. SmaU and medium factories enjoy an increase 
in the production capacity (see Table 7.1). Besides, local garment manufacturers can 
flexibly use quota categories both in Hong Kong and China's production plants because 
some categories can be exempted from quota restriction if they are made in China. 
Then they can compete on medium-price orders with other East Asian manufacturers. 
"We can deal with those buyers even though they don't increase the price. It's difficult to expect that 
they will increase the price. So, we can make it through the outward processing arrangement, increase the 
scale of production and then the cost can be lower. “ CThe owner of Factory C) 
The product line for Factory C is jeanswear. Cutting and assembling procedures 
are carried out in Hong Kong's shopfloor and the others are shifted to China in 1989. The 
foUowing table gives a summary ofthe establishment size and production capacity in HK 
and China after relocation. 
Cases Establishment size in HK after Establishment size in Production capacity in 
relocation (workers at operative level) PRC (workers at operative PRC's production lines per 
level) and overseas month 
production sites  
B l 5 80 700pcs  
^ ^5 ~ 300 several thousands pcs  
3 40 “ 200 an increase of 30 per cent 
with the existing 
production capacity  
~E 50 500, three plants incomplete  
^ 40 一 300 over 100,000 pcs  
G 150 — 2,000, one plant — 30,000 pcs  
T ^\ Total is 9,809 which 2,880,000 pcs 
comprises of 1,200 in PRC, 
1,385 in South East Asia and  
they have on such measures. Some firms doing illegal transshipment held the goods in PRC and 
return the production base to Hong Kong. (Hong Kong Economic Daily: 1997) 
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^ 
2,847 in Bangladesh  
l i i 3040 over 1,500, three plants incomplete  
^ 20 200-250 not applicable  
Table 7.1: Establishment size in Hong Kong and China's production sites after relocation and the 
production capacitv of each factory per month in China 
Second, the garment factories open more plants in China after a few years of 
relocation. My field data show that local manufacturers start the production in a small 
scale in the Mainland at the initial stage. They further expand the production bases. 
For instance, Factory E starts the first production plant in Shenzhen in 1987 employing 
less than a hundred workers. The workforce gradually increases to three hundred. 
Management seeks new buyers to support the production lines in China and it succeeds to 
expand the production to Jiangsu and Beijing in 1993 and 1994. Senior managers 
coordinate the production in these two plants. The owner plans to do the silk dyeing so 
as to support garment production in Jiangsu. 
Factory G has similar experience. The factory in Shenzhen had only one 
hundred workers in 1981 and it makes the licencee's orders. When their buyers gradually 
accept the product quality made in China, Factory G expands the production scale by 
increasing the workforce to two thousand workers. At present, the Shenzhen plant 
produces three hundred thousands pieces every month, which is ten times greater than 
that ofHK. 
Besides, the manufacturer can diversify the markets to non-quota countries. 
Before relocation, orders from non-quota countries Uke Japan or other East Asian 
countries are made in Hong Kong at a higher cost. They can be fully processed in the 
Mainland now. My field data shows that many garment manufacturers do not depend 
entirely on the US market. The following table shows the proportion of share of orders 
between quota and non-quota countries. 
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Case Exports Market and percentage share ratio % quota 
countries and 
non-quota countrie 
F US and European not available  
E US (950/0)，the European market (5%) 100% quota 
B Sweden, Spain, England (50%) Singapore and local market (50%) 50:50 
3 “ US (30%)，EEC 25%, UK 10%, others are East Asian countries, 55:45 
Canada, Australia and local market  
C ~US (35%), East Asian (65%) 35:65 
L US，China, Australia 40:60 
^ US (25%), Japan (30%), EEC (30%), domestic (17%)，Australia 55:45 
and others (3%), South America (8%) 
M US (60%), UK 6%, Canada 7%, Japan 3.14% and Austria 3.8%，69:31 
Germany 2.72% 
Table7.2.: Distribution ofbuvers' market among those factories with relocation 
However, some manufacturers make use of the loopholes in the OPA in getting 
more orders and make more profits. For instance, the cut-and-sewn garments are fully 
processed in China and then the garments are tran-shipped illegally, using made-in-HK 
label. This is illegal under the origin rules. The experience ofFactory D demonstrates 
how the manufacturer deals with this illegal practice. 
It is common that the merchandiser from the buying office needs to inspect goods 
in China ifthe garment producer offers "made-in-HK" option. The manufacturer, however, 
made the garments in China. The management gains the cooperation with the 
merchandiser and lets him inspect the goods in China in an "informal" way. That means 
that the merchandiser does not keep any written record after his inspection in China. 
"Some buyers know that the goods are 100 per cent or partly made-in China. They also know that you 
make use of the loopholes of the quota restrictions. Evetybody aUows me to do so. I can offer them a 
lower price. The buyers benefit in this process... weVe veriwl agreement, we can't have the black and 
white to prove that they have inspected the goods in China. It's supposed to be made in HK. It's our 
mutual agreement" CThe general manager ofFactoty D) 
It is noted that the manager evades the "factory audit checks" from the Hong 
Kong Customs by using two sets of account books. When I interviewed the manager of 
Factory D in August 1996, there was no production base there, although the garment firm 
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has been registered as a factory. In fact, the assembly line was closed in 1994. 
Merchandising, sourcing, and other trading activities remain in Hong Kong's office. 
When I re-interviewed him in November, the assembly line was re-opened. About 
fifty workers were working there. The manager explains that because the US and Hong 
Kong Customs office enforce the control of the origin rules^ they need to retain the 
production base. "But we wiU close it as soon as their checks become loose," the 
manager adds. 
7.1.2. Relocation with vertical expansion 
Vertical expansion means that local garment manufacturers can get forward 
integration of economic activities in the GCCs after relocation. Field data shows that 
Factory L is successful to do OBM and becomes the buyer in the commodity chain. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the group has an overseas production network in the 
East Asian countries and North China since 1985. It sets up eight joint-venture 
enterprises in Beijing, Jiangsu, Hebei, Hubei and Guangdong provinces. Management 
realizes that competition is not so keen by moving the production to northern China while 
other choose the South region. Besides, they gain easy access to cotton supplies. 
"We can buy good quality of cotton fabrics there. Everybody can make garment But how can we make 
people buy our garments? Quality is the most important thing. High quality depends on fabric quality. 
That ensures us to have high quality fabrics supply and prevent us from any unnecessaty delay. It's less 
risky that weVe plants in north China, CThe managing director ofFactoty L) 
The group makes use of the location advantages in north China by integrating 
raw-material manufacturing in the global commodity chain. The group formed four 
joint-venture enterprises of weaving, dyeing and knitting plants in north China and 
Zhuangdong in the eighties, and was set to develop retailing business in the late 
eighties. 
2 The US authorities have enforced stricter textiles and garment control on the Hong Kong's garment 
manufacturers in September 1996. Factories arc given prior consent and then the US customs inspects 
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"We know that other competitors can do the same thing as us. To win the game, we have to do two 
things. First, improving our product quality.. Second we must gain a profound position in the market. 
It's not enough to be a garment supplier. Instead, we must become part of the market. To do so, 
retailing is the only way out" 
The group improves the product quality by introducing the IS09002 in the 
production process. This helps them to build up a good image. The Hong Kong 
Productivity Council examines their product quality and production procedure every six 
months to grant the ISO 9002 certificate. 
The opportunity came in 1990 when a financial crisis ruined their frequent buyer, a 
brand-name chain store selling causal wear in Australia. Having kept a close tie with the 
group for ten years, it called for the group's support. The managing director describes that 
they were "passive" at the early stage, and were not actively involved in the daily 
management because they were not familiar with the retail business. Yet, they acquired 
the retailing expertise. The group took over the buyer's company in 1994 and used the 
brand name as a stepping stone to develop retailing business in China. 
The group's production bases in East Asian and northern China support garments 
for the retail outlets. At present, seventy-six per cent of the garment products for the 
chain stores and eighty-three percent of the export business are produced in the group's 
production lines in China and other developing countries. The group also establishes 
strong ties with twenty subcontractors - one in the PRC, eleven in Bangladesh and eight 
in the Philippines. 
After doing the retailing business both in Australia and North China, the group 
further raises the capital in the share market in 1996. The group is prepared to capture 
the retail market in South China. 
It is noted that the aggressive manufacturer possesses the producer-governance 
structure in the commodity chain by having an integrated network of manufacturing and 
the factoty as to prevent the illegal transshipment. 
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trading activities in the commodity chain. It is more active in shaping the production 
network in the commodity chain. 
7.1.3. Relocation but failed 
The third type of social outcome is that some factories fail to have any expansion 
after relocation. Factory K relocated the production to Dongguan in 1992. At first, the 
owner capitalizes on the cheap labour source through the outward processing 
activities. 
However, the owner wound up the factory in China when his business partner 
withdrew his investment after two years. He ran into financial trouble. 
"It's not easy to gain the financial backup from the bank because we're a small factory. Especially when 
bankers know that we need the money for investments in China. Unless we have the assets for mortgage, 
we can't gain their support ” CThe owner ofFactory K) 
His partner is responsible for getting orders and management ofthe production in 
Dongguan. The owner searches for a new partner but in vain. Moreover, his buyers do 
not help him. Finally, he gives up the Mainland's production. At present, the owner 
depends on a subcontracting network in Dongguan, which consists of four 
subcontractors. He explains that by doing so, he can minimize the cost and need not 
have his own plant in China. 
Thus, after relocation, local manufacturers enjoy either horizontal or vertical 
form of expansion ofthe garment firms in the commodity chain. Meanwhile, the failure 
case shows that the garment factory's development is constrained because of the lack of 
organizational resources Hke finance and manpower. The foUowing table shows for 
the garment factories get different forms of expansion after relocation. 
Factory Form of expansion Production bases in PRC or Year of set-up in PRC or overseas 
overseas  
_B horizontal Zhuangzhou 1997  
_C horizontal Dongguan 1989  
_D horizontal Dongguan 1992  
E horizontal, tends to Shen^en 1987, 1993 and 1994 
146 
^ 
have backward integratio Jiangsu and Beijing  
F horizontal Shenzhen, Panama and 1981 for PRC and further expanded th 
Mauritius workforce over 2,000 after 1988 
1983 for overseas  
_G horizontal Shenzhen ] ^  
K — fail Dongguan — 1992 
L vertical North China and Zhuangzhou, 1978 - 85 compensation trade and 
Monesia, Bangladesh, processing assembling 
Philippines 85-90，8 garment production plants, 
four in dyeing, weaving and 
knitting manufacturing bases in PRC 
78-95, nine factories in the east Asian 
countries 
Retailing in Australia and PRC from 1 
M horizontal Huizhou, Pun Yu and Dongguan 1978 encourage subcontractors to 
Dongguan, 
three factories are set up in 1990, 1994 
and 1995. 
Table 7.3: Different forms of expansion after relocation 
for the garment firms (except K^ in the nineties 
7.2. Implications for product upgrading after relocation 
I observe that although local garment manufacturers enjoy horizontal expansion 
after relocation, they do not necessarily shift their production to high-value added 
manufacturing. High-value manufacturing means the improvement in the product 
quality and a shift to higher-end orders. It also refers to the original design (ODM) or 
original brand manufacturing (OBM). Local manufacturers can eam more surplus by 
selling the uniqueness oftheir own design to the overseas buyers. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, while some garment firms shift the low-end 
product line to high-end product line (like Cases E, F), some stiU keep low-end 
production in the China's plants QJke Cases C, D, K, M). This is the same for those 
factories without relocation. They shift the low-end orders to China's production 
network. Obviously, garment production in China is locked into a low-wage and 
labour-intensive production. 
I observe that it is quite rare for local manufacturers to do the ODM or OBM 
(except case B and L). As mentioned in Chapter Five, there is only minimal cooperation 
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between overseas buyers and local manufacturers in the loose-tie pattern. Buyers rarely 
transfer firm-specific knowledge to their suppliers. My field data shows that some 
manufacturers refrain from doing the OBM. 
"To us, it's nothing special, the most important thing is that we can finish the goods and they give us the 
right price. I don't bother with the brandname. We don't need the design. We do the sample with the 
given design sketch. Serving this customer and then serve another is the same. The most important 
thing is to balance the production flow.” CThe general manager ofFactory D) 
Jn the close-tie pattern, although sharing of marketing and product information is 
common between both parties, the manufacturers prefer the OEM production because it 
is too risky and costly to develop their own brand-name in the market. The managing 
director of Factory F, who is also the owner, explained why he preferred the OEM 
production. 
"I don't need to do so, I concentrate on my effort in getting orders and production, ff I do the marketing 
(OBM), perhaps I can eam more profit But there are two sides of a coin. I need a large sum of money to 
develop a brand, ff the brand is not well sold then I'll make a loss. I mn this factory with ten million 
dollars, lf I do the OBM, then I need more capital, it can be double! I don't want to take risks. It's not 
necessarily good for me，You need to do a lot of things, set up office for marketing and need designers. 
I prefer to concentrate on the manufacturing sector." 
Many garment manufacturers share similar opinions, according to the fieldwork 
data. In fact, brand-name production strategy requires heavy investments in marketing, 
advertising and design. Some garment firms have attempted to do so but in vain. 
The manufacturer ofFactory E employed local designers to develop their own design a 
few years ago. It was not a successful experience because overseas buyers insisted on 
their own design. 
"Fashion design is a kind ofcultural product... It doesn't mean that our local designer is not good enough, 
it is only local design doesn't fit their taste and style. WeVe famous designer here, but the US buyers 
have theirs. They're close to the market, familiar with the Uving style and taste there." CThe manager 
ofFactotyE) 
Because of their overseas buyers，poor response, the manufacturer gives up the 
ODM production and sticks to the OEM production. It is rather difficult for local 
manufacturers to develop their own brands if their buyers do not support them. 
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However, some manufacturers succeed to develop high-value added production 
by doing the ODM or the OBM. It is worthwhile to examine why they can do so. 
Fieldwork data shows that two types of garment firms can do this. The first type is the 
large-scale garment firms (Uke Giordano, Theme, G2000, or the case L) which 
have very strong organizational resources Uke finance and manpower. They can spend 
large sum ofinvestment in advertising to promote their brand-name image in the market. 
Besides, they have backward or forward-integrated Hnks in the commodity chain. 
The second type is those manufacturers who have been trained as designers and 
specialize in making their own label The owner of Factory B has been trained as a 
fashion designer in her tertiary education. This kind of social capital enables her to do 
the ODM production strategy. On the other hand, she captures the market niches by 
doing high-quality garments which are near tailoring and small quantity orders. This 
enables her to gain competitiveness in the market. 
To sum up, it is not easy for the medium or small-size garment firms to 
•< 
overcome the difficulties ifthey shift to the OBM or ODM, given lack ofbuyers，support 
and Umited financial resources. Besides, they lack the incentive to do so when they can 
make profit from the OEM production. The relocation provides them an opportunity 
in getting more orders. Therefore, it has Uttle to do with the product upgrading in terms 
ofODM or OBM for the manufacturers even after relocation. 
7.3. Changes in organization of production after relocation 
There are changes in the organization of production and a re-organization of 
work after relocation. Besides, there also exists a change in the spatial division of work 
in the restructuring process. I will firstly examine the changes in the subcontracting 
network in Hong Kong and China in the current era. Second, I wiU examine the re-
organization ofwork between China's and Hong Kong's workplaces. By unraveUng the 
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above two aspects, we can have a better understanding about the social outcomes that 
relocation brings to the local garment industry in the restructuring process. 
7.3.1. Changes in the subcontracting network in Hong Kong and China after 
relocation 
My field observation shows that local garment manufacturers drop the use of 
Hong Kong's subcontractors after relocation in the nineties. (See the table 7.2.) Because 
of the lack of official statistics, we do not know the exact number of subcontractors 
remaining in Hong Kong. However, based on the fieldwork interview, local 
manufacturers either utilize the large production scale or the flexibility of subcontracting 
networks in the Mainland in the restructuring process. Hong Kong's subcontractors 
become less important. It is noted that the production network in China mainly comes 
from two sources. One is that the manufacturers wind up their factories in Hong Kong 
after moving the production to China. These factories are usually located in the 
Pearl River Delta Uke Dongguan, Shenzhen or Shunde. This pre-established network 
among local garment manufacturers has been shifted to South China after relocation. 
In some cases (like case M), the manufacturer encourages his subcontractors to relocate 
to China first and work with them. 
The second source is the local Chinese manufacturers. As mentioned above, 
Hong Kong businessmen have worked with the local government or party through 
compensation trade or outward processing activities when China opened up her 
economy in the late 1970's. When they are familiar with the environment, they open 
their production plant or joint-venture enterprises. Of the nine factories, six have 
worked with the local Chinese in subcontracting before relocation. Hong Kong's 
manufacturers still keep ties with them in capacity subcontracting. 
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On the other hand, there also emerges a triangular manufacturing in the 
commodity chain. Local manufacturers not only act as overseas suppliers, but also they 
put the orders to the second-tier producers in China or other overseas production plants. 
The following table summarizes the use of subcontractors in Hong Kong and in China 
before and afler relocation. 
Case Before relocation without-processin Afterrelocation After relocatio The background of 
use of activities use of use of the Chinese 
subcontractors in PRC before subcontractors subcontractors subcontractors 
in Hong Kong relocation 1 ^ in China  
B nil M nU Yes, one Hong Kong  
C yes yes, infrequent yes, infrequent Yes, four sub- local Chinese 
contractors people 
in Foshan  
D yes Yes ^2 yes Hongkong, Chinese 
E yes, rare No yes, vety rare no Hongkong 
manufacturer 
F yes yes, four in yes, two but yes, four in Local Chinese 
Foshan unstable Foshan  
G yes X^5 ^ ^ not applicable 
H yes not applicable* no yes, 5~6 local Chinese  
I yes, but rare not applicable* yes, but rare yes, 2-3 HK manufacturer • 
J[ nU not applicable* no yes, 4-5 local Chinese  
K yes Yes yes, but very yes, 2-3 HK manufacturer 
r ^  
L yes XE§ ^ ^ not applicable 
M yes, 5"6 factories No yes, 4-5 smaU- yes, the same Hong Kong 
s ^ as Hong Kon  
Table 7.4.; Use of subcontractors in China and Hong Kong before and after relocation 
*not applicable: Factory H’ I, J-they do not have relocation but depend on the supporting network in 
South China, either from the U)cai Chinese or the Hongkong producers 
7.3.2. Change in work organization in Hong Kong,s production site after 
relocation 
Jn this section, I would examine the change in work reorganization in Hong Kong 
after relocation. As suggested by Gereffi and Hamilton, changes in the economic 
organization is not just a geographical or spatial change in economic activities in the 
globalized product world, but rather the mobility of capital becomes "a perennial problem 
confronting the labour force in industrial societies." (Gereffi & Hamilton:1996:21) I 
suggest that the work re-organization reflects how local manufacturers utilize the labour 
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strategy in organizing the production. It also represents the social relations of 
production between labour and capital. Therefore, I will study the reorganization of 
work in three dimensions. The first is the changes in the production procedure in Hong 
Kong. The second is the use of technology in the workplace and the third is how local 
manufacturers utilize the labor strategy. I hope that this can shed light on the 
changes of the organization of work in Hong Kong's garment industry during 
restructuring process. 
a. Spatial division ofwork between China and Hong Kong,s production site 
There exists a spatial division of work between Hong Kong and China after 
massive relocation during the mid eighties. The production base in Hong Kong becomes 
contracted and the trading activities for the industry grew more important. I observe 
that many garment firms have a significant downsizing of operative workers in local 
shopfloor after relocation. The manufacturing operation is smaller in scale. It is quite 
common that sample-making, product design, merchandising, material-sourcing and 
other trading-related activities are carried out in Hong Kong, while the production is in 
South China. Official statistics shows that many manufacturing establishments do the 
trading-related activities or tum into trading companies. (CSD:1996) The number of 
operatives engaged in garment production has dwindled from 256,898 to 153,497, a sharp 
faU of40 % in the industry from 1981 to 1991 (CSD:1993:119). 
Ofthe thirteen factories interviewed, only one case closed its production base in 
Hong Kong. The owner of Case L closed the Hong Kong's production base in 1994. 
The Hong Kong headquarters coordinates offshore production and retailing business in 
China and Australia to do product design and marketing of their brands. 
Some garment firms contract their manufacturing operations in Hong Kong. 
Five factories have a significant drop of operative workers. (Cases D, E, F, G, H and M) 
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More than three hundred to a thousand workers were employed before relocation. The 
production scale did not shrink immediately after relocation. Labour-intensive 
procedures with lower skill requirement have usuaUy been shifted to the PRC production 
plants. When the manufacturing operations in China become mature, local production 
bases become less important. Li the fieldwork, I found many famous brand-names like 
Mexx, Christian Dior, Armani, CaIvin Klein are made in China. 
For the small factories, there is no significant change in their Hong Kong 
workforce, irrespective of having relocated or not (Cases A, C, I，J, K). Informal 
labor have been commonly employed in the shopfloor. The only exception is Case B. 
The owner prepares to close down the manufacturing operation in Hong Kong and shift 
the production to Guangzhou this year. 
On the other hand, I observe that how local manufacturers perceive the workers' 
skills and the origin rules regulations are quite important to influence their decision in 
organizing the work and production between Hong Kong and China. Meanwhile, 
overseas buyers have little say in this aspect. 
Garment production is usually divided into different production stages, which can 
be up to twenty to thirty steps. The number of steps depends on the complexity of the 
garments' style. This can be described in the following diagram. 
Pre-assembling stage  
• Orders getting from the sourcing agent or direct buyers 
• the customer gives the paper sketch to the manufacturer, the master in the sample-making 
room makes the 
first sample for the buyer. 
• First-sample is completed, the second sample is done after amendments 
Second sample (sales sample) is distributed to the insiders for further comment 
• after the sales sample is done, a production sample is finalized for production 
Production stage 
• Pattern-marking - maric the sizing (like extra-large, large, medium and smaU size) for the 
garment. 
• Cutting department - cut the fabrics into templates for sewing  
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• Sewing - fiuther subdivided into different parts Uke trimming, collar-making, pocket-making, 
zipper- sewing, etc., deskiUing is used in the labor process. However, in case of the fashion 
garment, workers need to sew the whole garment 
Ironing: this can be divided into two stages, the first stage is to iron the templates, 
and the second is to iron 
The whole garment before packing 
Post-production stage 
• Button-sewing 




• Packing  
Diagram 7.1. Division of work in garment production 
Obviously, garment production is very labor-intensive. Skill requirements are 
different in each department. In my fieldwork, I found that although some factories have 
contracted their production capacity in Hong Kong, the traditional departments like 
cutting, marker-making, assembling and other labour-intensive process are still retained in 
the local workplace. This can be described in the following cases. 
Factory E employed some three hundred operatives in the Kwun Tong's industrial 
building before relocation in 1987. The production capacity did not immediately 
shrink in the process. Instead, Hong Kong's production concentrates on doing high-end 
orders. At that time, they made ladies' evening wear for the XJK market and needed 
manual labour to sew the butterfly on the garments. Such labour-intensive procedures 
have been processed in the Shenzhen plant. When the garment firm expanded the 
production in Jiangsu and Beijing after a few years, the production site in Hong Kong 
gradually shrunk. Less than ten per cent ofthe orders are carried out in Hong Kong's 
production site. At present, only fifty workers are employed in Hong Kong's shopfloor. 
Although the factory has such changes, the traditional labour-intensive 
departments remain in Hong Kong to deal with the high-end or rush orders. For instance, 
the crafting department, consisting offive to six workers, is responsible to sew hemming 
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on the shoulders' of the ladies' jacket� because hemming-sewing is too delicate for 
machines to process. The same holds for the cleaning department. Workers check 
for any dirt or thread left on the garments after assembling the clothing. They have to 
slightly scrub the surface of the garment with cleansing agents. Again, this cannot be 
done by the washing machines. These procedures stiU remain at the local production site. 
The computerized sample-making room is also retained in Hong Kong. 
I suggest that the how the manufacturer perceives the skills in garment production 
is quite important to afFect how they organize the work between Hong Kong and China. 
/ 
For instance, sample making and marking grading are usually done in Hong Kong. 
The manager realizes that the Chinese workers，skills cannot reach her requirement. 
This makes her retain the sample making in Hong Kong. 
"The background of the Chinese workers affect their concept on garment. We have cultural difference in 
our thinking. They don't have the skills when they look at the clothes and then know how to get it 
done. They can't create the "look". The "iook" and "feeling" of the garment can't come out. It is 
because they have few contacts with the outside world. That's why at present they can't reach our 
requirement, 0 ^ e manager of Factory E) 
Li Case E, they have some experienced skilled workers in Hong Kong. A 
seventy-year-old Shanghai master has been working in the sample-making room for over 
twenty years. The manager describes him as an "artist" in sample making. 
*They've spent lengthy time to get training_. they have many experiences to do the work which is very 
delicate and excellent. They're so skiimU. I think that they're the artists. A good master is an artist!" 
Although the Chinese workers cannot replace the experience and skills of the 
Hong Kong workers now, the management provides skill training in sample making to the 
Mainland workers. 
Besides, since timing and keeping good communication with foreign buyers is 
also important in getting orders, the manager prefers to retain the sample-making room 
in Hong Kong. It is quite common that overseas buyers give the design sketch to 
3 Hemming is a kind of soft fabrics that makes the shoulders of a shirt or coat look more stiff 
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manufacturers and request to get the first-draft sample within one or two days. In some 
cases, the request can be within a few hours. Therefore, it is quite common that most 
factories retain the sample making in a local production site. Sometimes, computerized 
equipment is used to faciUtate sample-making and marker-grading process. Of the 
thirteen factories, ten retain the sample-making room in Hong Kong. 
The only exception is Case F and G. The sample making and marking 
department have been relocated to China in the 1990's. It is because the owners realize 
that the Mainland workers can master the skills and replace those ofHong Kong workers. 
The origin rules also influences the re-organization of work in Hong Kong and 
China. In doing the cut and sewn garments, the Hong Kong origin rules define the major 
transformation as "assembly of parts" of the garment. The procedure of "major 
transformation" must be done in Hong Kong while other parts can be processed outside 
Hong Kong after July 1996. Before the revision, "cutting and sewing" must be done 
in Hong Kong/ I observe that local garment manufacturers re-organize the work 
according to the changes of the origin rules' requirements. (See Table 7.5) In other 
words, local garment manufacturers shift the assembling procedure to China and the 
cutting department is retained in Hong Kong before July 1996. When the definition 
has been revised, assembling part is shifted back Hong Kong and cutting department is 
carried out in China. This institutional restriction in tum affects the re-organization of 
work between Hong Kong and China, 
b. Low technological innovation in the workplace 
Another salient characteristics in the work re-organization is that there is low 
use of technology in the workplace, irrespective of having relocation or not. Of the 
4 Minutes from the Hong Kong Legislative Council on the Panel on Trade and Industty, 10 December 
1996. 
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thirteen cases, only four firms (Case E, F, L, M) adopt computerized technology in the 
production. They are either the medium or large-scale firms. Computerized-aided-
design (CAD) in the pattern-grading, marker-making and numerically controlled O^C) 
cutting systems at the pre-assembUng stage are utiHzed at the local production site so as 
to support the large-scale production in China or offshore production lines.^  
My field data shows that the manufacturers usually try to minimize fabric wastage 
and control production cost by using the computerized equipment. 
"Previously, we need two or three skilled workers to do the pattern-grading for the production capacity 
with a total workforce of 100 workers. Now, we have five staff in two computer rooms. The capacity 
greatly increases and they can deal with the production lines of five plants both in Hong Kong and China. 
It helps us to minimize the production cost in terms of saving labor force." CThe manager ofFactory G) 
Obviously, the computerization helps them to minimize the production cost and 
raise the productivity. Due to this work re-organization, workers, skills in sample 
making or marker grading becomes obsolete and they need to be retrained before taking 
up the newjob. However, some are dismissed and replaced by the new technology in the 
process. 
My field data shows that the modular system has been employed in one factory. 
Factory E introduced this system two years ago in order to increase productivity in Hong 
Kong and China. The owner visited some garment factories in South Korea and Japan. 
He is impressed by their success. Then he employed a US consultant to help the 
implementation of "modular production system" in the plants ofHong Kong and China 
two years ago. 
Modular system differs from the traditional bundles system in the organizing the 
production. Jn "bundles system", garment components are cut and packed in bundles of 
^ e computerized-aided equipment is to minimize the fabric wastage in the production process. 
CAD system permits designs to be transferred to visual display terminal CVDT) screens for markers to 
arrange jig-saw-Uke for pattem cutting. Such systems tried to reduce fabric waste and cut product 
development time. While the NC systems permit large quantities of fabrics to be cut accurately and 
quickly. (See the Quick Response Bulletin) 
157 
over twenty to thirty parts. Then, they are packed into bundles of different parts for 
assembling, like collar, cuff，pocket, hemming. Individual machine operators perform a 
particular sewing operation for each part. They retie the bundles and put them in a bin 
for other operations. 
"In the bundle system, we used to finish parts of garment and then transfer to other Une to perform other 
parts. Sometimes it can be a mess when weVe to rush for shipment the next day! For example, our 
workers have sewn a thousand pieces of garment today, then we can't manage at the next assembly 
Une." CThe manager ofFactory E) 
In "modular system", workers are organized into smaU groups Uke a module, 
comprising five to twenty workers. They are required to perform a particular assembly 
task until the entire garment is finished within the team. The manager re-designs the 
shopfloor by putting the sewing machines into a U-shape, with workers reorganized into a 
small group. Team spirit is strongly emphasized in the modular system. 
"It's not only a physical change, the most important thing is that they should have the idea of "team spirit". 
"Ah, we're the same group and our team has to achieve the goal." lf some workers can't finish the task 
within the time schedule, others within the group need to help her to smooth the production flow. This 
keeps the flow more balance." 
Besides, lights are installed beside each modular in the workplace. 
"We set a completed rate standard for the workers, ff the group fails to achieve the goal, the light tums 
red. ff the group passes, the light tums blue. They don't know how much they eam until the entire 
clothing is finished. The wage will be based on the team effort. This idea is so good. This makes them 
look like as if they were the boss. The idea is like those teams are in competition. Workers participate in 
the team and compete with each others." CThe manager ofFactoty E) 
The idea ofcompetition among the different "modules" of workers is similar to the 
labor control logic as described by Michael Burawoy. (1979, 1985) He describes how 
the management exerts labor control over workers in the factory regimes when workers 
participate in the competition in doing the piece-rate job. The games are mutuaUy 
constructed and participated in by the operative workers. Without probing into further 
discussion on the labor control issue here, it is noted that the manufacturer seeks to 
increase the productivity by using this system. 
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On the other hand, the remaining nine factories do not adopt any technology in the 
production. Rather, the manufacturers prefer to capitalize on the abundant labor supply 
and its flexibility. For instance, Factory G expands the workforce in Shenzhen's 
plant by two thousand workers in 1996. The manager realizes that he makes use ofthe 
labor flexibility rather than making huge investment on the technological equipment. 
"It's so convenient. The sample making is done in Shenzhen and sent back to Hong Kong. We have our 
own trucks to transport the garments back to Hong Kong everyday, the production in Shenzhen is 
operated as if it were on our upper floor. That's why we don't use the technology." C h^e manager of 
Factory G) 
By the same token, the small factories can also make use of the abundant cheap 
labour supply in China by their own subcontracting network there. Besides, since their 
orders are usually small-batches and local garment manufacturers capture the fast 
changing market niches, it is not feasible to adopt technological innovations in the 
production lines. Moreover, it is not financially viable for the small factories to make 
heavy investments in purchasing computerized equipment, 
c. Numerical flexibility - continuation of flexible labor strategy 
It tum to the third dimension - the labour strategy being utilized in the 
organization of work in the Hong Kong. I observe that labour causalization is quite 
common in the workplace. Twelve factories have employed informal workers like Pao-
gong ( e : )，causal workers and outworkers in Hong Kong (See Table 7.5). Local 
manufacturers still utilize numerical flexibility in organizing the production. 
"Numerical flexibility" refers to irregularly and insecurely employed workers 
who may not have a direct relationship with a firm at all. It is the precariousness of the 
employment relationship which provides employment with a numerically variable 
workforce for the employers ^>ollert:1982:283). It is usually found in the cutting 
department, ironing, buttoning and packing department in the garment industry. 
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The manufacturers prefer to utilize flexible labor on the shopfloor as a form of 
internal subcontracting. For instance, Bao-gong ( )，as one type of internal 
contracting, is an ambulatory work group which is led by a gang leader or a contractor. 
The contractor negotiates with the management over the terms of the pay and the job 
requirement. This gang leader is also responsible for supervising the workers and paying 
them. This form ofintemal contracting does not carry any employment relationship with 
the manufacturer. Rather it only carries a "contractual relationship with the factory. 
"The bao-gong is the boss and we're doing business with him. We're only in a contractual relationship. 
We rent out workplace and machinery to them. I told him what I want and then he gets it done. We don't 
need to wony about whether workers are willing to work overtime if they're led by the Bao-gong. I can 
concentrate on production, rather than supemsing workers. This helps me save the management cost." 
CThe manager of Factoty E) 
The management can make use of labor flexibility by the use ofbao-gong in the 
peak season. The flexible labour can alleviate their responsibility for direct controlling 
the labour process and avoid employer conflicts with the workers. The conflicts between 
workers and the management are mediated by the Bao-gong. Workers do not have any 
employment relationship with the management when the factory ends the contract with 
the bao-Tao. The management need not bear any labour compensation or severance 
payments when laying ofFthe workers under the existing Employment Ordinance. 
Outwork is another form of informal work. Compared with the 1980's, local 
manufacturers use fewer outworkers in the garment industry. Jn the fieldwork, only four 
factories use women outworkers (Cases C, J, E, F). Case C and J use outworkers on a 
frequent basis while the latter do so very infrequent. 
Factory J depends on women workers to make collars in order to meet the flexible 
demand. Those women outworkers are the ex-workers and very experienced in the 
industry. Therefore, the manager need not worry about the quality control. 
"This can help us to save more space in the shopfloor. Then workers here can do other processes. We 
send the templates to them at a central point in the pubUc estate and then the head of the See Lai (the 
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housewife) helps to collect the finished collars for us. It helps us to increase the productivity." CThe 
manager ofFactoty J) 
Similarly, the manufacturer of factory C has subcontracted the sample making to 
the women outworkers. They are responsible to do the first-draft sample for the buyers' 
amendments. 
The latter two OFactory E and F) subcontract less than one or two per cent of 
work to the women workers and this depends on the order's urgency. 
I would suggest that the use of flexible labour strategy helps the manufacturers 
to save overhead costs, especially for the small-scale garment factories (Uke case J and A). 
Besides, since casual labor like workers in Bao-gong or outworkers are unprotected by 
the labor law so that manufacturers can evade their responsibiUty on the labour. 
However, it also shows that because of the availability of the abundant cheap labour 
source in South China, those manufacturers with relocation stop using informal labour 
in Hong Kong. It is more likely for small factories to utilize flexible labour strategy for 
low-cost production. 
7.5. Concluding Remarks 
To sum up the social outcomes that industrial relocation brings to the garment 
industry in Hong Kong, relocation itselfis a way for local garment firms to expand in same 
cases. The manufacturers can diversify the product Unes with different price ranges and 
explore markets in the non-quota countries after relocation. Besides, some garment 
firms develop their own brand-name and integrate the retailing and manufacturing in the 
commodity chains. Jn this case, garment manufacturers become a buyer and play an 
active role in coordinating the production network in the GCCs. 
However, this afFects the development of high-value added manufacturing in the 
industry. While local manufacturers manage to survive after relocation, garment 
161 
production is locked into low-wage production, by utilizing flexible labour either 
in their plants or through the subcontracting network in China. It is quite difficult for the 
medium or small-scale garment firms to develop high-value added manufacturing like 
doing the OBM production as large-scale factories do. Given limited organizational 
resources and lack of institutional support, they prefer the OEM production. 
Regarding the use of subcontracting network in the industry, the emergence of 
production network in the Mainland becomes an alternative for local manufacturers in 
organizing production. This leads to a spatial division of labour between Hong Kong 
and China in which Hong Kong becomes a center to coordinate the global production 
network for the industry while China becomes a significant production base to support the 
industry. 
workforce in HK Useofinformal Work at HK's Work at China's production 
(operative and non- work production site lines or other countries 
Case operative level)  
~A 15 machinists, 1 supervisor yes cutting, assembling, not applicable 
packing, ironing  
~B 13 operatives, 5 in nil cutting, assembling, assembling, but there wiU be 
merchandising, clerical wor packing change and shift aU the 
labour-intensive procedure 
thisycar  
~C 20-30 machinists, about ten yes, sample-making, washing, cutting, marker 
nonK)perative workers in outworkers assembling, label-sewin -making, pattern-grading, 
of5ce work, merchandisin doing the first- ironing, packing 
sourcing and clerical work draft samples  
~D 80 workers before relocation temporary worker cutting, marker- the same as the C 
and no production base in and causal making, sample-making 
1994, reopen the productio workers at assembling, ironing, 
site in Nov 1996, checking packing 
machinists, 15 causal and packing 
woricers and about ten 
non^perative workers 
merchandising and sourcin  
^ 60 machinists in assembly Bao-kung at sample-making, cutting, assembling, 
Une, ironing, buttonin cutting, buttoning, ironing, 
5 checking, and packing, pattem- cleaning, packing 
5 in supervising, causalworkers, grading(computerized), 
6-10 ironing and buttonin outworkers assembling, 
masters buttoning,ironing, 
7 machinists in sample-room cleaning,l  
20 in the office 1 abcl-sewing, packing  
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F 20 machinists, 8 outworker, marker-making sample-making, cutting, 
merchandising, but unstable (computerized)， assembUng, ironing, 
shipping, material sourcing assembling packing  
G 150 machinists, casual workers cutting, assembling sample-making, 
20 production and planning cutting, assembling, 
3 in engineering/ buttoning, ironing, 
maintenance, packing, 
8 in quality assurance, 2,000 machinists 
20 in sales and merchandis a team of35 people 
10 in administration and responsible for 
10 in shipping department quality assurance  
l l 8-10 machinists, about casual workers Cutting,sample-making, all the labour 
ten clerical workers buttoning, ironing intensive procedure are 
in merchandising, and packing, but on a put in the subcontractors 
material sourcing, accounts vety small scale and 
and other vety flexibly 
trading-related activities operated, depend on 
the orders  
~i 15 machinists in assemblin casual workers sample-making,pattem- not applicable 
sample-making, 3 in making,cutting, 
clerical work and 1 assembling,ironing, 
management packing  
J 20 machinists, 2 cutting outworkers and the same as I not applicable 
department, 1 in causal workers 
sample-making 
1 in management, 4 in 
office work . 
~K 20 machinists, 3 in office~~~ nil the same as J not applicable 
work, 1 supervisor, 
1 manager  
L Headquarters for the group nil no production base, PRC 
Management inHK but have a sample production sites 
administration 300 factoty with Guangdong, and north China 
sales and marketing 41 computerized-aided - retail shop 1316 
design and merchandising equipment for - management 486 
59, marker-making sales and marketing 71 
warehousing 22 design and merchandising 11， 
manufacturing 44 warehouse 186 






M 60 operatives in the causal workers sample-making, the same as in Hong Kong 
production site, over 20 employed in grading, 
people in trading ironing and packi cutting, ironing, 
-related activities assembling,  
buttoning, packing  
Table 7.5. : Organisation of work and change of workforce after relocation in Hong Kong 





Jn this concluding chapter I would relate my empirical findings to focus the 
discussion of industrial restructuring and to the theoretical issues of the global 
commodity chain literature. Gary Gereffi proposes that the buyer is a driving force in 
shaping the production network in the commodity chain. There are authority and power 
relationships over the producers in the buyer-driven governance structure that determine 
how material, human and financial resources are allocated in the GCCs. My empirical 
study brings the role of local manufacturers and their interaction with the buyers 
back into our analysis ofthe forces that shape the organization of production network. 
This study shows that the buyer is critical in shaping the production network and 
can afFect, though only under certain conditions, the restructuring strategy of garment 
manufacturers. I will try to reconstruct Gereffi's buyer-driven thesis in the first section 
of this chapter. Also, I will summarize my discussion of the forces shaping the 
restructuring strategy of local manufacturers in the second section. The third part will 
bring out the limitations of the study. I will propose possible directions for further 
research in the last part of this chapter. 
8.1. Rethinking the thesis of buyers, role in the commodity chain 
The study starts with an examination ofhow local garment manufacturers manage 
to capture market niches through the OEM or OBM to enter the world economy in 
the past decades. Facing keen competition during the early eighties, they compete 
with other MCs competitors by changing their product strategy. Three types ofproduct 
strategies are identified. The first is shifting from low-end and mass volume orders 
to high-end and smaU-batch orders, the second is speciaHzation in specific products, 
and the third is diversification of product lines with different price ranges. Local 
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garment manufacturers adopt quick response to cope with the volatile market and be 
flexible in meeting customers' orders. They also explore the markets in non-quota 
countries. 
When local manufacturers are incorporated in the world economy through the 
OEM or OBM, they rely on the local trading network, which consists oflocal traders or 
buying offices of the foreign buyers to receive orders. In this process, local 
manufacturers have built up direct Unkage with foreign buyers and there emerges different 
types of ties with them. Two types of interfirm linkages are identified: close tie and 
loose-tie pattem. These ties are anchored in the daily interactions between both parties, 
Uke getting orders, knowledge transfer, conflict management. Close tie pattem 
represents a symbiotic relationship with the buyers while loose-tie represents a more 
instrumental nature ofrelationship with the buyers. 
The unraveling ofthese interfirm linkages in the Hong Kong leads us to engage in 
a theoretical dialogue with Gary Gereffi about the nature of the governance structure in 
the buyer-driven commodity chain. Gereffi has placed strong emphasis on the 
authority and power relationship in the buyer-driven governance structure. This study 
shows that the picture in Hong Kong is more dynamic and contested. Not only does a 
power relationship emerge within the node, but also symbiotic and instrumental 
relationships. We need to unravel the conditions under which how different types of 
relationship emerge between overseas buyers and local manufacturers. 
Using the resource dependency organization theory, we find that when a focal 
organization manages to survive and cope with the conflicting demands with the external 
environment, its ability to acquire resources and whether the resources possessed by the 
influencer are critical to the organization's autonomy. Regarding to the relationship 
between buyers and domestic manufacturers, the fieldwork shows that manufacturers take 
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different product strategies in order to enhance their abilities to acquire resources (the 
order source and other product information) in the global commodity chain. On the 
other hand, buyers represent a pool of resources to the manufacturers (in terms of 
product information, marketing information and the power to allocate orders to different 
suppliers) that can be critical and important to the domestic manufacturers, survival. 
It is noted that ifthe manufacturers are fully dependent on the buyer to acquire the 
resources, it is more likely that overseas buyers can exert control over the organization. 
So too in the case of the relocation decision. The findings show that it is only when the 
manufacturers are fully dependent on the buyer and when the buyer expands its role as the 
manufacturer, that it is more likely buyers become critical and dominant in influencing the 
relocation decision of the manufacturers. On the other hand, when domestic 
manufacturers are able to maximize their discretion power by strengthening their ability 
to acquire resources elsewhere, they become less dependent on the buyers. 
To briefly conclude the findings in the previous chapters, I would contend that 
when local manufacturers are solely dependent on any particular buyer as their major 
source of orders, it is more likely that the buyers would exert authority and power 
relationship over manufacturers in terms of the relocation and the organization of 
production. Jn this light, the buyer becomes crucial as the driving force in afFecting the 
relocation of the manufacturers and shaping production network. But local 
manufacturers try to search for own autonomy to avoid being controlled by any buyer. 
In the close-tie pattern, sometimes the buyers restrict local manufacturers in 
receiving competitors' orders. Then there emerges a latent power relationship over 
manufacturers. However, the relationship between two parties is characterized as 
"symbiotic" in which the buyers assure stable order and transfer of product knowledge to 
the manufacturers. This helps to enhance the manufacturers' competitive edge. 
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With regards to the loose-tie pattem, orders are unstable and it is difficult for the 
manufacturers to maintain long term relationship with their buyers. Buyers lack the 
incentive to transfer any particular firm-specific assets (like the new product design or 
development) to local manufacturers. This kind of "instrumental" relationship in the 
loose-tie makes local manufacturers look for different buyers in the market. 
The emergence of different interfirm Unkages in the garment industry has 
implications for local manufacturers' relocation decisions. This study shows that 
buyers would have different responses and different roles when local manufacturers take 
"industrial relocation" as their major restructuring strategy. In the close-tie pattem, 
three types of responses emerge from the buyers - resistant, disinterested and active 
participation. This leads to a more contested and negotiated situation between both 
parties in the relocation process. Buyers are not necessarily the major enabling factor to 
push manufacturers to relocate. Sometimes it is the manufacturer that takes the initiative 
of relocation and persuades his buyers to accept his plan. Meanwhile, disinterested 
response from the buyers over local manufacturers' relocation decision is found in the 
loose-tie relationship. 
However, irrespective of close-tie or loose-tie relationship, price signals given 
by foreign buyers are found among local garment manufacturers. Although the buyers 
do not explicitly encourage the manufacturers to launch industrial relocation, the price 
pressure on the manufacturers becomes an indirect force to affect their relocation decision. 
They perceive that the environment is uncertain. This sense of uncertainty becomes a 
strong force to encourage them to follow other manufacturers who have akeady relocated 
to China. "Mimetic isomorphism" is found among the manufacturers in the relocation 
process in the late eighties. 
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My empirical findings reveal that the buyers can be crucial only when the 
manufacturer is in a dependent relationship. The other condition is that when the buyer 
himself integrates manufacturing and retailing activities in the commodity chain, the 
buyer becomes critical in enabUng the manufacturers to relocate. This in tum shapes the 
organization of production in the GCCs. I reconstruct Gereffi's buyer-driven thesis by 
means ofthe following diagram. 
Buyer^ven governance Nature of network in the Relationship between Buyers' role in 
structure GCCs buyers and manufacturers shaping the 
production 
network in the 
GCCs  
The~"substance of the Power and authority Manufacturers are Buyer is the main 
governance structure is relationship dependentonbuyers driving force 
not clearly specified  
Gereffi,s thesis on buver's role in shaping the organization of production network in the buver-
driven commoditv chain 
~Buyer-driven governance Nature of network in the Relationship between Buyers' role in 
structure GCCs buyers and manufacturers shaping the 
production network 
in the GCCs  
Close-tie 1. interdependent 1. Symbiotic Two patterns 
2. power and authority 2. Dependent on buyers emerge in symbiotic 
relationship (Gereffi) relationship in 
close-tie 
1. Resistant and 
negotiated 
2. Disinterested and 
detached, mimetic 
isomorphism 
Li case of the 
dependent 
relationship over the 
buyers, then it is 
more bkely that 
buyer is actively 
participating in 
relocation and then 
critical in shaping 
production network 
in the GCCs.  
Loose-tie instrumental instrumental, market- Disinterested and 
dominated detached, mimetic 
isomorphism 
Mv reconstruction on Gereff!*s thesis 
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To recapitulate, I would suggest that Gereffi's thesis holds only when the 
manufacturer is dependent on the buyers and has built up very strong ties with the 
buyers. When the symbiotic or instrumental relationship emerges between two parties, 
the buyer is not an enabling factor in shaping the production network. 
Regarding to the possibiUty for garment firms to move up the global commodity 
chain in Hong Kong, this study finds that the competitive edge oflocal garment firms can 
be enhanced after relocation. The garment firms experience horizontal or vertical 
expansion after relocation. It is because they can benefit from an increase in production 
capacity and diversify the markets to the non-quota countries. The other form of 
organizational growth is vertical expansion. Large-scale garment firms move ahead by 
doing the OBM or high-value added activities in marketing or product design in the 
commodity chain. Jn this process, such garment firms even possess the producer-driven 
governance structure by the full integration of economic activities in the commodity chain. 
The only exception is those factories which fail in the relocation. 
There are variations in the restructuring strategies among local garment 
manufacturers in the restructuring context. Some garment firms choose to retain their 
production bases in Hong Kong. The production network in China, which is governed 
by the social capital ofthe manufacturers, helps the garment firms to survive. 
The restructuring process also leads to changes in the production network and 
organization of work between Hong Kong and China. There is a spatial shift of 
subcontracting network from Hong Kong to South China after massive relocation in the 
past ten years. The subcontracting network either comes from the Hong Kong 
manufacturers or the Chinese manufacturers. With regards to the work re-organization, 
the production base in Hong Kong has contracted significantly when most of the labour-
intensive process have been shifted to China. Hong Kong remains as a centre for global 
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sourcing, merchandising, sample-making and other trading-related activities. But 
informal labour is still utilized by the manufacturers in the local shopfloor. 
8.2. Forces that shape the restructuring strategy of domestic garment 
manufacturers 
Manufacturers who relocate their production Hnes have a common belief that 
"garment-making" is a sunset industry in Hong Kong. The notion of "sunset" means 
marginal and the industry is in decUne. Some manufacturers used to have a strong 
sense of achievement as an industrialist in the past. But they are pessimistic about the 
industry's future. "It's a sweatshop industry and we can't eam much now," a veteran 
garment manufacturer put it. 
This study finds that this perceived threat to survival is widely held by local 
manufacturers who are late in adopting relocation. They perceive that they cannot survive 
if they do not relocate. 
Relocation is perceived as a convenient strategy for local manufacturers. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, sense of uncertainty is the powerful source for the 
organization to model after other firms which are perceived as successful. Besides, 
the outward processing arrangement is also conducive to the manufacturers to relocate 
the labor-intensive process to China. My study shows that when some manufacturers 
decide to relocate, they are not sure whether they can get sufficient orders to support the 
plant in China. They only have a very rough estimate about the orders. 
The minimal governmental role is an important institutional factor that forces 
the manufacturers to take "industrial relocation" as their major restructuring strategy in 
the eighties. The government has intentionally refrained herself from helping any 
particular industry. She does not have any plan to direct the development of the 
manufacturing industry when the economy is undergoing a structural change during 
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the eighties. Local manufacturers have to deal with the restructuring problem on their 
own effort. Yet the government is slow to respond to the changes. It was not until 1992 
that the Quick Response Centre has been set up by the Hong Kong Productivity Council 
to collect information on technologies and services for quick response, conduct 
research, and introduce specific technologies to the local manufacturers. The 
government also takes a cautious approach in research and development activities. But 
the total spending on research and development of manufacturing industry is only 0.1 
percentage ofGDP in 1994，which is the lowest among otherNICs and Asian countries. 
It has been criticized as "very low by world standards" QALT: 1997:72-77) Lack of a 
comprehensive industrial policy pushes the Hong Kong's manufacturers to move 
production either to China or other overseas countries. I observed that many 
manufacturers call for government support for the industry, especially in the provision 
of labour and cheap land supply. Some smaU manufacturers even caU for financial 
support. 
Since the factories with relocation can utilize the abundant cheap labour source 
in South China, the garment manufacturers have no incentive to adopt any technological 
innovation in organizing the production. There is no collective learning of doing ODM 
or OBM in the industry to upgrade the garment production. Instead, it leaves to the 
individual manufacturer to utilize the opportunity in the market. 
This leads to our discussion on the possibility of product upgrading of the 
garment firms in Hong Kong. Product upgrading or high-value added manufacturing 
can be viewed as an alternative strategy other than "relocation" strategy for garment 
firms. When the garment manufacturers take "relocation strategy" as the only-option, 
it is necessary for us to examine why high-value manufacturing is not chosen as an 
alternative coping strategy. As stated above，local garment manufacturers can maintain 
171 
their competitive edge in capturing the market niches by quick response and being flexible 
in meeting the customers' needs. They stick to the OEM experience and follow the 
buyers' requirement. Fieldwork observations show that they refrain from doing ODM 
or OBM (except case B and L) although manufacturers can accrue more surplus in the 
GCCs by offering higher value-added activities to the buyers. Some manufacturers try to 
do the ODM but in vain. They need long-term investments in advertising to build up 
their own brand-name in the market ifthey do OBM. So, compared with relocation, the 
manufacturers do not necessarily have any high-value manufacturing when perceiving the 
former as "a common trend" in the industry. Without the buyers' or any institutional 
support, it leaves to the individual manufacturer to take care of their production 
organization. 
8.3 Towards an organizational level analysis of industrial restructuring in Hong 
Kong 
The main objective of this study is to examine Hong Kong's way of industrial 
restructuring and to engage in a theoretical dialogue with the development literature, with 
special attention focuses on the global commodity chains perspective. The GCCs 
perspective is a grand political economy perspective to address the development issues. 
Gereffi is successful in departing from the Marxist production approach by 
conceptualizing the connection of economic activities in different zones as a commodity 
chain. However, the GCCs perspective is relevant to macro level analysis and it is 
inadequate to provide a middle-range theoretical framework to explain the actual 
restructuring experiences ofHong Kong's industry. Therefore, we need to bring back the 
firm,s level and look at the social process of the organization of economic activities, in 
order to fill the gap that Gereffi left unexamined in his GCCs study. 
172 
To sum up the findings, this study of the industrial restructuring pattem of the 
garment industry can be summarized in two theoretical contentions. First, I try to depart 
from the core-centered analysis and bring back the active role played by local 
manufacturers in the restructuring process. 
Second, I examine the substance ofthe governance structure ofthe buyer-driven 
commodity chain by unraveUng the nature of interfirm linkages in the commodity chain. 
By bringing back the organizational level analysis, the examination of the 
interorganizational influences between buyers and manufacturers in the resource 
dependency perspective helps us to understand the dynamics and nature of relationship 
between two parties and fill the gap of the governance structure in the commodity chain 
that Gereffi nelgects. Besides, this sheds light on how the economic actions of different 
actors are connected in the commodity chain and how they shape the production network 
in the GCCs. Besides, by proposing the direction of the emergence of triangular 
manufacturing and doing the OBM production strategy, the examination ofthe changes in 
the organization of production network and work re-organization sheds lights on what 
kind of social outcomes the restructuring bring to our economy. 
8.5. Limitation of the study in this thesis 
Thirteen garment firms have been interviewed in this study. Of these thirteen firms, 
ten had been interviewed twice while the remaining three can only be interviewed once. 
Some manufacturers can only offer me about an hour. 
Also, I examine the nature of ties between buyers and garment firms in the 
commodity chain. It would be better if the buying offices in Hong Kong could have been 
interviewed. 
It is not easy to get access to local manufacturers and I cannot fiilly employ a 
genetic strategy for the study. "Genetic" strategy means that it focuses on the 
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differences between similar cases and look for historically specific causality. 
OBurawoy:1991) However, I would contend that the significance of the cases being 
studied is that they can teU us about how they take the restructuring strategy in Hong 
Kong's industrial restructuring context. 
8.6. Proposed direction for future research 
A lot of interesting empirical and theoretical questions are worthwhile for 
further study of Hong Kong's industrial restructuring. For instance, with regards to 
the product upgrading ability of local garment manufacturers, my study shows few 
can do the ODM or OBM production. Their experience in doing the OBM is 
worthwhile examining in greater details in order to see how high-value manufacturing is 
possible within the organization. 
I find that most ofthe garment manufacturers have utilized a production network 
in South China after relocation. The manufacturer also changes its role to a trader in the 
commodity chain. Initially, the evidence shows that social capital of the entrepreneur 
govems the operation of this production network in South China and Hong Kong. Trust 
becomes a social mechanism that govems the relationship between the subcontractors in 
PRC and the producer in Hong Kong. My fieldwork suggests that the support of this 
subcontracting network in PRC can facilitate the survival of the Hong Kong garment 
manufacturers. It is worthwhile to examine the ties and relationship between the 
subcontractors and the Hong Kong garment firms, which relates to the theoretical 
discussion about the network form of economic organization. This surely deserves our 
theoretical and empirical attention. 
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Appendix 2 
The semi-structured questions for the fieldwork interviews 
Basic information 
Contact person: Title: Tel no.  
Name ofthe company:  
Characteristics of the factory: 
1. Nature of capital Foreign;' local capital 
2. Date ofestabUshment in HK  
3. An independent organisation or a subsidiary:  
4. NationaUty of the manufacturer:  
5. Types oftiie product manufactured:  
6. Source of order: countries:  
Types:e.g. sourcing agent, own brands for sale 
7. Degree ofmarket stability:  
What's the difference between 80 to 90's?  
Coping strategies on the changing economic environment 
8.What kind ofdifficulties does the industry face in the mid of90，s? 
9.From the above, what are the main obstacles that you feel the most difficult to handle? How does it 
differ from the 70's to 80's? 
10. How would you describe the profit margin within these three years? (increase, unchanged or 
decrease) 
11. What are the coping strategies in your company? How does your company remain the competitive 
fecing the above difficulties? 
12. Among various strategies, please give more details about the process 
13. Among various strategies, which factor do you think that you are most confident to manage? Why? 
14. What are the comparative advantages that the Hong Kong garment industry enjoys? 
Relationship between buyers and garment manufacturers in the buyer-driven GCC 
1. Source of order: from overseas buyers, trading firms, own licensee, or OBM? The percentage? 
2. Details ofthe product type: (most type),production volume, price and market 
high volume, low price from discount stores or mass merchandiser 
high volume, medium price from speciality stores or department stores like "private label" 
low volume, high price of fashion boutique 
low volume, medium price ofsmaU stores 
low volume, low price for local market 
others? 
StabiUty ofthe orders? 
Number offrequent buyers and the percentage? 
How many years of the frequent buyers? 
The order size? 
Is there any difference between 80's to 90s ( in terms of quantity, styles, quality request) 
3. Given there is keen competition in the market, how can you get the orders from overseas buyers? 
What kind of strategies do you have in getting the orders? What kind of product line enables you 
capture the market niche? 
4. Suppose a buyer comes to your office and wants to give you the order. Under what conditions will 
you reject the order? Apart from cost considerations, do other factors like product quality, time 
schedule, affect you decision? What kind of product quality can't you make? 
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5. If the buyers reduce the quotation price, under what conditions would you still accept the orders? 
What is the rationale? Do you expect both parties or you, as a vendor, can generate something good 
forthefuture? How? What is the good? 
6. Ifthere are several buyers who are competitors in the core countries, will they accept the same 
manufacturers to be the same suppUer for their competitors? What did they say? 
Kyes , as a supplier, what is your decision? WiU you follow the instructions from the buyers? 
Why? Or else what would you do? Any examples? 
Li ^uct, is there any difference in the quaHty requirement among different brands? Or the difference 
is just hke the brandname? (like the case ofReebok and Nike) 
7. As a supplier for the buyer, do you Hke to be the main suppUer for several buyers? But on the 
other hand, they may ask you to supply goods for them only. Do you like such subcontracting? 
8. Why? 
9. i i fact, when entering a transaction with the buyers, do you have any bargaining power with the 
buyers? (in terms of time delivery, payment) 
10. Since you have to get the orders from the buyers, do you perceive as a vendor that you are passive 
or "negotiating", or active in maintaining the relationship with the buyer? Please give some 
examples. 
Connections between buyers, trading company and manufacturers in getting orders and 
organising production 
1. Under what conditions do the orders come from the buyer directly and bypass the trading agent? 
Why? Could you enjoy more surplus in the GCC i fyou bypass the trading company? 
2. Again, under what kind of conditions do you need to depend on the trading company? What 
functions have they played that facilitate you in organising the production or getting the orders? 
Do they share the risks in the transactions? Examples? 
3. After the trading company refers you to a buyer, do the buyers know that you are his supplier? 
Will the buyer visit the factory site? After doing the first transaction, would you contact the buyer by 
your own means and bypass the trading company? Why? Or why not? 
Experience in doing the O E M in the G C C s 
1. What skills and techniques do you leam from the buyer in doing the production for them? How 
could this facilitate you to develop your business? 
2. Does your company have its own brandname or licensee? Ifyes , how does this develop? 
Relocation experience 
1. Any production line in China or other countries? 
2. When did the relocation take place? 
Rationale behind relocation decision 
The following questions are trying to identify the "enabling" factors in the relocation process 
a. Whether buyer is an enablingfactor 
1. How did you decide the factory has to be relocated? Apart from the cost factor, how do you 
perceive the investment cUmate in Hong Kong and China? Did the buyers give you any signals or 
ask you to relocate the production Une to China? i i what way? 
2. Do the buyers guarantee you to give more orders if you relocate to China? Or put it another way, did 
they say that i fyou don't give them a cheaper quotation price, they would find another supplier? 
3. Before the relocation, do you expect you can get more orders that is sufficient for you to open a 
plant in China? Do you need to teU your cUents in advance that you wiU relocate the plant to China 
and ask them to allow you to give you produce in China? What is their response? 
4. How do you decide which kind of orders are produced in China? Do the buyers have any say in 
this process? Do they accept the made in China product at that time? 
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5. Do the buyers have any say/participation in organising the production in China's plant? (just like 
Marks and Spencer) 
6. Do the buyers have any special request to monitor the production in China? For instance, do buyers 
visit the China plant frequently to monitor the production procedure? Is there any difference in the 
method ofquality control in monitoring the production in Hong Kong and China? 
b. Ifbuyer is not a significant enablingfactor, then what are the other critical determinants? 
1. Then, when you decide to relocate, how do you perceive the investment environment in 
Hong Kong? 
2. Was there any information sharing about relocation experience among other garment suppliers 
before your relocation? How did such information affect your decision? 
3. Do you view that relocation is a way of survival or an opportunity for business expansion? 
4. Or is it just because many manufacturers relocated their production lines and thus encouraged you 
to foUow their action? 
5 ‘ Before the relocation^ do you have any social network in China? How important was the network 
as an enabling factor in facilitating you to set up the plant in China? Li what ways did such 
network help you? Please give some examples. 
After relocation 
1. After you relocate the plant, how did the relocation facilitate you to get more orders? New buyers? 
Or the old buyers will give you more orders because ofthe relocation? 
2. Does your factory expand after the relocation? i i terms of production capacity, establishment and 
orders. Please give the number, if possible. 
3. Do you have any plan to expand for the next two years? (Sertical integration or backward 
integration) 
Forms of relocation 
1.Which form ofrelocation did you take in China: compensation trade, export-processing, joint-venture 
or owning a factory? Any change over the few years? 
2.What kind of work is being relocated at the initial stage? Workforce in China's plant  
Sample-making (any difference at the initial stage and at present?) 
cutting  
marker and pattem  




sewing label  
packing  
3. Do you work with the subcontractors before the relocation? How about after the relocation? 
4. tfyes，how many subcontractors you are working with? Are they frequent subcontractors? What is 
the percentage on your production capacity? What type of orders are being subcontracted to the 
subcontractors? Where are these subcontractors? Are they also relocated to China or still in 
Hong Kong? 
History of the firm: Before the relocation 
Embedded context ofthe owners 
1. Previous employment 
2. Subjective perception on the business environment in starting the firm 
3. organisational form ofthe factory e.g. establishment size, product line, order, subcontractor 
3 
Organisation of work after relocation 
1. Please describe the production procedure of the factory (in Hong Kong) 
Size ofthe establishment 
No. ofworkers employed in Hong Kong:  
Characteristics ofthe workforce: (fiill time and the sex-ratio) 
Management  
Office clerks/secretary  
Merchandiser  
Technicians/engineers  
SkiUed workersy'craftsman  
Operatives (machinists)  
Foreman>line supervisor  
Others  
2. How long is the production time? 
3. Which kind ofwork is employed by non-standardized forms 




Causal workers, part-time workers 
Temporary workers 
4. Under what conditions will your factory employ the non-standardised workers? 
5. What are the advantages? (e.g. flexibility, saving cost) ：  
6. How does the management have effective control on the producfs quality, keep on time schedule 
and meet the orders when employing the non-standardised form oflabour?  
7. How was work organised before the relocation? What is the fundamental difference in the 
organisation ofwork in your factory? E.g. which kind ofjobs are being displaced in the past years? 
Use of technology in the production line 
8. Any use oftechnology at the production line? Ifyes, pls specify which part? Any use oftechnology 
at the pre- or post-production process (e.g. inventory control, retailing) 
9. Kno, please explain why: (e.g. market, size of prcxiuction, product type, skiU ofworkers, 
inflexibility oftechnology, high cost, insufficient government support) 
10. What are the advantages and benefits for using technology? e.g. prcxiuction cost, control on 
production Une, meeting the market time led, quality control or others? 
11 With the use oftechnology, how does it affect the workers? (jp\s specify which level ofworkers) Any 
change of skiU requirement for workers? Is retraining necessary? Who will get the training? 
12. In the 90，s，is "quick-response manufacturing" or flexible manufecturing a rising trend for the 
clothing manufacturers? How does it affect the organisation of the production Une in your factory? 
13. The Government has encouraged the manufacturers to adopt the unit production system and modular 
production systems. Do your factory employ such system? Ifyes, what are the advantages? How does it 
affect the work process and the workers? Are workers required to use more team-work and self-
initiative spirit in performing the tasks? If no, why? 
14. Is it necessary for the management to maintain a flexible labour organisation strategy or is it stable? 
What are the reasons? 
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Skill Dimensions 
15. What is the skill requirement for Hong Kong workers (at different level) at the production line? 
16.. At operative level- (multi-skill or low-skiU/deskilling) 
-Li your opinion, what constitutes a "skill"? 
-adaptability to changing orders 
-quick pace 
Compared to the mass production, whether in the past is a kind ofdeskilling (ie. workers just handle a 
part ofthe clothing) but now they need more multi-skiU because ofthe changing product need? 
b. Atthe Craftsman( Pattem-making, marker) 
c.supervisory/foreman : 
d.Merchaniser : 
Office work: ：  
17. Does the company provide any training to the workers because ofthe new skill requirements? 
18 ^vhat kind ofworkers are most urgently required in the clothing industry? (at operative, craftsman 
and nonHDperative level 
19. Is the recruitment easy or difficult? Why? Li what ways? Please give some examples? 
20. Is there any labour shortage? Why? Every year the Clothing tistitute, TI and the Polytechnic 
University have many graduates students and they are the supply side ofthe labour force. Could they fill 
the gap? 
Management ofworkers /Nature ofcontrol towards workers(Optional, depend on the time) 
21. What type ofpay system for operative workers? ^)iece-rate, daily or monthly) Why is it so? Is 
there any change when the factory is undergoing a restructuring process? 
22. On the piece rate system, how do the management calculate the price for the garment? Is it a 
general practice? , . 
23. Do the workers know the price before starting sewing the garment? Kthey are dissatisfied with the 
price, how does the management deal with it? M what way? (e.g. through the line-supervisor, or the 
workers will collectively bargain with the management?) 
24. How does the management ensure the production can meet the time-schedule? (e.g. rushing the order) 
Do you set the minimum level for workers to complete the task? If yes, how? If no，why? 
25. Does the management set any measures to evaluate the workers, performance? Ifyes, what are they? 
Is there any difference in terms of 
a. in different division of work  
b. between male and female workers    
26.How do you keep the productivity ofthe workers and motivate their morale on work? , 
27 Can you describe i f i s there any significant difference in managing the workers during the 90's? 
28 How could describe the stability ofthe labour force in your company? (turnover rate ofthe workers) 
29.Which group of workers' turnover rate is comparative greater? Why? And how does it affect the 
production Une? 
30.Are there any measures taken to encourage workers to have stable service? 
31. Wetfare Conditions ofthe factory: 
(Machinists or others) Yes/no 
attendance bonus  
Bonus for overfilling output quota  
Long service reward  
Year end bonus   
meal allowance  
shift aUowance  
fectory coach/travelling allowance  
provident fund — ~ 
entertainment activities  
5 
others 
Relating to the above’ is there any significant difference before the restructuring? 
32. What is the pay condition ofthe machinists in these three years? (increase, decrease or unchanged) 
Are they underemployed? Ifyes, do you think that the management has some responsibility on 
this? 
Why 
33. How do you describe the work mentaKty of your workers? 
34. Is there industrial conflict in your factory? What is the nature? How did it happen? How was it 
resolved? What lessons did the factory leam from the conflict? 
35. Generally speaking, how would you describe the relation between the management and workers in 
the past years? 
36. Views on the labour legislation: how do you see the recent amendments of the Employment 












D General manager 
19/8/96, 29/11/96 
E General manager 
23/10/96, 20/2/97 
F Owner, managing director 
25/10/96, 3/3/97 
G marketing manager 








L Managing director 
21/11/96 
M Owner, managing director  
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